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SUMMARY 
 
This dissertation presents an investigation of the modifying role of attention and 
awareness in human learning and decision making. A series of experiments showed that 
performance in a range of tests of unconscious cognition can be better explained as resulting 
from conscious attention rather than from implicit processes. 
The first three experiments utilised a modification of the Serial Reaction Time task in 
order to measure the interaction of implicit and explicit learning processes. The results did 
not show evidence for an interaction, but did exhibit an effect of explicit knowledge of the 
underlying rules of the task. 
Subsequent studies examined the role of selective attention in learning. The 
investigation failed to provide evidence that learning inevitably results from the simple 
presentation of contingent stimuli over repeated trials. Instead, the learning effects appeared 
to be modulated by explicit attention to the association between stimuli. The following study 
with a novel test designed to measure the role of selective attention in prediction learning 
demonstrated that learning is not an obligatory consequence of simultaneous activation of 
representations of the associated stimuli. Rather, learning occurred only when attention was 
drawn explicitly to the association between the stimuli. 
Finally, the Deliberation without Attention Paradigm was tested in a replication study 
along with two novel versions of the task. Additional assessment of the conscious status of 
participants’ judgments indicated that explicit deliberation and memory could best explain 
the effect and that the original test may not be a reliable measure of intuition.  
In summary, the data in these studies did not require explanation in terms of 
unconscious cognition. These results do not preclude the possibility that unconscious 
processes could occur in these or other designs. However, the present work emphasises the 
role conscious attention plays in human learning and decision making. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
What is the role of awareness in learning? Is attention to coincident stimuli sufficient 
for learning an association between them? Do we make better decisions if our attention is 
diverted, or if we consciously deliberate on our options? Scientific interest in answering these 
questions started long ago (e.g., Brunswik, 1956; James, 1890) and the resulting theories have 
had long-lasting effects on general thinking. Consistent with the basic dichotomous 
propensity of human thinking, binary descriptions of memory and learning processes (e.g., 
conscious – unconscious; declarative – procedural; short-term – long-term) became principles 
of our understanding of human cognition. The crucial question, however, remains as to 
whether we have sufficient empirical evidence to sustain such distinctions. While recent 
theories postulate the existence of more than two memory systems (e.g., McDonald, Devan, 
& Hong, 2004), other researchers argue that the empirical data can be explained in a single-
model view (e.g., C. J. Berry, Shanks, & Henson, 2008). Is it reasonable to hypothesise the 
existence of only one form of human learning or two? Is three unthinkable, maybe four or 
more? This thesis will take the parsimonious position that a single-process learning viewpoint 
should be sustained until contradictory empirical evidence emerges or until the explanatory 
costs of maintaining such a position exceed that of its abandonment.  
The Implicit–Explicit Distinction 
Empirical support for independent systems emerged in parallel in the fields of 
learning and memory. Systematic investigations of independent memory systems began with 
Scoville and Milner’s (1957) discovery that patients with medial temporal lobe (MTL) 
damage demonstrated intact memory performance in certain tasks, but impairment in other 
types of learning and memory functions. Further evidence for this independence has come 
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from priming studies (e.g., Cermak, Talbot, Chandler, & Wolbarst, 1985), in which improved 
performance has been observed after previous presentation of the stimulus, despite patients 
with amnesia not remembering that they had ever seen the stimulus. Based predominantly 
upon these studies, theorists started to propagate the idea of a dual-model memory system. As 
Tulving said, “…we are tempted to think that [these priming effects] reflect the operation of 
some other, as yet little understood, memory system” (1982, p. 341). This conception of 
memory as a dichotomous process clearly advocated a view of two memory systems that are 
independent and control different domains of behaviour. These systems have often been 
dissociated into distinctions such as declarative versus non-declarative (Squire & Zola-
Morgan, 1988), or explicit versus implicit (Graf & Schacter, 1985), relating mainly to the 
presence or absence of awareness.  
Based on the observation of correspondences between brain lesions and specific 
memory deficits, such dissociations between memory systems have been described on a 
neuroanatomical level. Distinct, different patterns of deficit have been claimed to be 
associated with disruptions of distinct regions, including the hippocampus and perirhinal 
cortex (Gaffan, 1994); the hippocampus and amygdala (R. G. Phillips & LeDoux, 1992); the 
hippocampus and striatum (Packard, Hirsh, & White, 1989); and the cerebellum and 
amygdala (Hitchcock & M. Davis, 1986).  
However, in more recent studies, difficulty has arisen in interpreting the results of 
such neuroanatomical studies as providing evidence for dichotomous memory processes, and 
thus a new taxonomy was needed in which to fit the data. While the original concept of a 
declarative system was relatively clear, the ‘non-declarative’ expression was used only as an 
‘umbrella term’ (Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1988) as it referred to several less well-defined 
subsystems. The first detailed taxonomy of long-term memory systems based on 
neuroscientific evidence (Squire, 1987) divided the non-declarative system into four sub-
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systems (procedural, priming, classical conditioning, non-associative learning) that “operate 
in parallel to support behaviour” (Squire, 2004, p. 174). An increasing number of 
behavioural and neurobiological researchers claimed recently, however, that separating brain 
regions by different memory functions without knowing much about their relations is not 
sufficient for constructing valid models of these memory substrates (e.g., Hartley & Burgess, 
2005; McDonald et al., 2004; Poldrack et al., 2001; Turk-Browne, Yi, & M. M. Chun, 2006), 
and others have questioned whether observed dissociations in test results necessarily indicate 
dissociating processing systems (e.g., C. J. Berry, Henson, & Shanks, 2006). 
In parallel with the memory research, the systematic exploration of this 
conscious/nonconscious dissociation in the field of learning started with Arthur Reber’s 
initial work in the late 1960s, when he coined the term implicit learning to describe his 
findings in an Artificial Grammar Learning (AGL) test (A. S. Reber, 1967). In this test, he 
first trained participants on letter-strings by asking them to reproduce the strings shortly 
following their presentation. Unbeknownst to them, the letter strings followed a 
predetermined artificial grammar. In a subsequent test phase participants were asked to judge 
whether a novel set of letter-strings were grammatical or not. It was observed that many of 
the participants could categorise the strings correctly above chance, indicating that learning 
had occurred. Interestingly, however, they were generally unable to verbalise the rules or the 
presence of rules. On the basis of these results, Reber concluded that the learning in this task 
was not conscious. 
Since his initial empirical work, Reber (1992) has argued that consciousness is a novel 
phenomenon evolving after many higher perceptual and cognitive processes. From this 
standpoint, he reasoned, implicit learning is phylogenetically older than explicit learning. 
Based on this notion, Reber proposed four hypotheses relating to the capacity of implicit 
learning: (1) it is robust in relation to psychological and neurological effects; (2) it is 
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independent of IQ; (3) it is independent of age; and (4) it has little variance between 
individuals. Derived from this view is a general notion that implicit learning requires little 
effort, and is often accurate and even, perhaps, more optimal than alternative, explicit 
learning mechanisms (e,g, Holyoak & Spellman, 1993). 
Theoretical Definitions of Implicit Learning 
Implicit learning has various descriptions and numerous definitions. Some models 
explain implicit learning as an associative-based process (e.g., McLaren, Green, & 
Mackintosh, 1994; Spiegel & McLaren, 2006), others as learning by statistical regularities 
(e.g., Hunt & Aslin, 2001), or in connectionist models (Cleeremans & Dienes, 2008; Dienes, 
Altmann, & Gao, 1999; Kinder & Shanks, 2001). Although most definitions of implicit 
learning address some acquisition of knowledge, in practice this ‘knowledge’ often 
designates a complex rule or sequence, a relationship more complex than simple associations. 
Implicit learning does not have a single definition, and for that reason, it is important to see 
what the general characteristics are of the different conceptualisations. Some typical 
examples of the many definitions are listed below (emphasis added): 
Implicit learning “is the acquisition of knowledge that takes place largely 
independently of conscious attempts to learn and largely in the absence of explicit 
knowledge about what was acquired.” (A. S. Reber, 2003, p. 5) 
“[I]mplicit learning [is a] nonintentional, automatic acquisition of 
knowledge about structural relations between objects or events.” (Frensch, 1998, p. 
48) 
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 “[I]mplicit learning is taken to be an elementary ability of the cognitive 
systems to extract the structure existing in the environment, regardless of their 
intention to do so.” (Jimenez, 2003, p. 6)  
“Traditionally, implicit learning has been defined as learning which takes 
place incidentally, in the absence of deliberate hypothesis-testing strategies, and 
which yields a knowledge base that is inaccessible to consciousness.” (Shanks, 2003, 
p. 11)  
“Implicit learning occurs without intention to learn and without awareness of 
what has been learned.” (Williams, 2005, p. 269) 
A common feature of these definitions is that, unlike models of implicit memory, they 
describe the mode of learning rather than the mode of retrieval. Implicit learning is often 
considered to be nonintentional/automatic, unconscious or incidental.  
Roughly speaking, learning may be described as automatic when it is unavoidable and 
when it happens without conscious effort or monitoring (Perlman & Tzelgov, 2006). 
Automaticity is a strong assumption since it would require that performing other tasks does 
not reduce the capacity for learning, since it does not demand attention (Kahneman & 
Treisman, 1984). Despite intense interest, evidence for such a strong form of automaticity has 
been difficult to obtain (D. Berry & Dienes, 1993; Jiang & Leung, 2005; Mitchell, De 
Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009).  
The descriptions of implicit learning as unconscious, nonconscious, and unaware 
have slightly different connotations, but are similar in that they state that the process occurs 
without consciousness. The term incidental refers to the case in which learning occurs 
without direct instruction. This is perhaps the least controversial attribute of implicit learning 
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amongst researchers in the area, but does not in and of itself necessitate that performance 
requires a different type of learning.  
In consideration of the various issues above, for the remainder of this thesis, the term 
‘implicit learning’ will be used only to refer to knowledge acquisition which does not require 
conscious attention.  
Operational Definitions and Measures of Implicit Learning 
Operationally, implicit learning is generally defined by performance on implicit 
learning tests. A typical example is the Serial Reaction Time task (SRT; Nissen & Bullemer, 
1987). In this task, a target appears in one of four possible horizontal locations on a computer 
screen. Participants are instructed simply to report the location of the stimulus by pressing 
down one of four corresponding keys. Participants are told to be as fast and as accurate as 
possible. They are not, however, informed that the location of the asterisk follows a repeating 
sequence (or a probabilistic rule), such that knowledge of the rule or sequence would allow 
prediction of the location of the asterisk. Participants have shown that they learn about the 
rule or sequence, in that irregular probe trials typically produce longer reaction times than do 
trials on which the location of the asterisk is predictable. Explicit, conscious knowledge about 
the rule or sequence assessed using post-experimental questionnaires (e.g., Eimer, Goschke, 
Schlaghecken, & Stürmer, 1996), or Process Dissociation Procedures (e.g., Destrebecqz & 
Cleeremans, 2001) often found that the participants exhibited learning without showing 
explicit knowledge about the sequences. The sequences used in SRT designs are often 
constructed as second order conditional sequences where a given pair of consecutive items 
determines the location of the next item (Reed & P. Johnson, 1994). Learning in the SRT task 
has also been demonstrated using complex (Remillard, 2008) as well as probabilistic 
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sequences (Schvaneveldt & Gomez, 1998; Vandenberghe, Schmidt, Féry, & Cleeremans, 
2006).  
Support for distinct implicit and explicit learning processes has also come from 
clinical studies (e.g., Nissen & Bullemer, 1987), studies with event-related brain potentials 
(e.g., Rüsseler & Rösler, 2000) and brain imaging works (e.g., Poldrack et al., 2001). 
Neuroimaging data have shown different brain activation patterns in implicit versus explicit 
learning conditions. For example, Rauch and colleagues (1995) found that in an implicit 
learning condition the right ventral premotor cortex, the right ventral caudate/nucleus 
accumbens, the right thalamus and the bilateral Area 19 were involved. By contrast, in an 
explicit learning condition the primary visual and inferior parietal cortex were activated, 
areas which are usually involved in visual and language processes. Moreover, functional 
neuroimaging studies have suggested that the MTL activity, which correlated with explicit 
learning, was independent of the processing of implicit learning (Curran, 1998). Bilateral 
MTL lesion patients were also reported to be selectively impaired in explicit, but not implicit 
learning tasks (e.g., Gagnon, Foster, Turcotte, & Jongenelis, 2004). Despite some 
contradictory findings that demonstrated the involvement of the MTL in implicit as well as 
explicit learning processes (e.g., Rose, Haider, Weiller, & Buchel, 2004; Schendan, Searl, 
Melrose, & Stern, 2003), the neuroimaging literature is relatively consistent in interpreting 
the data according to a model in which the human brain supports multiple learning 
mechanisms. 
As has been described, seemingly compelling arguments for the existence of a 
nonconscious version of learning have been made based on conceptual considerations, as 
well as behavioural and neuroscientific research. To assess the validity of these arguments it 
is essential to consider the (often tacit) preliminary assumptions upon which they are based. 
In a typical implicit learning study, such as SRT, the presence of relationships between the 
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stimuli remains hidden from the participants. After the experiment, tests of awareness explore 
whether any of the hidden rules describing the relationships are available to consciousness as 
a result of the learning that produced above-chance performance. The absence of conscious 
knowledge of the rule in conjunction with above-chance performance is often interpreted as a 
consequence of unconscious learning. For example, Remillard (2008) makes the argument 
overtly that “Sequence learning that is explicit [...] would presumably lead to an awareness 
of the sequence of target locations. Thus, a lack of awareness of the sequence of target 
locations would suggest that sequence learning was implicit” (2008, p. 400).  Note that, 
although implicit learning is defined by the learning process, within this approach it is 
measured by its product. In a practical sense, therefore, the operational definition of implicit 
learning becomes “the capacity to learn without awareness of the product of learning.” 
(Frensch & Runger, 2003, p. 14).  
The Smart Unconscious 
Another area of human cognition where the dual-model descriptions are prevalent is 
decision making. Everyday situations require numerous judgments and decisions where the 
components of the situations are often very complex and the outcomes of the decisions are 
rather uncertain. How is the human cognitive resource capable of dealing with these 
demanding tasks? Brunswik (1956) suggested that the decision-makers utilise their 
knowledge about the various cues of the environment by way of statistical processing. 
Brunswik (1955) advocated that humans are better regarded as ‘intuitive statisticians’ since 
this processing occurs involuntarily. Since then, various dual-models of decision making 
describe a separate source or process as heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), associative 
(Sloman, 1996), or experiential (Epstein, 1994) distinct from the conscious domain. 
Stanovich and West (2001) have proposed the term System 1 for a counterpart of deliberate 
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thinking with older origins. This system is often attributed with labels such as automatic, 
unconscious, rapid, powerful, associative and pragmatic (Evans, 2007). Attention plays a 
central role in intuition, as it is often considered to be a thought without attention (e.g., 
Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006).  
For most of the theorists of unconscious cognition, intuition is a conscious feeling 
about an unconscious knowledge (e.g., Dienes, 2008). In this sense, the intuitive decision is 
based on knowledge gathered in the past that is currently not available for consciousness 
(Polanyi, 1967). In another interpretation, however, intuition is a process that can deliberate 
on the decisions without thinking. The Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT, Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren, 2006) claims that in complex situations this unconscious thought, which weighs 
the various aspects of the decisions in a distributed way, is able to suggest more optimal 
decisions than conscious thought. This approach ascribes certain intelligence to the 
‘unconscious’ and based on its empirical findings it advises us to rely on our intuitions in 
complex decisions. The validity of this wisdom, however, is debated in the field. Without 
finer-grained investigation it remains undecided whether intuition is truly a powerful 
unconscious process, or whether conscious attention is inevitably necessary for consequential 
thinking. 
Overview of the Thesis 
This chapter has provided only an introductory overview of theoretical and 
experimental issues relating to unconscious learning and decision making. However, many of 
these issues are specific to particular experimental paradigms, and thus will be considered, 
along with those issues outlined here, in the introductions to the relevant experimental 
chapters. 
10 
 
This thesis explores the role of awareness and attention in human learning and 
decision making. In the first empirical chapter, Chapter II, the interaction of implicit and 
explicit learning processes are investigated based on the idea that if separate learning 
processes exist, then they could be independently modulated and their effects observed 
through their interaction. For this reason, preliminary phases were added to the SRT to 
facilitate the two processes separately and in combination.  
The following chapter, Chapter III, asks the following two questions: (1) Does 
predictive learning occur incidentally without focused spatial attention on the stimuli? (2) Do 
the different tests of awareness measure the phenomenon in concordance? To explore this 
question, a new test was designed where peripheral stimuli are used as predictive cues of 
target locations, thus creating an incidental learning environment. To measure the 
concordance of the tests of awareness, a combination of forced choice tasks, subjective 
measures and verbal reports were employed.  
In Chapter IV, the claim that learning is an obligatory consequence of selective 
attention of the stimuli is tested. Towards this aim a novel test, the Selective Attention 
Learning Test (SALT), was devised. The unique aspect of this test is that it can engender 
simultaneous selective attention on the stimuli while disguising elements of their predictive 
relationship. If the assumption is tenable, then the participant’s belief about a particular 
predictive relationship should not be necessary for learning to occur.  
The final empirical chapter, Chapter V, investigates the role of attention and 
awareness in decision making. The Deliberation without Attention paradigm (DWA) was 
originally designed as a demonstration that, in complex situations, humans make better 
decisions if they divert their attention from the task for a period of time than they do by 
making conscious effort to solve it. The theory behind the paradigm states that unconscious 
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thought leads to a solution by a more optimal, distributed weighting of the experienced 
information. A replication of one of the original tests and two further adaptations of the 
paradigm were performed to allow a detailed examination of the empirical support for this 
claim.  
The General Discussion attempts to integrate the results of the 11 experiments 
reported and to assess their implications for current conceptualisations of the role of attention 
and awareness in human learning and decision making. This section also proposes some 
additional speculative thoughts about the development of learning, aiming to foster new 
empirical questions and hypotheses for further research. 
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II. INTERACTION IN IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT LEARNING 
The objective of the experimental approach adopted in this chapter is to analyse the 
interaction of the two kinds of processes in a single task. In researching the interactions 
between cognitive systems, it is generally assumed that the behavioural product of the 
simultaneous use of the systems may be modulated by the different types of interplay 
between these systems. 
The idea of ‘system interaction’ has already been applied to the field of memory 
research. In their summary of the existing neurobehavioral research of memory systems, 
Hirsh and Krajden (1982) provided theoretical descriptions of the possible interactions 
between cognitive-, and habit-based memory systems. They proposed that, depending on the 
occasion, the systems interact by way of either competition or cooperation. They propose that 
in the majority of the cases, the two systems process the information in parallel, and it is 
determined by the requirements of the given situation whether they interact competitively or 
cooperatively.  
To date, studies examining interactions between memory systems relations have 
indicated competitive (e.g., Mizumori, Yeshenko, Gill, & D. M. Davis, 2004), cooperative 
(e.g., Hartley & Burgess, 2005) and compensational (e.g., Voermans et al., 2004) relations 
between proposed memory systems. The basis of these interactions is held to be the shared 
representations (Turk-Browne et al., 2006) and common access to the same information 
(McDonald et al., 2004) between the simultaneously processing parallel systems. The 
independent retrieval hypothesis assumes that the difference between the systems lies not in 
the encoding, but only in terms of retrieval processes (Turk-Bowne et al., 2006).  
The explanations of when and how these systems interact did not go further than the 
original framework of Hirsh and Krajden (1982), and it is mostly limited to notions such as 
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“in some tasks, cooperation is possible because the parallel systems support compatible 
behaviours, whereas in other tasks they drive conflicting responses and must therefore 
compete to control behaviour” (Hartley & Burgess, 2005, p. 170). 
Evidence for Independent Learning Systems 
Not all subscribers to the multiple memory system view suggested a similar interplay 
between learning processes. Squire and his colleagues (e.g., P. J. Reber & Squire, 1994; 
Squire, 1992) advocate that implicit and explicit learning proceed independently, generating 
knowledge within each system, which, in turn, can have a joint influence on behaviour. 
Similarly, in his control-based learning theory (COBALT), Willingham (1998) presents a 
dual mode model of motor skill learning, which applies to SRT. This proposes a Dual Mode 
Principle which states that the conscious mode is attention-demanding, but accurate, whereas 
the unconscious mode is not attention-demanding, but also not as accurate. The actor can 
switch between the two modes weighing the accuracy and attentional demands of the 
situation. The two modes operate independently, in the sense that one mode may operate 
without the other. The two systems can interact unidirectionally only; the conscious mode can 
overrule the unconscious mode. In some cases the conscious mode can be detrimental to the 
performance (e.g., the choking under pressure effect, Baumeister, 1984), while at other times 
it can be beneficial. According to the model, easier tasks are not susceptible to the 
detrimental effect of conscious mode, but for skilled performers on more difficult tasks the 
unconscious pathway may guide performance more effectively. Therefore, the overriding of 
the conscious mode can lead to poorer performance.  
Further support for the notion of parallel learning systems came from studies of brain 
impairment. Some of these motor learning studies reported that focused impairment of one 
system had no effect (N. J. Cohen & Squire, 1980), or led to impaired learning in the other 
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system (Curran, 1997a). In a behavioural study, Willingham and Goedert-Eschmann (1999) 
trained participants either on an implicit or an explicit SRT task using a 12-element repeating 
sequence. The final probe block consisted of mostly random elements, but occasionally probe 
elements that followed the trained sequence. The authors assumed that in such a probe block 
explicit knowledge could not be applied. They found that on trials where the sequence was 
the same as they were previously trained with, the participants were faster than they were on 
the random trials. Interestingly, the explicit and the implicit groups did not show difference. 
However, in a post-experiment free recall test the explicit group showed evidence of explicit 
knowledge, whereas the implicit group did not. This pattern of results was interpreted in 
several studies as an indication of parallel processing of implicit and explicit learning, with 
no competitive interaction between them (e.g., Karni et al., 1995; Willingham, Salidis, & 
Gabrieli, 2002; Deckersbach et al., 2002).  
Evidence for Interactive Learning Systems 
On the basis of non-overlapping brain activation patterns observed during implicit and 
explicit learning tasks, early researchers argued that these processes are mutually exclusive, 
and cannot even occur simultaneously (Grafton, Hazeltine, & Ivry, 1995; Hazeltine, Grafton, 
& Ivry, 1997; Rauch et al., 1995). More recent neuroimaging studies of sequence learning, 
however, found overlapping activation pattern of brain regions in implicit and explicit 
learning. Willingham, Salidis and Gabrieli (2002) trained the participants to explicitly learn 
and detect the locations of red circles, which were presented along with black circles. 
Unbeknownst to the participants, the to-be-ignored black circles followed a different 
repeating sequence. During the fMRI scanning, participants were presented with either the 
first (red) sequence, of which they had been aware (explicit condition), or with the second 
(black) sequence, of which they had not been aware (implicit condition). A crucial third 
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group received the first sequence, but in black instead of red (explicit-covert condition). The 
authors expected that this latter group would believe that the sequence is random. However, 
they had motor knowledge about the sequence, thus creating a “direct comparison” of the 
presence or absence of awareness about the same sequence. Willingham and his colleagues 
found overlapping cerebral network activations in these conditions. 
Other studies also found overlapping (Schendan et al., 2003) or partially overlapping 
caudate, prefrontal, and MTL activations (Destrebecqz et al., 2005; Aizenstein et al., 2004) in 
functional imaging explorations of explicit and implicit learning. In these studies activation 
of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and medio-temporal regions correlated with processing in 
the implicit learning task (see also McIntosh, Rajah, & Lobaugh, 1999), regions that are 
primarily associated with the declarative memory system (Squire & Zola, 1996). 
Studies of probabilistic classification learning have indicated competitive interaction 
between implicit and explicit learning systems, which are described as systems constantly 
engaged in optimising learning (Foerde, Knowlton, & Poldrack, 2006; Poldrack & 
Rodriguez, 2004). Poldrack and his colleagues (Poldrack et al., 2001) found a reciprocal 
relationship between the caudate nucleus and the MTL in a probabilistic classification 
learning task. After some initial activity in the MTL, the caudate became active and MTL 
activity subsided. The authors claimed that the activity in these regions is indicative of 
competing implicit and explicit systems. They argued from an evolutionary standpoint that 
different learning systems have developed, specialised for the different learning situations, 
which compete for processing in a learning situation (Poldrack & Rodriguez, 2004).  
In general, explicit knowledge is often reported to develop far more slowly than 
implicit learning. Participants could provide usable verbal knowledge only after implicit 
learning was already measured (Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990; A. S. Reber & 
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S. Lewis, 1977; Stanley, Mathews, Buss, & Kotler-Cope, 1989). These results were 
interpreted as explicit knowledge having been “extracted” from implicit knowledge (Seger, 
1994; Sun, Zhang, Slusarz, & Mathews, 2007).  
The Unexpected-Event Hypothesis (Frensch et al., 2003) introduced another means of 
interaction between the systems. It posited that implicit learning precedes explicit learning 
and, furthermore, that explicit learning is triggered by the consequences of implicit learning. 
The observation of the unexpected events, caused by incidental learning, triggers the 
conscious system to search for a cause and, consequently, leads to the discovery of 
regularities. Slower and more error-prone responses on random or irregular trials become 
unexpected events and can trigger explicit search or interpretation (Rünger & Frensch, 2008). 
Haider and Frensch (2005) provide an example of an experiment giving empirical support to 
this hypothesis. In this experiment, the researcher attempted to manipulate of the level of 
declarative (explicit) learning, whilst keeping the non-declarative (implicit) learning constant. 
A significant change in verbal reports was detected, but no significant difference in the RTs. 
The authors interpreted this pattern of results as “clear evidence in favour of the multiple-
systems account” (p. 399), thus seemingly taking the lack of evidence of difference in RT as 
conclusive evidence of no difference in implicit learning. 
A number of studies trying to promote learning by explicit instruction resulted in 
slight or no performance improvement for implicit learning tasks (Ingram et al., 2000; 
Mazzoni & Krakauer, 2006; Watanabe, Ikeda, & Hikosaka, 2006). Many other studies, 
however, have claimed to demonstrate that explicit processes can influence implicit learning. 
Explicit knowledge can be provided to participants in a variety of ways. Improved 
performance has been demonstrated in groups given preliminary explicit training relative to 
an untrained control group (Curran & Keele, 1993). General information being provided to 
participants before the test can also have a beneficial effect on the SRT performance (Curran, 
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1997b; Frensch & Miner, 1994; Buchner, Steffens, Erdfelder, & Rothkegel, 1997). 
Concurrent verbalisation (Ahlum-Heath & Di Vesta, 1986; Stanley et al., 1989); explicit 
instructions (D. C. Berry & Broadbent, 1984), or a synergy of the two (Sun, Slusarz, & Terry, 
2005; Sun, Merrill, & Peterson, 2001a) have also been shown to lead to improved 
performance in different implicit learning tasks.  
Explicit knowledge is often associated with the acquisition of plan-based control and, 
consequently, with better performance (Tubau & Lopez-Moliner, 2004). Jiménez, Méndez 
and Cleeremans (1996) suggested that the benefit of explicit knowledge upon implicit 
learning tasks may depend on the structural complexity of the stimuli. They found that 
providing explicit information helped the performance on deterministic sequence learning, 
but not probabilistic sequence learning. This pattern of results was replicated by Stefaniak, 
Willems, Adam, and Meulemans (2008). The effect of explicit training was reported to 
disappear in dual-task conditions, interpreted as support for the existence of two learning 
mechanisms (Keele, Ivry, Mayr, Hazeltine, & Heuer, 2003). The beneficial effect of explicit 
knowledge and the measured correlation between SRT performance and post-task explicit 
knowledge (e.g., Hartman, Knopman, & Nissen, 1989; Buchner et al., 1997; Curran, 1997b; 
Frensch & Miner, 1994) was not interpreted in these studies as evidence against the implicit 
nature of the learning task, but rather as an interaction of the two systems and a development 
of explicit knowledge based on an implicit learning experience. 
Explicit knowledge has also been reported to hamper performance on implicit tasks 
(e.g., A. S. Reber, Kassin, Selma Lewis, & Cantor, 1980). Shea, Wulf, Whitacrem and Park 
(2001) ascribed their finding of a negative effect of explicit instruction on SRT performance 
to the processing limitations of the explicit system, saying that in tasks of high demand the 
implicit processing can be more efficient. However, the explicit information can be 
sometimes misleading, as Perruchet, Chambaron and Ferrel-Chapus (2003) argued had 
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happened in Shea and colleagues’ case. Masters (1992) argued that highly skilled, but 
anxious, individuals try to explicitly monitor their behaviour, which in turn interferes with 
their automatic task processing, resulting in an impaired performance in motor skill tasks. 
Also, the participants receiving implicit practice conditions are less likely to fail under 
pressure than if they learned the skill explicitly (Rathus, A. S. Reber, Manza, & Kushner, 
1994).  
Imaging studies have shown interference of explicit knowledge upon implicit learning 
tasks using complex sequences, but not for simple deterministic sequences (Fletcher et al., 
2005). Also, a behavioural study showed that these explicit processes did not interfere with 
AGL for young individuals, but they did interfere for elderly ones (D. V. Howard & J. H. 
Howard, 2001). The varying pattern of results was ascribed to methodological differences in 
the tasks, such as the ways stimuli were presented (A. S. Reber et al., 1980), or whether the 
instructions promoted only rule search (Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993) or provided 
‘how-to’ information (Stanley et al., 1989).  
Also, decreasing the response-stimulus interval (RSI) in the SRT task was shown to 
selectively impair explicit, but not implicit learning (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001, 
2003). This finding was interpreted as longer RSIs providing an opportunity to develop 
conscious expectation about the location of the stimuli, although later studies have repeatedly 
shown that explicit sequence learning is possible in the 0 ms RSI condition (e.g., Norman, 
Price, & Duff, 2006; Wilkinson & Shanks, 2004). 
Integrated Models of Implicit Learning 
More recently, researchers started to argue against models proposing independent or 
mutually exclusive systems, claiming that it is highly implausible to assume that any form of 
learning could be “process pure” since awareness cannot be “turned off” (Perruchet, 
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Cleeremans, & Destrebecqz, 2006; Destrebecqz, 2004; Destrebecqz & Peigneux, 2006). This 
approach suggests a model with simultaneous involvement of the different processes with 
varying contribution from each (Sun, Merrill, & Peterson, 2001b; Sun et al., 2005; 
Cleeremans & Jimenez, 1998). Instead of aiming for studying these processes in isolation, the 
integrated approach tries to escape the controversies of identifying which process is involved 
in a task by taking into account both learning processes. As an example, in a study of skill 
learning, Sun and his colleagues (Sun et al., 2001a) constructed CLARION, a hybrid 
connectionist model for the continuous interaction of declarative and procedural knowledge. 
This model combined the contribution of top-down learning to a bottom-up development of 
knowledge. For the skill-learning (Sun et al., 2001a) and process-control (Sun et al., 2007) 
tasks under investigation, the model provided a good fit for the human data. 
Other evidence for a form of ‘compensatory interaction’ comes from studies involving 
patients with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD). Neuroimaging studies (Rauch et al., 
1997, 2001) found that those patients with a dysfunction in the frontal-striatal network (a 
region that is associated with implicit learning) showed normal implicit learning, but failed to 
show striatal activation. Instead, these patients had activation in the hippocampal-
parahippocampal regions (medial temporal regions), brain regions normally associated with 
explicit learning. This finding was interpreted as representing compensatory interaction 
between the two learning systems. The hypothesis has been supported by another experiment, 
where the SRT task was combined with a dual task to engage the explicit system of the OCD 
group (Deckersbach et al., 2002). As a result of this manipulation, the OCD group did not 
show implicit learning, supporting the idea that the original pattern indicated that the two 
systems are in compensatory interaction.  
20 
 
The Present Study 
Despite the repeated criticism of the multiple systems approach (e.g., Dulany, 1997; 
Kinder & Shanks, 2001; Shanks & St. John, 1994; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Perruchet & 
Vinter, 2002) and the failure to replicate implicit sequence learning in Destrebecqz and 
Cleeremans’ (2001, 2003) critical no-RSI group (Shanks, Wilkinson, & Channon, 2003), 
measuring only explicit learning in further repetitions (Wilkinson & Shanks, 2004), the 
question of implicit-explicit duality is still unsettled.  
The aim of the present study was to further investigate the topic of interactive learning 
systems. To separate implicit, explicit and interactive conditions is a challenging task in the 
implicit learning paradigm. As reported in several of the above mentioned studies, previous 
training in sequence learning tasks have led to (at least partial) explicit knowledge about the 
sequence. To manipulate the degree to which the (putative) implicit and explicit processes 
contribute to sequence learning, a novel SRT methodology was used, adapted from the field 
of judgment and decision making.  
Ferreira and his colleagues (Ferreira, Garcia-Marques, Sherman, & Garrido, 2006) 
compared the involvement of automatic and controlled components in reasoning tasks. To 
facilitate the processing of heuristic reasoning or rule-based reasoning, they used ‘preliminary 
priming’. The notion behind their design was that a particular type of processing of a stimulus 
facilitates the same processing of new stimuli (Smith, 1994). Hence, the priming of either 
automatic or controlled processing was expected to facilitate the subsequent use of one type 
of processing, leaving the other unaffected. Applying this preliminary process facilitation to 
the learning paradigm, the expectation is that implicit and explicit processing of sequences 
would enhance the same processes in subsequent, novel sequences. Using this logic, the 
interaction between learning processes may be open to analysis.  
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Experiment 1.1: SRT Study 1 
The basic assumption behind this study was that if separate learning processes exist then 
their effects could be observed separately, or in interaction. One way to attempt such research 
would be to measure the contributions of each process to task performance separately, and 
then to compare these contributions with those when both processes are involved. Even if 
separate implicit and explicit systems exist it is highly unlikely that any experimental task 
could be constructed in such a way that it would clearly depend only and entirely on one 
system. Thus the only practicable aim of an investigation such as this is to set and manipulate 
the task properties so that they are more or less likely to rely on a particular kind of 
processing.  
A suitable task is one which can be solved both explicitly and implicitly and for which the 
two strategies are not antagonistic, in the sense that outputs of any explicit process would not 
mask any implicit processes. Rather, the task should be of a kind where the implicit processes 
could act in conjunction with any explicit process such as the deliberate application of rules. 
A suitable candidate may be a reaction time task where motor sequence control is expected to 
be facilitated by automatic resources based upon associative learning (Spiegel & McLaren, 
2006, 2003), in addition to any separate explicit knowledge concerning the sequence. 
Given that a task may use either type of process, to investigate the contribution of each 
requires the ability to construct situations where one of the processes is preferentially 
involved. One possibility is to use a priming logic, where prior activity may lead to 
facilitation of one domain of processing. According to previous studies (Ferreira et al., 2006; 
Smith, 1994) processing a particular stimulus in a given way facilitates the subsequent 
repetition of the same processing with new stimuli. Recent evidence suggests that such 
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priming may be domain specific (Ferreira et al., 2006). Rule-governed formal activity prior to 
the task may encourage the use of explicit (rule-based) processes, while leaving the implicit 
processes unaffected. Similarly, activity which may involve implicit processing may facilitate 
the use of highly similar processes during the task, without influencing the proposed rule-
based system. 
Following this logic, a standard SRT task was utilised, preceded by preliminary process 
facilitation to manipulate the involvement of the two processing systems. A dual-system 
model predicts that experimental groups solving the same test would do so differently, 
depending on the type of facilitation they received. Furthermore, if the two systems are truly 
interactive, the facilitation due to each type of priming may be ‘additive’ or ‘subtractive’. To 
investigate this possibility a group which receives both kinds of preliminary facilitation was 
included.  
In summary, the aim of this study is to extend the SRT paradigm by an attempt to ‘prime’ 
processing of implicit and explicit types both independently and in combination. 
Methods 
Participants 
66 undergraduate students (38 females and 28 males; age M = 19.97 years; SD = 1.22 
years) of the Department of Experimental Psychology at the University of Cambridge 
participated in the study. The task was included in a teaching session as an illustration of the 
SRT paradigm. The participants were informed about the nature of the paradigm only after 
the practical session. The participants were divided into four groups: Implicit Group (I) (N = 
16); Explicit Group (E) (N = 24); Random Group (R) (N = 10); and Combined Implicit-
Explicit Group (IE) (N = 16).  
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Materials and Procedure 
The testing was conducted in group sessions in the same classroom at separate 
computers. The participants were seated approximately 60 cm from the computer monitor 
and were presented with the instructions on the screen. The task program was written in 
REALbasic 2006 Standard Edition, Academic Version software. The test application was run 
under Mac OS X operating system on a set of identical iMac G3 personal computers of Apple 
Inc.. Responses were collected via the keyboard. 
The test consisted of three phases: a Preliminary Facilitation phase, a learning phase 
(Main Task) and a Process Dissociation Procedure (PDP) phase. The sequence knowledge of 
the participants was assessed by a paper questionnaire after the experiment (Appendix A). 
Main Task Phase. All of the participants from the four groups were presented with an 
SRT task (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987) based on a design used by Destrebecqz and Cleeremans 
(2001). The task consisted of 10 training blocks during which participants were exposed to a 
serial four-choice RT task. Each block consisted of 96 trials, giving a total of 960 trials. On 
each trial, a stimulus (asterisk) appeared at one of four possible screen locations (Figure 1). 
Participants were instructed to respond as fast and as accurately as possible by pressing on 
the corresponding key. The participants were not informed that the majority of blocks 
contained repetitions of a sequence. Reaction times were recorded via the computer program, 
incorrect and timed-out responses were signalled to the participant. 
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Figure 1. SRT test presented on computer. The letter string above represents an example of hidden 
order of the appearance of the four stimuli. The corresponding keys were Y, C, B, and M. 
After the associated key was pressed the target was immediately removed from the screen 
and the next stimulus appeared with no latency1. A short break was programmed between 
each 96-trial block where the participants could restart the test whenever they felt ready.  
The sequences were 12 items long, and created from ‘second order conditional’ 
transitions (SOC, Reed & P. Johnson, 1994), where two elements always determine the 
location of the next stimulus and no consecutive repetition of a location is permitted. 
Following this rule, the four elements make 12 possible pairings and since two elements 
always determine the location of the next stimulus, the sequence is a composition of chunks 
of three elements (Table 1). Following this procedure, each task sequence was consequently 
counterbalanced for stimulus location and transition frequency.  
Table 1 
                                                 
1
 The zero latency condition was used as a longer, 250ms interval resulted in evidence of explicit 
knowledge in Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001. 
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The Construction of SRT Sequences 
 
Note. Table 1 demonstrates the construction of a single 12-element SOC sequence. Since two 
elements always determine the location of the next stimulus, the sequence is a composition of chunks 
of three elements. The numbers represent the screen locations from left to right. 
 All the 10 blocks included 96 trials in 8 sub-blocks of 12-element SOC sequences 
generated as shown in Table 1. Seven of the eight sub-blocks were the same sequence which 
shall be termed SOC1 (e.g., 124313214234, where the numbers represent the screen 
locations). In addition, each block contained a single sub-block of a different sequence 
termed SOC2. A different sequence was used as SOC2 in each block, which occurred 
between the third and the seventh sub-block of the block randomly. The RT difference 
between the SOC2 sub-block and the equivalent regular, SOC1 sub-blocks thus is one 
measure of the acquired SOC knowledge.  
SOC chunks: 1 2 4          
  2 4 3         
   4 3 1        
    3 1 3       
     1 3 2      
      3 2 1     
       2 1 4    
        1 4 2   
         4 2 3  
          2 3 4 
sequence: 1 2 4 3 1 3 2 1 4 2 3 4 
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The last but one 96-trial block (Block 11) was used as an irregular probe block. This 
block consisted of eight previously unseen sequences without repetition. All the participants 
received different sequences. The last block returned to the original design and sequence. The 
comparison of the RT measures of Block 11 to the regular blocks serves as another measure 
of sequence learning, and is typically reported in SRT tasks. 
A third way to analyse the effect of learning is to compare the proportion of errors in 
the detection of the asterisk locations during the test. It is plausible to assume that the 
sequence knowledge could lead the participants to mispredict and consequently respond 
incorrectly to the location of the stimulus in the case of irregular trials. It is also possible that 
knowledge about the sequences that arises from different learning conditions (instructed/ 
uninstructed during to the preliminary phase) could result in different patterns of error. 
Preliminary Facilitation phase. The I (Implicit) group received two 96-trial blocks of 
SRT training prior to the Main Task. These blocks were of the same format as the ten blocks 
of the main task, except that all eight SOC sequences were identical. These 192 trials were 
expected to prime2 implicit processing for the succeeding task.  
The E (Explicit) group received 2 blocks of explicit SRT training prior to the main 
Sequence Learning phase. In the explicit SRT the participants were instructed to watch two 
blocks of a self-moving SOC sequence on the screen and attempt to memorise it and notice 
any sequences present without pressing down any keys.  These 192 memorising trials were 
expected to facilitate explicit processing of new sequences during the subsequent Main Task 
phase (Table 2).  
                                                 
2
 The term priming in this study is not used in the sense that presentation of a stimulus influences 
response to a later stimulus, but rather a mechanism whereby a particular mode of stimulus processing facilitates 
the subsequent processing  other stimuli in the same mode (see Ferreira et al., 2006). 
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Table 2  
General Comparison of the Implicit and Explicit Preliminary Tasks 
 Implicit group Explicit group 
Task set - sequence learning task - sequence learning task 
Instruction - attend to the moving stimuli 
and press the corresponding key 
- attend to the moving stimuli 
and memorise the sequence 
How information 
is learned 
- without instruction 
- unintentionally 
- by practice 
- with instruction 
- intentionally 
- by explicit memorisation 
What is learned - presented sequence - presented sequence 
Facilitated system -mainly the implicit - mainly the explicit 
 
 
The IE (Implicit-Explicit) group received two blocks of training on a SOC sequence 
in the same manner as the I group, during which they were also instructed to notice any 
sequences occurring.. This task was expected to prime both implicit and explicit processing 
for the main Sequence Learning task. Before the start of the next phase the explicit 
knowledge of the E and IE groups was assessed in a 12-trial test where they were asked to 
regenerate the previously presented sequence. 
The control R (Random) group received the same instructions as the I group. 
However, no sequences were repeated for this group (all blocks, both during pretraining and 
the main task, were construced in the same way as block 11 for participants in other groups). 
There was, therefore, nothing to learn for this group, and so the performance of this group 
was planned as a control to the performance of the experiment groups  
All the four pre-training conditions were followed by a pause and the instructions for 
the next phase.. The design is summarised in Table 3.  
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Table 3 
Structure of the Experiment 
 
Process Dissociation Procedure task3. After the Main Task, the participants were 
informed that the asterisks on the screen have followed a 12-element sequence. In the 
Inclusion phase of the PDP the participants were presented with a single asterisk in a random 
location and they were asked to freely generate a series of 96 trials that resemble the training 
sequence as much as possible. They were also told that they should rely on their intuition 
when feeling unable to recollect the location of the next stimulus. In the Exclusion phase of 
this task the participants were asked to type another series of 96 trials, but this time they had 
to try to avoid reproducing any sequential regularities of the training sequence. By pressing 
the keys the asterisk moved to the corresponding locations. In both phases the participants 
were told not to repeat any response, i.e., no responses of the form 11 or 22 or 33 or 44. 
When the computer test was terminated, the participants were asked to fill out a one-
page paper questionnaire assessing their sequence knowledge and awareness (Appendix A). 
                                                 
3
 A discussion of the Process Dissociation Procedure is in Chapter III. 
   Preliminary facilitation    task        Main task PDP 
Implicit group
 2 blocks of imp. SRT 10 blocks of SRT  Inclusion + Exclusion  
Explicit group
 
2 blocks of exp. SRT 10 blocks of SRT 
 
Inclusion + Exclusion
 
I-E group
  2 blocks of imp. & exp. SRT 10 blocks of SRT  Inclusion + Exclusion 
Random group
 
2 blocks of  rSRT
  10 blocks of rSRT                   — 
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Results 
Reaction time data are the primary measure for analysis in this experiment. For groups 
I, E and IE, mean reaction times were obtained from each of the experimental blocks for the 
trained sequence (Regular) subblocks and the probe sequence (Irregular) subblocks.  
The two blocks of the Preliminary Facilitation phase were analysed separately. Blocks 
3 - 10 were analysed as the Main Task; Block 11 as the probe block, and Block 12 was the 
return to the trained sequence.  
Preliminary Facilitation 
Data from the preliminary facilitation stage are shown in Figure 2 for the I, IE and R 
groups (there are no RTs data for the E group in these blocks). A mixed ANOVA with Block 
as within-subjects factor and Group as between-subjects factor compared the mean RT values 
during these two blocks. This showed a strong main effect of Block, F(1,39) = 86.90, p < 
.001, η2p = .69, confirming that responding became more rapid across these two blocks. A 
significant group effect was observed, F(2,39) = 8.35, p = .001, η2p = .30, and further 
comparison showed that this Group effect was the result of the longer mean RTs of the IE 
group compared to the I group, F(1,30) = 13.26, p = .001, η2p = .30; and to the R group, 
F(1,24) = 5.63, p = .026, η2p = .19. There was no reliable evidence for a difference between 
the I and the R groups, F(1,24) = 1.24, p = .275, η2p = .05. Thus, the task instructions for the 
IE group seem to have had a detrimental effect on the RT performance. A Group × Block 
interaction, F(2,39) = 8.09, p = .001, η2p = .29, suggests that this effect was reduced by the 
second block. 
An assessment of explicit knowledge about the sequence showed that the participants 
regenerated more chunks of the presented sequence than they would have done by chance in 
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the E group, t(23) = 4.29, p < .001, d = .88; and in the IE group, t(15) = 3.57, p = .003, d = 
.89. These data indicated that the two groups instructed to memorise the sequence followed 
the instructions. 
Main Task 
RT data for all the groups in Block 3-12 are shown in Figure 2. A mixed ANOVA 
with Block as within-subjects factor and Group as between-subjects factor applied to the 
mean RT values of Block 3-12 of the task showed a significant effect of Block, F(4.26, 
263.80) = 5.99, p < .001,  = .09, suggesting that responding became more rapid across 
blocks. Whilst this is consistent with the patterns of sequence learning, such speeding could 
also arise from mere practice with the task stimuli. Sequence knowledge would be revealed 
by a difference between those groups with a repeated sequence (I, E and IE) improving more 
across blocks than did the control group, R. Whilst the main effect of Group did not approach 
significance, F(3, 62) < 1, the predicted pattern of differential improvement across blocks is 
apparent from (Figure 2), and confirmed by a significant Group × Block interaction as well, 
F(12.77, 263.80) = 2.04, p = .019, η2p = .09.  
 Figure 2. The mean RTs of the four groups in the 12 blocks of the test. Block 1 and 2 are the 
Preliminary Facilitation phase, Block
The role of sequence-
by comparing the impaired performance on
only) with the other blocks. Mixed (2 blocks × 4 groups) ANOVAs revealed that the Block 
11 RTs were significantly longer than the RTs on
.001, η2p = .22, and longer than 
This pattern is restricted to the groups with repeated sequence (I, E, IE) as Block 11 is the 
same as the adjacent blocks for Group R, confirmed by a
ANOVA comparing the three final blocks
together, the comparisons between the sequential groups and the control group, R, indicated 
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that participants were able to use sequence knowledge to respond faster when the task 
contained a repeated SOC sub-blocks. 
Further evidence for sequence knowledge comes from the analysis of the differences 
between the RTs from the Irregular and Regular sub-blocks in the groups. The degree of 
facilitation due to sequence regularity was calculated by subtracting the mean regular RT 
values of the sub-blocks 3-7 from the mean RTs of the irregular SOC sequences (which was 
always a sub-block appearing randomly in the sub-blocks 3-7 during the training) in each 
block. These data are shown in Figure 3. 
A mixed ANOVA compared the mean RT on each trial type across Blocks 3-10 with 
Block as a within-subject factor and Group (I, E, and IE; the Random group received no 
regular trials) as a between-subject factor. The mean difference scores were above zero on 
Blocks 3-10 for each of the experimental groups: I group 95 % CI = 10.35 - 48.98; E group 
CI = 26.96 – 57.87; IE group CI = 55.18 – 93.03; indicating more rapid responding on regular 
trials for each group. This difference appears to represent gradual learning of sequence 
knowledge: the advantage for regular trials increased across blocks, as reflected in a within-
subjects linear contrast along Block 3-10, F(1, 53) = 30.95, p < .001, η2p = .37, giving a 
significant effect of Block, F(6.58, 348.60) = 7.48, p < .001, η2p = .12. In Block 11, where all 
groups received a novel set of SOC sub-blocks, there was no evidence for such effects, F(2, 
53) < 1.  
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Figure 3. Reaction times differences of the irregular and regular sequence means of the three groups 
in Block 3-12 of the Main Task. The error bars depict the SEMs. 
Crucially, these learning effects were not equal for all three groups, as shown by a 
main effect of Group, F(2, 53) = 6.06, p = .004, η2p = .19. This provides evidence that 
different forms of preliminary training influenced learning on this task differently. 
Differences between the three groups were investigated using Fisher’s LSD procedure, which 
showed that the difference scores were greater for the IE group than either the I or E group 
(larger p = .012), with no evidence that these latter groups were different from each other, p = 
.285.  
Figure 4 shows the mean error rates for each type of trial, which were analysed using 
a mixed ANOVA with Regular-Irregular Error as within-subjects factor and Group as 
between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed that regular trials produced lower error rates 
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overall, F(1, 53) = 7.14, p = .010, η2p = .12, an effect which interacted significantly with 
Group, F(2, 53) = 10.79, p < .001, η2p = .29. Figure 4 suggests that the regularity effect is 
restricted to Group I. Paired t tests confirmed that error rates were lower on the regular than 
on the irregular trials in this group, t(15) = 3.88, p = .002, d = 1.03, with no evidence of a 
difference in the other groups, ts < 1. 
 
Figure 4. The percentage of the errors made in the detection of the asterisk in the regular and irregular 
trials in the three experimental groups. The error bars represent the SEMs. 
Overall, error rate data gave a slightly different impression to the RT data, in that 
those groups who were encouraged to seek explicit knowledge (E, IE) did not differ in their 
error rates between the regular and irregular trials, whereas the group primed to take an 
‘implicit’ approach (I) showed less accuracy on the irregular than the regular trials. 
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Process Dissociation Procedure 
After the SRT test the sequence knowledge of the participants was assessed by the 
PDP test. The performance in each condition was evaluated by the number of 3-item long 
chunks from the regular sequence (Figure 5). Since the participants were asked not to repeat 
any key press on subsequent trials in both conditions of the PDP, they could have chosen one 
of the three locations on each trial. After any non-repeating pair of responses, exactly one 
response was correct according to the original SOC sequence. Therefore, the chance level of 
their performance for a randomly generated valid set of response would be 33.33%.  
As described earlier, above-chance performance in the Inclusion part indicates 
sequence knowledge, which could be a result of both explicit recollection and implicit 
influence. In the Exclusion part, however, above-chance performance (that a higher degree of 
correct chunks, in violation of instructions) may be regarded as the sign of pure implicit 
knowledge: such a pattern would result from automatic generation without knowledge that 
the response violated the instructions. In the absence of above-chance performance in the 
Exclusion part the presence of implicit knowledge cannot be claimed unambiguously 
(Wilkinson & Shanks, 2004). 
A mixed ANOVA with Condition (Inclusion, Exclusion) as a within-subjects factor 
and Group as a between-subjects factor showed a significant effect of Group, F(1, 54) = 4.61, 
p = .014, η2p = .15, indicating that the type of preliminary training influenced the overall 
probability of reproducing the sequences. In addition, a significant effect of Condition, F(1, 
54) = 15.70, p < .001, η2p = .23, shows that, overall, participants were able to strategically 
control at least some of the knowledge that they had acquired. The Group × Condition 
interaction was not significant, F(1, 54) = 2.38, p < .103, η2p = .08, thus there was no 
evidence that groups possessed knowledge that was different in flexibility. 
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The criterion for demonstrating ‘pure’ implicit learning (above-chance performance in 
an Exclusion condition) was not met. Performance was not above chance in any of the 
exclusion conditions, in fact only the Inclusion performance of the IE group differed reliably 
from the chance level, it was higher, t(16) = 4.06, p <.001, d =.99 (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. The Inclusion and Exclusion conditions of the PDP for the three experimental groups. The 
error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
The PDP results suggest that the IE group acquired the greatest overall sequence 
knowledge from the three experimental groups. The exclusion instruction had significant 
effect on the behaviour of this group, the participants generated fewer chunks of the sequence 
than in the Inclusion condition, t(16) = 3.45, p = .003, d = 1.16. This result suggest that the IE 
group had controllable knowledge about the sequences, even if this knowledge was not 
enough to avoid producing sequence fragments below chance-level during the exclusion 
condition, t(16) = 1.58, p = .133, d = .38. 
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Questionnaire Assessment 
The answers of the questions in the paper questionnaire indicated participants had 
acquired explicit knowledge about the regularity in the test and the presence of a sequence. 
On average the length of the sequence that they believed to be present was M = 9.25 items, 
SD = 3.02 items for the experimental groups, the true length being 12 items, while the 
random group (which one never saw the sequence) believed that they had experienced much 
shorter ones, M = 6.31, SD = 1.06, (Figure 6). Dunnett Post-Hoc pairwise comparisons 
showed that, for the combined IE group, the mean reported length was greater than for the 
control (Random) group, p = .029. 
 
Figure 6. The length of sequence as reported by the four groups. The true length was 12 items for the 
experimental groups.  
The four groups differed in their answers to the question “To what extent did you feel 
that the asterisk followed a random or predictable sequence of locations?” in a scale of 1-5 
where 1 represented “totally random” and 5 was “totally predictable”.  The average of the 
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three experimental groups was above the half predictable scale point (3), M = 3.39, SD = .71, 
while the Random group found the test mostly unpredictable M = 2.67, SD = 1.00), An 
ANOVA confirmed that the groups differed on average rating, F(3, 48) = 3.41, p = .026, η2p 
= .19, (Figure 7). A Dunnett Post Hoc test indicated that the only significant difference from 
the report of the R group was of the IE group, t(24) = 3.13, p = .005, d = .30. The average of 
these IE group ratings was largest (closest to the label of “mostly predictable”) M = 3.65, SD 
= .61. The questionnaire assessment thus revealed that participants acquired some explicit 
knowledge of sequence regularity, and that this knowledge was the highest for the IE group.  
 
Figure 7. Predictability in the test as the participants reported it in the paper questionnaire in the 
different groups. 
Discussion 
In this experiment, the various behavioural measures all showed that the three 
experimental groups acquired effective knowledge about the sequence of stimulus locations. 
The evidence suggested that, according to each measure, the groups learned different 
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amounts, the overall pattern indicating more learning for the combined IE than for the I and E 
groups.  
Was this effect in the IE group a result of some summation of facilitation for both 
implicit and explicit processes? One possible interpretation could be that the two learning or 
memory systems interacted in a cooperative fashion and their joint activation led to the 
beneficial performance.  
 This hypothesis can be supported by the finding of the error rate analysis, which 
explored a qualitative difference between the I and E groups suggesting distinct processing 
systems. However, an alternative, single-system explanation would simply suggest that the 
combined group improved as a result of both previous practice and the information provided, 
while the other groups benefited at most from either one or the other. The single system 
account is somewhat supported by the absence of any evidence for implicit knowledge in the 
PDP and the presence of explicit knowledge in the verbal reports. In addition, it is possible 
that, lacking practice at responding during the Preliminary facilitation phase, the Explicit 
group regarded the Main Task as a different task to the extent that they did not transfer any 
useful knowledge (about sequence presence, structure or length) to the second task. These 
open questions were explored in the following experiment by replicating the study with 
additional conditions in which the possible effect of practice, explicit knowledge, and transfer 
were disentangled. 
 
Experiment 1.2: SRT Study 2 
This experiment was designed to explore the possible contributing factors to the ‘IE 
effect’ found in the previous study. It is possible that practice, explicit knowledge and 
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instructions could be causes of this effect as well as any combined facilitation of the 
processing systems. In this study, each experimental group received different preliminary 
treatments to allow an examination of the effect of practice, explicit knowledge and 
information separately. The role of attention was also investigated in an additional 
manipulation which separated the visual attention to the sequence and the requirement to 
learn the sequence. 
Methods 
Participants 
61 undergraduate students (43 females and 20 males; M = 19.60 years; SD = .92 
years) of the Department of Experimental Psychology at the University of Cambridge 
participated in the study as part of their practical course. Each participant was randomly 
allocated into one of the seven groups described below. 
Materials and Procedure 
The materials and procedure of the present experiment were unchanged after 
Experiment 1.1 in the Main Task. The procedures of the Preliminary Facilitation phase for 
each of the seven groups were as follows: 
 (1) Implicit Group (I) (N = 7): This group was the same as in Experiment 1.1: two 
blocks of SRT training (192 trials) using a different sequence to the main task, with no 
irregular sub-blocks. 
(2) Explicit Informed Group (E-Inf) (N = 10): This group received the same 
training as the E group of Experiment 1.1: two blocks of a self-moving sequence with 
instructions to memorise it and notice any sequences, then to report the learned sequence. 
After completion of this training (and unlike the previous study) the participants were 
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explicitly informed before the Main Task that “The asterisk will follow a repeating sequence 
of locations, thinking of this may help you to be faster with pressing the keys”. 
(3) Informed Group (Inf) (N = 11): This Inf group received no pre-training. 
Instead, they were explicitly informed about the presence of a sequence in the same way as 
the E-Inf group. 
(4) Implicit-Explicit Group (IE) (N = 10): This group received the same training 
as the IE group of Experiment 1.1: two blocks of SRT like those for the I group, with 
additional instructions to notice any sequences occurring. 
 (5) Implicit Informed Group (I-Inf) (N = 9): This group received the same implicit 
training as the I group, followed by information about presence of a sequence in the same 
way as the Inf and E-Inf groups. 
(6) Perceptual Group (P) (N = 10): The P group received similar SRT pretraining 
to that for the E-Inf group, with a different instruction.  The colour of each asterisk stimulus 
was selected at random from four different colours (white, red, yellow and purple). The task 
was merely to signal if two consecutive stimuli had the same colour by pressing key ‘M’, 
otherwise the instruction was to push another key (‘X’). The aim of this design was to divert 
the attention from the underlying sequence of locations while still requiring attention on the 
stimuli. 
(7) Random Control Group (R) (N = 6): This group received the same training as 
the R group of Experiment 1.1: two blocks of SRT with no repeating sequences (a randomly 
generated series of individual SOC sequences). 
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Table 4 
Structure of Experiment 1.2 
 
 Preliminary  Facilitation Info.       Main task PDP 
Group I 2 blocks of imp SRT - 10 blocks of SRT Inclusion + Exclusion 
Group E-Inf  2 blocks of exp SRT + 10 blocks of SRT Inclusion + Exclusion 
Group I-Inf 2 blocks of imp SRT + 10 blocks of SRT Inclusion + Exclusion 
Group Inf  - + 10 blocks of SRT Inclusion + Exclusion 
Group IE 2 blocks of imp-exp SRT - 10 blocks of SRT Inclusion + Exclusion 
Group P  2 blocks of explicit SRT with a 
concurrent task 
- 10 blocks of SRT Inclusion + Exclusion 
Group R  2 blocks of  random SRT - 10 blocks of rSRT - 
Note. I = Implicit, E-Inf = Explicit-Informed, I-Inf Implicit-Informed, IE = Implicit-Explicit, P = Perceptual, R = 
Random, rSRT = random sequence. 
 
After the Preliminary Facilitation phase all groups were presented with the Main 
Task, the PDP test (for all except group R), and the paper questionnaire (Appendix A), as 
described in Experiment 1.1. 
Results 
Preliminary Facilitation 
A mixed ANOVA with Block (1, 2) as within-subjects factor and Group (I, I-Inf, IE, 
R)4 as between-subjects factor applied to the mean values of the first two blocks of the 
experiment showed only a main effect of Block, F(1,28) = 46.29, p < .001, η2p = .62. There 
was no Group × Block interaction, F(3, 28) = 2.58, p = .073, η2p = .22, nor any effect of 
Group, F(3, 28) = 2.513, p = .079, η2p = .21. These results indicated that practice on the SRT 
task caused a reduced mean RT on the second block, but no evidence that this effect differed 
                                                 
4
 From the remaining groups no RTs were recorded in this part of the task. 
 between the groups. The IE group
other groups, was once again numerically 
Main Task 
A mixed ANOVA, with Block 
between-subjects factor contrasting all seven groups, was
revealed a significant effect of Block, 
Group effect was not signific
F(27.08, 263.80) = 1.81, p = .010, 
blocks was not equal in all groups
Figure 8. The mean RTs of all the groups in the 12 blocks of the test. Block 1 and 2 are the 
Preliminary Facilitation phase, Block11 is the random probe block of the Main Test.
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Sequence knowledge was also observed, in that the RTs of the control Block 11 were 
significantly longer than the RTs of the blocks before, F(1, 56) = 34.14, p < .001, η2p = .38; 
and after it, F(1, 56) = 50.82, p < .001, η2p = .48; with no evidence of a difference between 
the groups on this block, F(6, 56) < 1. 
Analysing the differences of the Irregular and Regular RTs in a mixed ANOVA with 
Block (3-10) as a within-subjects factor and Group (all except the Random group that 
received no regular trials) as a between-subjects factor showed a significant effect of Block, 
F(6.86, 349.73) = 6.33, p < .001, η2p = .11, and a difference between regular and irregular 
RTs that linearly increased along Block 3-10, F(1, 51) = 20.82, p < .001, η2p = .29, suggesting 
that the sequence knowledge gradually developed in the test, (Figure 9). There was no overall 
effect of Group, F(5, 51) = 1.84, p = .121, η2p = .15, or Group × Block interaction, F(32.30, 
329.48) = 1.12, p = .308, η2p = .099, and the mean regularity effects were above zero on 
Block 3-10 for each group, (in ms): I group 95 % CI = 15.06 – 63.47; E-Inf group CI = 40.14 
– 80.64; Inf group CI = 18.92 – 57.54; IE group CI = 49.07 – 90.57; I-Inf group CI = 35.14 – 
77.83; P group CI = 16.13 – 56.63; indicating a facilitatory effect of learning in all these 
groups.  
A planned comparison of the two purely explicit groups (E-inf, Inf) did not show 
evidence for a difference between them in this measure, F(1, 19) = 2.29, p = .147, η2p = .11, 
nor was there any evidence for a difference between the IE  and I-Inf groups, F(1, 17) = 1.21, 
p = .286, η2p = .07. The Perceptual group did not differ from any of the other groups, ps ≥ 
.157. Finally, the data did not provide a replication of the finding of Experiment 1.1, here the 
IE group did not show reliably greater learning than the Implicit and Explicit groups, F(2, 24) 
= 2.09, p = .146, η2p = .15. 
 
45 
 
 
Figure 9. Reaction time differences of the irregular and regular sequence means of the groups in 
Block 3-10. The error bars depict the SEDs of the Dunnett comparison. 
The error rates in these groups across Blocks 3-12 are shown in Figure 10. A mixed 
model ANOVA with regular and irregular error rates as within-subjects factor and Group as 
between-subjects factor showed that there was a reliable difference between the regular and 
irregular error rates, F(1, 51) = 48.32, p = .006, η2p = .14, and an interaction between 
Regularity and Group, F(5, 51) = 5.31, p = .001, η2p = .34. Investigation of the interaction 
reveals that the regularity effect (more errors on irregular than on the regular trials) is the 
largest, and significant, in two groups: the I group, t(6) = 3.28, p = .017, d = 1.34;  and the I-
Inf group, t(8) = 3.09, p = .015, d = 1.14. Interestingly, these two groups received the same 
kind of uninformed preliminary facilitation SRT task. 
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Figure 10. The percentage of the errors made in the detection of the asterisk in the regular and 
irregular trials in all of the groups. The error bars represent the SEMs. 
 
Process Dissociation Procedure 
After the SRT test the sequence knowledge of the participants was assessed by the 
PDP test. A mixed ANOVA with Condition (Inclusion, Exclusion) as within-subjects factor 
and Group as between-subjects factor showed a significant effect of Condition, F(1, 51) = 
30.69, p < .001, η2p = .38, indicating acquisition of flexible knowledge, and an effect of 
Group, F(5, 51) = 4.00, p = .004, η2p = .28, but no interaction of Group × Condition, F(5, 51) 
< 1. One sample t-tests revealed that only the inclusion performance of the E-Inf group, t(9) = 
2.64, p =.027, d =.84; and the inclusion performance of the IE group, t(9) = 3.26, p =.01, d = 
1.03, were higher than chance-level; and that the exclusion performance of the Inf group, 
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t(10) = -5.62, p < .001, d = 1.7, was significantly lower than chance-level (33.33%) (Figure 
11). 
 
Figure 11. The Inclusion and Exclusion conditions of the PDP for the three experimental groups. The 
error bars represent the confidence intervals with corrected α. 
The lack of a significant interaction implies that there is no evidence of a difference 
between groups in terms of the amount of flexible sequence knowledge; however, as in the 
previous study, the IE group showed (numerically) the greatest sequence knowledge of the 
experimental groups. Once again, there was no tendency for the exclusion conditions to be 
above chance level, providing no evidence for implicit knowledge. 
Questionnaire Assessment 
There were group differences in the answers of the regularity question in the paper 
questionnaire (Q2 in Appendix A), F(6, 56) = 4.00, p = .025, η2p = .22. Reporting the 
15
25
35
45
55
65
Im
pl
ic
it
E-
In
f
In
f IE
I-I
n
f
Pe
rc
e
pt
u
a
l
Im
pl
ic
it
E-
In
f
In
f IE
I-I
n
f
Pe
rc
e
pt
u
a
l
Inclusion Exclusion
Pe
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 
Co
rr
e
ct
48 
 
observed regularity in the task, the means of the E-Inf, IE, I-Inf groups were closer to the 
predictable than the random end of the scale (Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12. The means of the reported observed predictability in the task by groups. The error bars 
depict the SEDs. 
The same groups gave (numerically) the nearest estimation of the length of the 
repeating sequence as well (Figure 13). The IE group gave the closest estimation (M = 9.40, 
SD = 2.79), and the only that was significantly different from the estimation of the R group 
(M = 4. SD = 06), t(14) = 3.21, p = .006, d = 1.24. 
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Figure 13. The length of sequence as reported by the four groups. The true length was 12 items for the 
experimental groups. 
Discussion 
The RT measure showed sequence knowledge in all the sequence groups, but did not 
differentiate between the effects of the various group treatments. In contrast to the previous 
experiment, the overall regularity effect in the combined IE group was not appreciably larger 
than the I or the E groups. The PDP, however, suggested that the clearest evidence for 
acquired knowledge emerged within the IE group. There was no evidence, however, that the 
knowledge of the IE group was based on increased implicit processes; the PDP and the paper 
questionnaire reports suggested the opposite. In fact, the PDP did not provide evidence for 
implicit knowledge in any of the groups.  
The analysis of the error rates showed, however, an interesting pattern: only the two 
groups which received the uninformed preliminary facilitation SRT showed the clear effect of 
regularity (more errors on irregular than on the regular trials) that was observed for the I 
group in Experiment 1.1. One interpretation could be again, that these groups processed the 
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sequence knowledge implicitly, and this automatic behaviour was detrimental when the 
location of the stimulus followed an irregular sequence. However, since no other data 
indicate the presence of implicit knowledge, it cannot be excluded that these groups had 
knowledge about the sequence that was less controllable, leading to commission errors on 
irregular trials.  
Interestingly, the P group that received a decoy task in the preliminary facilitation 
phase showed a weak performance over all the measures. The RTs of this group were 
(numerically) the slowest in all the blocks and their perception of predictability in the task 
was (numerically) lower than the Random group. It is possible that the previous experience 
with the sequence at a perceptual level and with the task in a different setting prevented the 
participants from exploring and finding the hidden sequences in the Main Task, or that they 
continued to attend to the (unchanging) colour information during this task. In this case, a 
prior belief may have interfered with the sequence learning. 
In summary, this experiment failed to provide any clear replication of the previous 
combined effect of implicit and explicit facilitation. Overall, the performance of the groups 
seems to be best explained by suggesting they acquired explicit knowledge. The absence of 
significant group differences in RT measures and lack of a systematic pattern of differences 
in other measures in this study trigger the question of whether the preliminary training had 
any effect on learning processes. It is plausible that the providing of explicit information is 
solely responsible for the group differences in learning observed in the two studies.  
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Experiment 1.3: SRT Study 3 
The aim of this experiment was to replicate the original groups of Experiment 1.1 and 
contrast them with a group with no preliminary facilitation or explicit knowledge. This 
contrast should answer the question of whether the training in the design really primed 
different processing. The Perceptual group was also replicated to test whether the previously 
observed tendency reflected an effect of the manipulation. 
Methods 
Participants 
73 undergraduate students (46 females and 27 males; M = 20.89 years; SD = 5.53 
years) of the Department of Experimental Psychology at the University of Cambridge 
participated in the study as part of their practical course. The participants were divided into 
five groups: Implicit (I) Group (n = 16); Explicit (E) Group (n = 12); Combined Implicit-
Explicit (IE) Group (n = 16); No Pre-training (NP) Group (n = 15); Perceptual (P) group (n = 
14). 
Materials and Procedure 
The materials and procedure of most conditions were precisely as described above for 
Experiment 1.1 (Groups I, E and IE) and Experiment 2.2 (Group P), for facilitation phase, 
main task and final questionnaire. Group NP was different from the other conditions in that it 
received no preliminary facilitation, nor any explicit instruction about a sequence. The 
experiment for this group started with the Main Task.  
 Main Task 
A mixed ANOVA model (
factor) applied to the mean RT 
257.57) = 16.60, p < .001, η2
the five groups, F(4, 68) < 1
there was no evidence of the facilitation phase differences between groups influencing 
performance. Overall, none of the experimental groups differed from the control NP group in 
Dunnett’s Multiple Comparison, 
Figure 14. The mean RTs of the four groups in the 12 blocks of the test. Block 1 and 2 are the 
Preliminary Facilitation phase, Block
represent the SED of the interaction.
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As in the previous studies, learning was shown in terms of a longer mean RT in the 
probe Block 11 compared to Block 10, F(1, 68) = 40.54, p < .001, η2p = .37; and a RT 
decrease on Block 12 compared to Block 11, F(1, 68) = 47.87, p < .001, η2p = .41; with no 
evidence of a reliable group difference on Block 11, Fs(4, 68) = 1.03, p = .396, η2p = .06. 
These results confirm that learning happened in each group, although, the magnitude of 
learning was not reliably different across the groups.  
Analysing the differences between the Irregular and Regular RTs in a mixed ANOVA 
with Block (3-10) as within-subjects factor and Group as between-subjects factor showed a 
significant effect of Block, F(6.58, 447.95) = 10.38, p < .001, η2p = .13; but there was no 
evidence for a difference between the groups, F(4, 68) < 1, nor any reliable Group × Block 
interaction, F(26.52, 450.81) < 1. The mean RT difference scores were above zero on Block 
3-10 for each group: I group 95 % CI = 19.13 – 57.46; E group CI = 15.01 – 59.28; IE group 
CI = 28.12 – 66.46; P group CI = 14.89 – 55.87; NP group CI = 24.26 – 63.85, and a linear 
contrast confirmed that the difference between the Regular and Irregular RTs gradually 
increased along the blocks (3-10), F(1, 68) = 542.52, p < .001, η2p = .39 (Figure 15). Thus the 
data again indicated that learning occurred in all of these groups.  
These finding are in agreement with the previous results: aside from a reliable effect 
of learning there was no difference between the groups. None of the groups differed from the 
No Pre-training group, ps ≥ .932, providing no evidence that learning is reliably affected by 
the preliminary facilitation per se. Finally, a planned comparison of the three experimental 
groups of Experiment 1.1 (I, E, IE) once again did not provide a reliable replication of the 
group differences within that experiment F(2, 41) < 1. 
 Figure 15. Reaction time differences of the regular sequence means of the groups in Block 3
error bars depict the SED of the interaction.
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Figure 16. The percentage of the errors made in the detection of the asterisk in the Regular and 
Irregular trials in the five groups. The error bars represent the SEMs. 
Overall, the analysis of the RT measures did not indicate that the preliminary 
facilitation had any reliable effect on the performance of the groups. The error measures 
indicated some group differences, in that the groups with more implicit pre-training made 
more errors on irregular than regular trials, providing some evidence of an influence of the 
preliminary training. 
Process Dissociation Procedure 
A mixed ANOVA with Condition (Inclusion, Exclusion) as within-subjects factor and 
Group as between-subject factor showed a significant effect of Condition, F(1, 63) = 6.45, p 
= .014, η2p = .09, reflecting flexible knowledge; and an effect of Group, F(4, 63) = 2.90, p = 
.029, η2p = .16, but no Group × Condition interaction F(4, 63) < 1, and thus no evidence for a 
difference between the groups in terms of their level of explicit, flexible knowledge.  
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One sample t-tests revealed that only the inclusion performance of the I group, I t(13) 
= 2.24, p = .043, d = .60; the inclusion performance of the IE, one-tailed t(15) = 1.91, p = 
.038, d = .48, were higher than chance-level; and the exclusion performance of the E group, 
t(11) = -2.92, p = .014, d = .84, was significantly lower than chance level (33.33%) (Figure 
17). 
 
 
Figure 17. The Inclusion and Exclusion conditions of the PDP for the three experimental groups. The 
error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
Questionnaire Assessment 
There were no reliable group differences between the reported measures of observed 
regularity in the test as assessed by the post-test questionnaire, F(1, 67) < 1. All groups, on 
average, reported the predictability of the movements of the asterisk as close to the label “half 
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and half”, i.e. halfway between random and predictable. Nor was there any evidence for a 
difference between the groups in the estimation of the length of the sequence either, F(4, 66) 
= 1,36, p = .257, η2p = .08. The mean estimations of the real length of the sequence were as 
follows: Explicit (M = 7.25, SD = 4.59), Implicit (M = 6.57, SD = 5.12), IE (M = 6.31, SD = 
3.84), P (M = 4.93, SD = 3.50) and NP (M = 4.07, SD = 3.02); the true length of the sequence 
was 12 items. 
Discussion 
This experiment replicated aspects of Experiment 1.1 and 1.2, exploring the possible 
interactions between the proposed implicit and explicit learning mechanisms. The effects of 
facilitatory pretraining conditions from the first experiment, along with the perceptual 
pretraining condition from the second, were compared with a group that received no 
preliminary facilitation.  
As in Experiment 1.2, the RT results failed to show reliable group differences in 
learning, including comparisons with the group that did not receive any pretraining. Whilst 
the NP group responded the slowest overall and the most accurately, these data offer no 
support for the notion that the preliminary facilitation stage influences the amount learned 
during the SRT main task.  
The analysis of the error rates provided some support for the pattern from Experiment 
1.2 in that the uninformed groups generally made more errors on the irregular trials than the 
regular trials. Whilst this could be assumed to provide evidence that these groups had learned 
in a different, perhaps more ‘implicit’ way, the data from the knowledge tests do not indicate 
that these groups possessed any implicit knowledge.  
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It is possible that these groups, whose attention was previously not drawn to the 
sequential structure, used their knowledge in a different, less controllable way during 
responding on the SRT. Whilst it is possible that a different ‘use of knowledge’ may be 
responsible for the particular pattern of error rates, there is no reason to take the difference as 
indicating unconscious learning and memory processes. 
The performance of the Perceptual group did not differ from that of the other groups, 
and so the previous conjecture that the preliminary facilitation had an inhibitory effect on the 
performance was not supported. The analysis of the accuracy measures showed great 
similarity between the I and the P groups, which provides support for the notion that the key 
difference lies in whether the attention of participants was drawn to the presence of the 
hidden sequences. 
 In summary, the present data failed to provide support for the original finding that the 
performance of the IE group represents the result of the summation of two kinds of processes. 
Furthermore, in none of the tests of knowledge was evidence found for performance based on 
implicit knowledge.  
 
Chapter Discussion 
The basic assumption behind these studies was that if there are separate learning 
processes then they could be observed through their interaction. For this, an attempt was 
made to manipulate, through facilitation, implicit and explicit processes both independently 
and in combination. 
The task of exploring the interaction of learning processes is a real challenge from 
both theoretical and empirical perspectives. As was described in the introduction of this 
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chapter, there is no general agreement in the field about either the definitions and the 
descriptions of these learning processes, nor about the methods of how to differentiate the 
implicit processes from their explicit counterparts.  
The present work approached the question by focusing on interactions. It was 
reasoned that even if independent processes cannot be easily separated in behavioural tasks, 
an interaction of effects could serve as an indication of the presence of more than one source 
of processing. Apart from some works studying the effect of explicit prior knowledge or the 
computational modelling of interaction in learning, very few systematic methodologies are 
described for tackling the question of process interaction.  
Based on previous studies (Ferreira et al., 2006; Smith, 1994) the idea was followed that 
processing a particular stimulus in a given way can facilitate the subsequent repetition of the 
same processing with new stimuli. Specifically, in this design, instructed formal learning 
prior to the task was applied to encourage the use of explicit processes, while aiming to leave 
the implicit processes unaffected. Similarly, presenting a test during which implicit 
processing could be used may be expected to facilitate the use of similar processes during the 
task, whilst not influencing the proposed explicit system. If the two systems have an 
interactive relationship then it was expected that the combination of the two processes could 
lead to cooperative or to interfering influences upon performance.  
The results of Experiment 1.1 allowed for the interpretation that the interaction of the two 
systems resulted in a summated performance; that is, the preliminary engagement on the two 
systems with the same task (but different sequences) may have added up in a beneficial way. 
This interpretation, however, was not supported by any of the tests of awareness, nor was it 
replicated in the following two experiments. Crucially, none of the experimental groups 
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turned out to be reliably different from the control group that received no preliminary 
facilitation.  
From these results it can be concluded that despite the occasional group differences in the 
SRT and accompanying measures, the preliminary facilitation is not an effective method for 
the exploration of learning processes.  
It is possible that the failure to find reliable group differences in the RT data was due to a 
lack of sensitivity in the test, the test being sensitive to only one type of processing, or that 
the facilitation did not promote specific processing styles in any way.  
A surprising result of the experiments in this study is the similar patterns in accuracy 
whereby the uninformed groups made more mistakes on the irregular trials compared to the 
regular trials. Different behavioural characteristics of RT and error rate indices have been 
reported previously (e.g., Hikosaka et al., 2002; Watanabe et al., 2006). Song and colleagues 
(Song, J. H. Howard, & D. V. Howard, 2007) ascribe high importance to this dissociation 
saying that in SRT “accuracy reflects only implicit learning, whereas reaction time also 
incorporated aspects of explicit knowledge and strategy.”(p. 173).  
It is difficult to argue the same for the present results. Although the error rates 
differentiated between the groups primed for ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ strategies, the overall 
analysis of the data concerning the conscious status of knowledge did not suggest that these 
groups acquired knowledge through different underlying processes. It is plausible that they 
differed somewhat in how any knowledge was applied during responding on the SRT task, 
perhaps as a result of differences in attention to the sequence.    
The design of the Perceptual group was constructed to investigate a slightly different 
question. If types of preliminary training are differentially beneficial, do the benefits arise 
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due to the experience with the motor task, the explicit knowledge about the hidden sequences 
or simply the engagement of the attentional system in localising stimuli in a repeating order? 
 Previous perceptual-based implicit sequence learning tasks have led to controversial 
results. Kelly and Burton (2001), for example, did not find learning after pure observation of 
the sequence. However, in this experiment the participants were not prompted to pay 
attention to the stimuli. Others (Deroost & Soetens, 2006a, 2006b; Remillard, 2003) have 
found evidence for learning with a decoy task where the participants’ attention was drawn to 
the stimuli, but this learning was restricted to very simple sequences and appeared to be 
limited by attentional capacity. The results of the current study did not provide reliable 
evidence that the purely perceptual exposure to a repeating sequence was of benefit in the test 
phase. Instead, this group behaved similarly to a group receiving implicit pre-training that 
also received no instructions about the presence of a hidden sequence. 
In summary, the aim of this study was to extend the SRT paradigm by attempting to 
‘prime’ implicit and explicit processing both independently and in combination. Although the 
RT results of the first study suggested that the IE group combined facilitation of two 
processes in a summative way, further attempts to replicate this effect, and tests to probe for 
different levels of consciousness, failed to support any interpretation based upon implicit 
knowledge.  
Rather, all the groups showed evidence for explicit knowledge, thus a single source of 
explicit knowledge provides the most parsimonious account of the behavioural results. It 
appears that learning was facilitated in these experiments primarily when the visual attention 
of the participants was drawn to the existence of the hidden rule.  
The finding that all groups, at least at some stage during experimentation, became 
aware of the contingencies of the task, leaves open the question of whether learning is 
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possible in the absence of such awareness. Furthermore, the inability to observe an 
interaction between implicit and explicit conditions in the IE group in itself cannot rule out 
the existence of an implicit system, but may simply be the result of ceiling effects of explicit 
knowledge on performance. The following chapter was dedicated to addressing these issues. 
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III. VISUAL ATTENTION AND LEARNING 
An inherent hindrance of nonconscious cognition research is that the conscious status 
of any process can be assessed only indirectly. Generally speaking, research in this area has 
involved two methodological approaches to provide evidence of nonconscious cognition. One 
approach is that of using or inducing situations which are believed to restrict or facilitate 
either conscious or nonconscious cognition; the other approach is to attempt to assess the 
conscious status of the task-relevant knowledge.  
In the field of implicit learning, one example of the first approach is the use of special 
populations known to have selective deficiencies in the explicit, or in the implicit domains of 
memory, for example, people with amnesia (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; Knowlton, Mangels, 
& Squire, 1996), Huntington’s disease (Knowlton, Squire, Paulsen, Swerdlow, & Swenson, 
1996; Willingham & Koroshetz, 1993), or Parkinson’s disease (Joel et al., 2005; Westwater, 
McDowall, Siegert, Mossman, & Abernethy, 1998).  Performance of these patients may be 
contrasted with that of patients with striatal dysfunction, such as in Obsessive Compulsive 
Disorder (Rauch et al., 2001) or Tourette Syndrome (Keri, Szlobodnyik, Benedek, Janka, & 
Gádoros, 2002), who are thought to display deficiencies in implicit processing.  
Restricting explicit processing can be also achieved through test design, typically by 
means of a procedure where the real aim of the test remains hidden from the participants 
(incidental learning design, e.g., Marvin M. Chun & Jiang, 1998). Alternatively, the task can 
be constructed to be so complex in its nature (e.g., Lewicki & Hill, 1987; Schvaneveldt & 
Gomez, 1998), or to require such rapid reactions (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001) that it is 
assumed that learning of the task is beyond the capacity of the explicit system. 
Another way to obtain evidence that learning happened without awareness is via post-
experimental evaluation of awareness. The aim of such evaluation is a post-hoc assessment of 
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the state of consciousness of the representation of the learned knowledge. These measures of 
awareness are often divided into subjective and objective categories. The measures are 
subjective when they assess the extent to which people believe that they know. The objective 
measures assess how much people know. 
This introduction will discuss the most frequently applied post-experimental 
assessment tools: verbal report and other subjective measures, along with two measures 
typically labelled as objective: Post-Decision Wagering (PDW) and the Process Dissociation 
Procedure (PDP). 
Verbal Report 
Since consciousness is an essentially first-person experience, verbal report is the most 
obvious measurement for estimating conscious knowledge. The earliest empirical support for 
implicit learning came from the discrepancy between behavioural performance on, and verbal 
reports of, the same task (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; A. S. Reber, 1967). Participants are often 
unable to report what knowledge they used in the performance of the implicit learning tests 
despite their above-chance performance (e.g., Curran & Keele, 1993; Frensch, Buchner, & 
Lin, 1994; Frensch & Miner, 1994; Willingham, Nissen, & Bullemer, 1989).  
Some authors insist that since consciousness is an intimate, first-person experience, 
only verbal reports can assess it. As Marcel (1988) argued “There is really only one criterion 
for phenomenal experience. This is the person’s report, direct or indirect, that they have a 
sensation of one or another kind, they are or were conscious in one or another way. /.../ 
[P]rovided that the person is not lying, there is little reason to doubt the validity of a report 
that there is phenomenal experience” (p. 131). According to French and Rünger (2003), 
verbal reports are the most valid measures of explicit sequence knowledge. Nonconscious 
knowledge can induce a feeling of ‘rightness’ which can be deployed to the execution of 
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forced-choice prediction tests, thus confounding other, nonverbal tests of awareness with 
non-aware knowledge (Norman et al., 2006).  
Other authors have suggested applying more rigorous verbal assessment procedures 
(Brody, 1989) or verbal discrimination tasks (Eriksen, 1958). Yet, a fundamental criticism of 
verbal report concerns the basic assumptions behind the assessment process. A tacit 
assumption is the reliability of introspection, that is, the consideration that people reliably 
monitor their mental states and that they can be trusted to report them accurately to the 
researchers (Goldman, 2000).  Another assumption is that the participants can remember 
whether they were aware or not of a particular stimulus or rule at the moment of the 
behaviour.  
In an extensive analysis of the research taken as evidence for dissociable implicit and 
explicit learning systems, Shanks and St John (1994) pointed out that any test of awareness of 
some knowledge has to satisfy the information and sensitivity criteria. The information 
criterion requires of the awareness test that the information that it assesses must be the same 
information that is responsible for the performance change, i.e. the information of which 
learning has been demonstrated. The sensitivity criterion requires the experimenter to design 
a test of awareness that is sensitive to all of the conscious knowledge that could have been 
relevant in the test.  
Verbal reports may fall short in the test of these criteria. To satisfy the first criterion 
most researchers try to use the very same design in the assessment as in the test, which is a 
difficult, if not impossible, requirement for verbal reports. The ability to verbalise a conscious 
state may also be more difficult than it was to experience it.  
In summary, verbal reports can constitute strong evidence for presence of conscious 
knowledge if, say, the person is able to verbally describe the role of the stimuli (e.g., the 
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sequence in the SRT). It is more troublesome to claim the opposite; that the inability to recall 
results from the absence of conscious knowledge: it may just as well result from the lack of 
sensitivity in a questionnaire, a memory failure, or motivational biases. 
Subjective Measures 
One of the possible reasons why, despite these criticisms, verbal reports are still 
frequently employed as a test of awareness may be most clearly understood in term of the 
theoretical considerations of the Higher Order Thought (HOT) theory (Rosenthal, 1997). 
Rosenthal’s conceptual theory of consciousness places constraints on any mental state to be 
conscious: “We are conscious of something, on this model, when we have a thought about it. 
So a mental state will be conscious if it is accompanied by a thought about that state. [...] so 
the state we are conscious of is a conscious state. Similarly, when no such [higher-order 
thought] occurs, we are unaware of being in the mental state in question, and the state is then 
not a conscious state” (p. 741). In this view, therefore, any evidence for the absence of 
higher-order thought about a representation would be evidence for the unaware state of that 
representation. According to this, if a verbal report is assumed to be sensitive enough to 
measure the relevant higher-order thought then it legitimises the use of subjective reports.  
In terms of the content of learning, we can differentiate two kinds of knowledge: 
structural knowledge and judgment knowledge (Dienes, 2008). The structural knowledge 
refers to knowledge that enables performance, such as the actual details of a rule, or the order 
of elements in a sequence. If the person has to decide whether a string follows a certain rule 
or if a chunk is part of a sequence, then they may rely on (conscious or unconscious) 
structural knowledge to come to a certain answer, but the knowledge of this answer is 
judgment knowledge. The decision of how to respond requires only the judgment knowledge: 
knowledge of the answer, but not the knowledge of how the answer was obtained. In this 
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sense the traditional view of unconscious knowledge reflects a situation where one has no 
conscious judgment knowledge, nor any conscious structural knowledge. On the other hand, 
when one has conscious judgment knowledge about something, but has no conscious 
structural knowledge of it, that qualifies as intuition (Dienes, 2008). 
Two criteria have been proposed for taking subjective measures as evidence of 
unconscious knowledge: the guessing criterion and the zero-correlation criterion. These 
criteria rely on the premises of the HOT theory (Dienes, Altmann, Kwan, & Goode, 1995; 
Dienes & D. Berry, 1997). As Dienes argues, “[i]f a person’s knowledge states are 
conscious, she will know when she knows and when she is just guessing” (2008, p. 57). It 
follows from this that when people believe (and thus report) that they are guessing, any 
knowledge that their performance reflects is unconscious knowledge. This is referred to as 
the guessing criterion of nonconscious processing. (Cheesman & Merikle, 1984). However, 
the criterion for reporting “guess” may differ between individuals, biasing the reliability of 
such a measure (Eriksen, 1960). One participant may only report as knowledge those beliefs 
held with high confidence, and report anything below as ‘guess’; others may set a more 
liberal criterion.  
The zero-correlation criterion (Dienes et al., 1995), however, escapes this 
conundrum. It is suggested that higher confidence should correlate with performance if the 
participant is aware of the knowledge. If the participant’s confidence rating correlates with 
the measured performance then it must be that some part of the knowledge is conscious. If 
there is no such correlation then the knowledge is unconscious. In repeated applications of 
these subjective measures, a dissociation was reported between performance and confidence 
(e.g., Channon et al., 2002; Dienes & Altmann, 1997). Note that these subjective measures 
(guessing and zero-correlation criteria) of conscious knowledge do not assume that the 
presence of one kind of knowledge excludes the presence of the other (Jacoby, 1991). These 
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criteria allow for simultaneous conscious and unconscious knowledge (e.g., conscious 
judgment knowledge with unconscious structural knowledge).  
It is important to note that the guessing and zero-correlation criteria are not meant to 
be operational definitions of consciousness (Dienes, 2008), nor is a lack of correlation 
between performance and confidence a necessary indicator that all knowledge is unconscious. 
Rather, “[they are] tools and like any tool must be used with intelligence and sensitivity on 
each application” (Dienes, 2008, p. 59). 
Post-Decision Wagering 
The subjective measures of unconscious knowledge described above rely on the 
honesty and cooperation of the participant in reporting their subjective knowledge state. 
Persaud, McLeod and Cowey (2007) planned to overcome the uncertainties associated with 
such tests by inviting the participants to wager on correctness of their judgments. The 
rationale behind the procedure is that if someone has subjective confidence about a judgment 
then the person would use it for contingent monetary gain, even if they may be motivated to 
report that judgment as a guess. For instance, in an AGL experiment Persaud and colleagues 
trained the participants on letter-strings which, unbeknownst to them, followed a 
predetermined grammar. In the test phase, where they were presented with new grammatical 
and ungrammatical strings, they had to judge whether the presented strings were grammatical 
or ungrammatical.  After each judgment they had to wager £1 or £2 on the correctness of 
their choice. Each participant could have earned an average of £76 if they wagered high on 
the correct judgments. The correct classification was 81% on average, however, the amount 
of high wagering on the correct trials was not significantly higher on the than chance level, 
reflecting, as they argued, the lack of awareness. In a subsequent experiment, where the 
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participants were made aware of the grammar of the strings, their wagering accurately 
reflected their performance.  
Persaud and colleagues argued that while other subjective measures measure 
introspection, and awareness about awareness, their post-decision wagering (PDW) technique 
measures awareness directly. This claim is open to criticism, namely that PDW is not a direct 
measure of awareness since it is a second-order judgment, a judgment of the reliability of a 
first-order experience (Seth, 2008a). Persaud and his colleagues (Persaud, McLeod, & 
Cowey, 2008) insist, however, that in contrast to the questions used in subjective measures of 
awareness, in PDW the participants found wagering intuitive. Also, they found that a 
blindsight patient showed good performance in another test while not being able to turn that 
knowledge to optimal wagering. Therefore, they claimed that the PDW might involve 
metacognition, but it does not measure it.   
Nevertheless, other empirical works suggest that since PDW is a decision about 
confidence, it can be sensitive to metacognitive decision biases, such as risk aversion 
(Schurger & Sher, 2008). Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) summarises 
decades of empirical evidence that people exhibit greater sensitivity to possible losses than 
possible wins when making probabilistic decisions. This has also been claimed to be true for 
PDW bets (Clifford, Arabzadeh, & Harris, 2008a). In summary, PDW differs from the 
previously mentioned subjective measures of awareness, because it does not directly rely on 
introspection and, therefore, it is in some sense an objective measure (Seth, 2008b). However, 
it can be biased by the wagering strategies of the participant (Clifford, Arabzadeh, & Harris, 
2008b). 
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Process Dissociation Procedure 
Considering the weaknesses of the subjective measures of awareness, many authors 
suggested that forced-choice tasks are useful for detecting knowledge that could not be 
captured by verbal reports (e.g., Perruchet & Amorim, 1992; Willingham et al., 1989). Since 
reports of consciousness are associated with recollection, most of the forced-choice tasks 
constituted generation or recognition tasks (e.g., Dulany, Carlson, & Dewey, 1984; Gomez & 
Schvaneveldt, 1994; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990). According to the exclusiveness assumption 
of Reingold and Merikle (1988), an acceptable test of awareness should be sensitive only to 
the relevant conscious knowledge. It is, however, easy to recognise that the performance of 
these tasks require the same kind of retrieval processes as the implicit task itself, and hence 
may be sensitive to unconscious processes as well. Indeed, successful generation can be 
measured on the same trials where the participants report guessing (Ziori & Dienes, 2008).  
 What should an optimal test of awareness be like? In order to fulfil Shanks & St 
John’s (1994) information criterion; the design and task should be as close as possible to the 
original test. To overcome the contamination problem – that all processes can depend on both 
simultaneously implicit and explicit influences – the two kinds of processes can be set in 
opposition in a manner similar to Jacoby’s (1991) Process Dissociation Procedure (PDP).   
This procedure was developed in the field of implicit memory research based on the 
assumption that the conscious and unconscious knowledge may have independent influences 
on performance. Assuming that the influences differ in ‘flexibility’ it is possible to 
decompose them by pitting them against each other.  
A PDP task consists of two parts, an inclusion condition and an exclusion condition, 
which differ in the instructions (as in was used in Chapter II). In the inclusion part (I) the 
participants have to make a valid response, including if possible the items or rules from the 
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preceding learning phase; while in the exclusion part (E) they are asked to make valid 
responses whilst avoiding learned items. For example if in a word learning task the person 
consciously recalls the word ‘dean’ then if the inclusion part consists of a word-stem 
completion task they might regenerate the word when presented with the stem ‘de__‘. In the 
exclusion part, however, the person should attempt to complete the stem with a different 
word, for example ‘deer.’ In either case, if they are unable to recall a suitable item they can 
rely on their intuition.  
It is assumed that both conscious (recollection) and unconscious (automatic 
facilitation) processes can be responsible for an item being successfully produced during the 
inclusion task. In the exclusion part, however, they are asked to avoid any regeneration, thus 
conscious control should result in lower probability of response, whereas automatic 
facilitation will still lead to production of the item. According to the logic of PDP, if the 
researcher still observes above-baseline performance, it can be ascribed exclusively to 
automatic facilitation based on unconscious knowledge, coupled with the absence of 
conscious knowledge (Jacoby, 1991).  
Assuming independence of the two systems, an algebraic computation of the 
probabilities of recall from Exp (from explicit) and Imp (from implicit) sources is possible 
(Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993). The probability of generation during exclusion 
performance is given by P(E) = Imp(1 - Exp), and inclusion performance by P(I) = Imp + 
Exp + Imp × Exp.  The logic of the test (Jacoby et al., 1993)5 infers that the difference 
between the inclusion and exclusion performance provides a ‘pure’ measure of the explicit 
process, Exp = P(I)- P(E), and a measure of the implicit process, Imp = P(E) / (1 - Exp). 
                                                 
5
 The original work used Recollection (R) and automaticity (A). 
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Recently, this approach has been adapted by other authors of the field (e.g., Q. Fu, X. 
Fu, & Dienes, 2008). In a typical application of the PDP in an SRT test, the participants 
receive an instruction to generate sequences that either include, or exclude, parts of the 
sequence they saw earlier (e.g., Experiments 1.1-3 in this work) or to continue (or avoid 
continuing) a sequence from a presented fragment (e.g., Wilkinson & Shanks, 2004). Despite 
the elegance of this approach, according to the logic put forward by Wilkinson and Shanks 
only a specific pattern of results, I = E > B, where B refers to the performance baseline, 
unambiguously indicates the use of unconscious knowledge. A pattern of results of I > B > E 
is consistent with knowledge that was wholly conscious (Wilkinson & Jahanshahi, 2007). 
In previous studies unconscious knowledge has been reported based on application of 
the PDP technique to the analysis of sequence learning (e.g., Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 
2001; Goschke, 1997). Destrebecqz and Cleeremans (2001) claimed that the design of SRT 
with delay intervals between responses and the following stimuli led to explicit knowledge 
while the condition where there was no delay between the responses and the following 
stimuli, the zero response-stimulus interval (RSI) condition, led to implicit learning. 
However, replication studies by Wilkinson and Shanks (2004) and Norman, Price, and Duff 
(2006) did not find evidence of unconscious knowledge in Destrebecqz and Cleeremans’ 
crucial zero RSI condition using the ‘E > B’ approach. Rather they found the pattern of 
responding (I > B > E) which is consistent with sequence learning being explicit. Fu, Fu and 
Dienes (2008), however, successfully replicated the original findings of Destrebecqz and 
Cleeremans, showing an ‘E > B’ pattern, and suggested that the rewards for performance in 
Wilkinson and Shanks’ study may have reduced the above-chance exclusion performance to 
baseline. This latter argument implies, however, that the knowledge had to be explicitly 
controllable.  
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The usage of the PDP is not uncontroversial even for the supporters of the multiple 
system view. The procedure conceptualises independent conscious and unconscious 
processes, thus its logic is not evident from the view of interactive processing. If, say, the two 
processes positively correlate, then the exclusion condition will underestimate their effect 
(Ferreira et al., 2006). Jacoby’s assumption that the PDP is an objective test of awareness and 
that the exclusion condition measures conscious knowledge is also debated. Fu, Fu and 
Dienes (2008) claim that the PDP can be taken as a type of subjective measure in the sense 
that refraining from the generation of the sequence depends on the participants’ assessment of 
whether they know the sequence or not. It is also claimed that exclusion can happen without 
conscious awareness of the sequence. The participant can develop a feeling of ‘rightness’ 
about certain answers and avoid it along the trials. The sense of feeling of knowing is enough 
for correct exclusion. In this way the exclusion condition measures the judgment knowledge 
of the person, but it is not informative about the structural knowledge. This feeling-of-
knowing state is described by the concept of fringe consciousness (Norman et al., 2006), or 
intuition (Dienes, 2008). 
In general, an obvious limitation of any post-experimental evaluation is that it is 
capable of reflecting only whether there is an intact or fragmented consciously available 
memory of what was learned, not whether the process of learning occurred with or without 
awareness during the test. Still, many claim that the presence of unconscious knowledge 
indicates that the acquisition of this knowledge occurred unconsciously (e.g., Jimenez, 1997).  
The Present Study 
The following experiments aim to answer two main questions: (1) Can learning occur 
incidentally without focused attention on the stimuli? (2) Do the different post-experimental 
tests of awareness measure the phenomenon in concordance?   
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A single measurement of awareness seems to be unable to offer an accurate 
assessment of conscious knowledge. For this reason it is suggested that systematic 
application of several awareness tests could capture more of the phenomena than any of them 
alone (Destrebecqz & Peigneux, 2006). In the present study all of the measures were attached 
to the same incidental learning test. To promote incidental learning a typical SRT design was 
modified by a feature often applied in attentional learning research.   
Previous studies comparing the effects of central and peripheral spatial cues showed 
that the processing of central cues is sensitive to conscious control (Lambert, 2003), whereas 
the processing of peripheral cues is more rapid, reflexive and unaffected by secondary tasks 
(Müller & Rabbitt, 1989). Lambert and his colleagues (Lambert, Naikar, McLachlan, & V. 
Aitken, 1999) found in several experiments that participants learned to predict target 
locations (as reflected by RT decrease) by the identity of peripheral cues (letters) even when 
they appeared very briefly (100 ms or shorter) before the onset of the target. The participants 
did not seem to have explicit understanding about the cue-target relationships, as shown by 
post-experiment questionnaires.  
This pattern of results was found even when the predictor stimuli were the colours of 
the frame of the display (Lambert & Roser, 2001). The participants were able to learn the 
cue-target associations with very similar (green and blue-green) colours and still 40% of the 
participants failed to gain awareness about this knowledge. The authors claimed that even 
though the peripheral cues are of apparently incidental nature, learning can be based on 
covert attentional responses resulting in implicit learning. These studies originated from the 
notion of derived attention (James, 1890/1998; Lambert, 2003) which describes the passive 
process whereby “the cue events come to attract attention by virtue of their association with 
target locations” (Lambert, 2003, p. 265). 
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 Some studies in the priming literature also observed learning without conscious 
attention resulting in ‘implicit effects’ measured by indirect tests such as word-stem 
completion, or repetition priming (e.g., Merikle & Daneman, 1996; Parkin, Reid, & Russo, 
1990). This so called residual processing (Vuilleumier, Schwartz, Duhoux, Dolan, & Driver, 
2005), which takes place without focused attention, was reported to happen at as high a level 
as semantic priming (Merikle, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001).  
For this study a task was devised where peripheral visual stimuli (colour frames) 
probabilistically predicted the location of the target stimulus (asterisk) in an SRT task. While 
the locations of the asterisks followed a random sequence, the colours of the frame of the 
screen were probabilistically related to stimulus locations. Attention to the changing colour of 
the frame was not required as part of the task. Instead, the participants had to report the 
location of the appearing stimulus by pressing one of the four corresponding keys.  
In this design the predictive stimuli were not presented in a way to prevent them 
receiving attention from the participants, but they were not instructed to attend to them. 
Although deliberate attention to the colour frames was not expected from the participants, 
post-experimental assessments were included to detect the degree of attention paid. Based on 
Lambert and his colleagues’ observations and the assumption of the derived attention 
paradigm, it was anticipated that the participants would be able to learn the predictive 
relationship between the peripheral cues (colours) and the target locations (asterisks), and that 
this learning would be, to some degree, incidental and unintentional.   
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Experiment 2.1: Incidental Learning Study 1 
Methods 
Participants 
The participants were 20 undergraduate students (13 female and 7 male; M = 21.30 
years, SD = 3.80 years) of Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary and all were native 
speakers of Hungarian. Each participant received 1000 HUF (approximately 5 GBP) for 
participation in a 45-minute session comprising several unrelated experiments; this study 
made up the first half of the session.  
Materials and Design 
The testing was conducted in one group session in the same classroom at separate 
computers. The participants were seated approximately 60 cm from the computer monitor 
and were presented with the instructions on the screen. The task program was written using 
REALbasic 2007 Standard Edition, Academic Version software. The test application was run 
under Microsoft Windows XP operating system on a set of identical desktop computers; 
responses were collected via the keyboard. 
The test consisted of two phases. The first phase resembled a classic SRT task (Nissen 
& Bullemer, 1987), where four horizontal dashes appeared on the computer screen and the 
participants were instructed to detect the location of the asterisk appearing above one of the 
dashes as quickly and as accurately as possible. The colour of the four dashes and the asterisk 
was white; the background of the screen was black. A rectangular frame was 50 pixels wide, 
and was presented along the four sides of the screen (Figure 18). The colour of the frame 
changed with each trial. The colours were selected from an array of 16 distinct colours (see 
Appendix B), which were created by the adjustment of the saturation of red, green and blue 
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components. The dashes appeared in font size 140, the asterisks were in font size 50. The 
four allocated keys were Y C N and ; of the Hungarian language keyboard (which correspond 
in location to Z C N and , on the standard UK English language keyboards).  
 
Figure 18. Screenshot of the Colour-Frame Task as presented to participants in Experiments 2.1, 2.2 
and 2.4. 
The appearances of the asterisk did not follow any repeating sequence. Across trials, 
the colour of the frame was probabilistically related to the location of the asterisk. Each 
colour of frame was always followed by one of two possible locations, one of which (regular 
location) was presented along with that frame colour more often than another, irregular 
location. By varying the number of regular and irregular locations presented, the different 
colours were given different degrees of predictive value (see Table 5).  The physical colours 
corresponding to each colour number within Table 5 were randomised for each participant, 
but the colour-location pairings followed the same fixed, pseudo-random sequence for all 
participants. 
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Table 5 
 
The second part of the test was designed to assess the level of knowledge about the 
relationship of the colour frames and the location of the target stimuli. For this purpose a task 
Probability Structure of the Colour-Frame Task 
Colour 
Regular Pairing  Irregular Pairing 
Location Frequency Probability  Location Frequency Probability 
Colour 1 1 41 91.1  3 4 8.9 
Colour 2 3 40 88.9  2 5 11.1 
Colour 3 1 39 86.7  3 6 13.3 
Colour 4 3 38 84.4  2 7 15.6 
Colour 5 1 35 77.8  3 10 22.2 
Colour 6 3 34 75.6  2 11 24.4 
Colour 7 1 31 68.9  3 14 31.1 
Colour 8 3 30 66.7  2 15 33.3 
Colour 9 2 37 82.2  4 8 17.8 
Colour 10 4 36 80.0  1 9 20.0 
Colour 11 2 33 73.3  4 12 26.7 
Colour 12 4 32 71.1  1 13 28.9 
Colour 13 2 29 64.4  4 16 35.6 
Colour 14 4 28 62.2  1 17 37.8 
Colour 15 2 27 60.0  4 18 40.0 
Colour 16 4 25 55.6  1 20 44.4 
Note. The values of Location represent the position of the asterisk numbering the location 
increasingly from left to right. 
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based upon the Process Dissociation Procedure (PDP; Jacoby, 1991) was used, along with a 
combination of Subjective Measures (Dienes, 2008) and Post Decision Wagering (PDW; 
Persaud et al., 2007). On each PDP trial, a colour frame was presented and the participant 
was requested to press a single response key. The PDP consisted of 32 inclusion trials and 32 
exclusion trials. In the inclusion condition, participants were asked to press the key for the 
location that was most commonly associated with that colour frame during the first stage; in 
the exclusion condition they were asked to press a key that had not been associated with the 
colour frame. In both of the phases of the PDP each of the 16 colour frames appeared twice in 
random order. Each trial was followed by either a confidence assessment or a PDW question. 
Each trial ended with an assessment of structural knowledge as described in the Procedure 
section. 
The paper questionnaire (Appendix D) that the participants were asked to fill out after 
the experiment consisted of questions about their knowledge and risk aversion. In the first 
knowledge question they were asked to choose the degree to which they found the location of 
the asterisk predictable. The scale had five levels: (1) Totally Random; (2) Mostly Random; 
(3) Half-Half; (4) Mostly Predictable; (5) Totally Predictable. The next verbal report question 
asked “If you noticed any regularity in the relation of the asterisk and the colours, what are 
you able to say about it? When did you first notice this?”. In a further categorical scale the 
participants were asked to report how risk-aversive they think they are. The scale ranged 
from 1 (risk-aversive) to 7 (risk seeker). Finally, the participants had to report what risk they 
would take for different monetary gains. Each of the five pairs of options consisted of one 
fixed money gain and 50% chance of an increasing amount of win. The fixed amount was 
1000 HUF (about 3 pounds), the risky amount increased from 1500 HUF (about 5 pounds) by 
500 HUF in each choice. 
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Procedure 
The test was introduced to the participants as a reaction time measuring experiment. 
After signing the ethical consent form (Appendix C) and reading the instructions on the initial 
screen of the test, the participants could ask further questions from the experimenter or start 
the test with a designated key. At the start of each trial, the colour frame appeared along with 
the dashes on the screen, then there was a 200 ms delay before the appearance of the asterisk. 
If the participant detected the asterisk with the correct key press within five seconds then the 
new trial started following a 50 ms interval. If the participant pressed an incorrect key or 
failed to respond within the time limit, then an error message appeared on the screen and the 
data of the given trial were excluded from the RT analysis. The task was 720 trials long. 
After each 90-trial block they had the opportunity to take a short break. 
In the PDP phase, the participants were informed that there was a hidden relationship 
between the colour of the screen frames and the location of the target stimuli. The task was to 
choose where the asterisk would most likely appear. They were also told that after each 
decision they can wager a small amount of money (10 - 50 HUF, approximately .03 - .15 
GBP) on their decision. By wagering they can increase their real payment up to 2000 HUF 
(approximately 6 GBP). The participants were also informed that they would get feedback 
about the correctness of their decisions only at the end of the experiment. They were also 
informed that if they were to not win any money or if they were to lose more money than 
they would win, then they would receive only their participation fee.  
For practice with wagering, a 10-trial game was introduced where an imaginary coin 
was tossed and they could put money on the outcome, winning or losing some game money. 
The participants could wager between 10 and 50 HUF by moving the bar of a slider on the 
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screen. After each trial the outcome and the amount of money won or lost was displayed on 
the screen together with the accumulated amount of wagered money.  
After the wagering practice trials the participants were informed again about the task 
in this phase of the test. They were also told to rely on their intuitions if they could not 
recollect the location of the asterisk after a given colour frame. As this phase of the test 
started, the four dashes appeared on the screen with one of the colours of the frame. Without 
time pressure the participants could choose one of the locations of the asterisk by pressing the 
corresponding key. At this point the asterisk appeared in the chosen location without any 
feedback as to whether their choice was correct. This was followed by one of two questions. 
On odd-numbered trials the participants were asked how confident they were that their choice 
was correct. To answer the question the participants could move the bar of a slider between 
50% representing ‘complete guess’ and 100% representing ‘completely certain’ (Figure 19). 
The confidence scale ranged from 50% to 100% instead of 0-100% to preclude ambiguity in 
interpretation of 50% as either complete chance, or halfway between guess and certainty 
(Dienes et al., 1995). On every second trial they had to wager between 10 and 50 HUF on 
their correctness in the manner described above (Figure 20). On each trial after either 
question they were also asked to choose whether they based the given decision on 
guess/intuition or memory/rule as an assessment of structural knowledge. 
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Figure 19. Screenshots from the English version of the Knowledge Assessment part of the test. On 
odd-number trials of the PDP, the confidence in the decision of the participants was assessed. They 
were also asked to choose whether they based their given decision on guess/intuition or memory/rule 
as an assessment of structural knowledge. 
 
83 
 
 
Figure 20. Screenshots from the English version of the Post Decision Wagering part of the test. In 
every second trial of the PDP the participants had to wager money on whether their decision was 
right. After their bet they were asked – just as after the confidence rating – to choose whether they 
based the given decision on guess/intuition or memory/rule as an assessment of structural knowledge. 
When the computer task ended, the participants were asked to fill out the paper 
questionnaire (Appendix D) to assess their impression of predictability in the test, their 
verbalisable knowledge of the regularities in the test and their level of risk aversion, as 
described above. 
Results 
RT Measures 
The RTs of the regular and the irregular trials were averaged into nine blocks. Each 
block consisted of 80 trials: 5 repetitions of all the colour-location pairings. The prediction 
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was that, if learning had occurred, the RTs from the irregular trials would be longer than 
those from the regular trials. Surprisingly, however, the RTs in the irregular trials were faster 
on average than in the regular trials (irregular M = 480.22, SD = 11.99; regular M = 493.74, 
SD = 11.79)6. An ANOVA with Regularity and Block as within-subject factors confirmed 
that this effect of Regularity was reliable, F(1, 19) = 34.03, p < .001, η2p = .64; along with an 
effect of Block, F(3.68, 69.87) = 3.73, p = .010, η2p = .16; and a Regularity × Block 
interaction, F(4.33, 82.17) = 6.96, p < .001, η2p = .27, (Figure 21).  
A correlation analysis was performed to determine whether the predictive strength 
(proportion of ‘regular’ pairings) on each trial was related to the RTs on the regular, and on 
the irregular locations. Neither of the analyses showed evidence that RT reflected the 
relationship between colours and location, the average correlational coefficients were not 
significantly different from zero, regular trials: (mean r = -.01, SD = .05), t(19) = 1.5, p = 
.149, d = .34; irregular trials: (mean r = .01, SD = .11), t(19) < 1. 
 
  
                                                 
6
 Reaction times reported in this study are always measured in ms. 
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Post-Experimental Measures 
The Process Dissociation Procedure did not indicate that the participants could 
perform differently from the chance level (8) in either the Inclusion (M = 8.85, 95% CI = 
6.77 – 10.93), nor in the Exclusion part (M = 8.40, CI = 7.01 – 9.79), with no evidence of a 
difference between these conditions, ts(19) < 1. In the absence of any evidence of learning in 
either the RT data, nor in the PDP test, the Subjective Measures and the Post Decision 
Wagering measures could not be meaningfully analysed; these tests are designed to ascertain 
the conscious status of knowledge, and thus cannot be informative when there is no 
knowledge to discuss. 
When the participants were asked about the predictability between the colours and the 
locations of the asterisks on a scale from 1 (totally random) – 5 (totally predictable) the 
group choose on average around the label ‘mostly random’ (M = 2.35, SD = .81).  In the 
verbal reports, however, 11 of the 20 participants mentioned that they had noticed some 
regularity between the colour frames and the target locations. 
Discussion 
The aim of this study was to investigate whether probabilistic incidental learning 
happens in this design, producing faster detection of the target stimuli when the colour frames 
of the screen probabilistically predicted their locations. The RT results did not show any 
advantage for the regular trials over the irregular ones. In fact, the mean RT on the irregular 
trials was smaller than the mean RT on the regular trials. The reason for this is unclear. As a 
consequence of the task structure, there were fewer irregular trials (184) than regular trials 
(536), and it is possible that the fixed random order of these trials allowed hidden procedural 
or sequential biases to produce the observed regularity effect on reaction times. No such 
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biases were revealed during the analysis, nevertheless, if the regularity effect is not the result 
of learning, it is not relevant to the aims of the study.  
Experiment 2.2: Incidental Learning Study 2 
One possible reason why no evidence of learning was detected in the previous 
experiment may have been that the delay between the appearance of the colour of the frame 
and the appearance of the asterisk was too short (200 ms) to reliably affect the RTs of target 
detection. Therefore, the previous experiment was replicated with a slightly longer, 300 ms 
delay between the onset of the colour frames and the appearance of the asterisks. 
Methods 
Participants 
The participants were 25 undergraduate students (13 female and 12 male; M = 21.84 
years, SD = 3.44 years) of Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary and all were native 
speakers of Hungarian. Each participant received 1000 HUF (approximately 4 GBP) for 
participation in a 45-minute session comprising several unrelated experiments; this study 
made up the first half of the session. 
Materials and Procedure 
The materials and the procedure of the present study were identical to the previous 
experiment with the only exception that the asterisks appeared on the screen 300 ms after the 
appearance of the colour frames, instead of the previous 200 ms delay.  
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Results 
RT Measures 
Once again, the mean RT was faster again for the irregular (M = 465.32 ms, SD = 
10.59) than the regular trials (M = 472.77 ms, SD = 10.59). The ANOVA model used in the 
previous experiment was applied to these data, with Regularity, Block, Hand and Hand-shift 
as factors. This confirmed that the irregular trials were significantly faster, as shown by a 
main effect of Regularity, F(1, 24) = 6.047, p = .022, η2p = .20; There was also an effect of 
Block, F(3.12, 74.86) = 5.25, p = .002, η2p = .18; and an interaction of Regularity × Block, 
F(5.18, 124.30) = 10.02, p < .001, η2p = .30.  
The mean of the right hand RTs (M = 466.48 ms, SD = 10.50) was faster than that for 
those made by the left hand (M = 471.61 ms, SD = 10.13), but this effect did not reach 
significance in the ANOVA model, F(1, 24) = 1.31, p = .263, η2p = .05. As in the previous 
study, the Hand-shift effect was considerable, F(1, 24) = 42.35, p < .001, η2p = .64, with no 
reliable Regularity × Hand-shift interaction, F(1, 24) < 1.  
A combined between-subjects comparison of the two studies showed no group 
difference, F(1, 42) = 1.41, p = .242, η2p = .03, indicating that setting the delay between the 
colours and locations from 200 ms to 300 ms did not cause any observable change in the 
pattern of measures (Figure 23). The joint analysis of the two groups showed a significant 
interaction between the Regularity and Hand-shift factors, F(1, 42) = 10.51, p = .002, η2p = 
.20, as well as an effect of Hand, F(1, 42) = 5.05, p = .030, η2p = .11. However, the latter had 
no effect on the regular and irregular RTs, Regularity × Hand, F(1, 42) < 1. 
 Figure 23. The difference scores of 
2.2). The difference scores were computed by subtracting the mean regular RTs from the mean 
irregular RTs in each block. The error 
× Block interaction. 
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correctness, the average correlation coefficients was not significantly above zero, one tailed 
t(19) < 1.   
According to the proposed guessing criterion, unconscious knowledge is indicated if, 
on those trials where the participants reported guessing, their performance is above chance. 
The guessing criterion did not detect unconscious knowledge, as the performance was not 
reliably above chance level (.25) on trials where the participants reported guessing, t(17) < 1. 
 
Figure 24. The Inclusion and Exclusion conditions of the PDP result. The chance level was 8 in the 
task. The error bars represent SEMs. 
Taking the zero-correlation criterion and the PDW measure alone might suggest the 
conclusion that any knowledge used to perform on the PDP task was implicit. However, 
given that the PDP performance differed from chance only in that participants were able to 
avoid ‘correct’ responses in the Exclusion condition, a conclusion of implicit knowledge is 
not tenable: by the nature of the PDP task, this pattern requires the presence of conscious 
control. 
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Inclusion Exclusion
Pe
rfo
rm
a
n
ce
92 
 
In the Inclusion condition the amount the participants wagered significantly correlated 
with how risk aversive they reported themselves to be in the paper questionnaire, r(25) = .40, 
p = .049. The positive correlation indicates that the more risk-averse the participants were the 
less they were willing to wager.  
When the participants were asked about the predictability between the colours and the 
locations of the asterisks on a scale from 1 (totally random) – 5 (totally predictable) the 
group choose in average around the label ‘mostly random’ (M = 2.32, SD = .85).  In the 
verbal reports, however, 5 of the 20 participants mentioned that they had noticed some 
regularity between the colour frames and the target locations. 
 
Discussion 
In this experiment the delay between the onset of the colour frames and the target 
locations was 300ms instead of the 200ms in the previous experiment. In Experiment 2.1, 
learning was detected neither in the RT measures, nor in the PDP. Then it was speculated that 
the brief latency between the appearance of the cues and the target stimuli prevented any 
learning. The present study still showed no learning in the RT analysis, in that the 
participants did not respond to predictable ‘regular’ targets faster than the irregular ones.  
By contrast, the exclusion measure of the PDP showed below-chance performance, 
indicating the presence of explicit knowledge; the longer delay was sufficient to trigger 
explicit learning about the cue-target associations. What is not clear, however, is why the 
irregular RTs were significantly shorter on average. Does it represent learning in some 
unexpected way, or is it the result of some artefact arising from the particular fixed order of 
the stimuli? The question can be answered by a test where the participants respond to the 
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same sequence of target stimuli in the same fixed order, without any possibility of learning 
from the colour frame cues. 
Experiment 2.3: Incidental Learning Study 3 
The aim of the present experiment was to investigate whether the colour–location 
associations were responsible for any of the previously found behavioural patterns: that is 
whether the RT differences can indicate any learning in the task. For this control experiment 
the colours were removed, keeping other features of the test identical with the previous 
description. If the behavioural data under these circumstances is not different from the 
previous findings then it cannot be concluded that the previous measures reflected learning in 
any way. 
Methods 
Participants 
The participants were 25 undergraduate students (16 female and 9 male; M = 21.00 
years, SD = 1.63 years) of Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary and all were native 
speakers of Hungarian. Each participant received 1000 HUF (approximately 5 GBP) for 
participation in a 45-minute session comprising several unrelated experiments; this study 
made up the first half of the session. 
Materials and Procedure 
The materials and procedures of the present test were the same as the previous 
description with the only exception being that the colour frames were removed, such that all 
the trials appeared with identical black screen background. Since there was nothing to learn 
about colours in this test, only the RTs were measured, the PDP, the SMs, the PDW and the 
paper questionnaire was not included in the design. 
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Results 
Analysis of the RTs was conducted using the same model as the previous studies. 
Trials were described as ‘regular’ or ‘irregular’ based upon whether those trials that were 
regular or irregular in the previous designs (in the absence of colours, regularity does not 
apply directly to the present test). Once again, on average, the RTs of the ‘irregular’ trials 
were faster again (M = 452.77, SD = 6.89) than the ‘regular’ trials (M = 462.00, SD = 7.96), 
with the corresponding main effect being significant, F(1, 24) = 11.13, p = .003, η2p = .32. 
There were also significant effects of Block, F(3.37, 78.42) = 4.97, p = .003, η2p = .17; Hand-
shift, F(1, 24) = 65.20, p < .001, η2p = .73; along with a significant interaction between 
Regularity × Block, F(4.04, 97.03) = 4.97, p = .001, η2p = .17.  
The effect of which hand was used was not reliable in this study, F(1, 24) = 2.99, p = 
.097, η2p = .11, although unlike previous studies, handedness was recorded. For those with 
dominant right hand (n = 18) the right hand key trials were still numerically faster, right: M = 
453.65 ms, SD = 7.75; left: M = 461.60 ms, SD = 8.51. For those with dominant left hand (n 
= 2) the left hand key trials were faster, left: M = 452.62 ms, SD = 17.52; right: M = 456.55 
ms, SD = 25.73. 
Crucially, a mixed model ANOVA including the data from this study with those from 
the previous study showed no main effects of Group, nor any interaction between Group × 
Regularity, Fs(1, 48) < 1 (Figure 25). These results confirm that the effect whereby irregular 
RTs were shorter did not indicate learning about colour–location associations; the predictive 
peripheral stimuli did not induce measurable learning effects in the RT data. 
 Figure 25. The difference scores of the previous (
difference scores were computed by subtracting the mean regular RTs from the mean irregular RTs in 
each block. The error bar represents the adjusted 2 
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participants are informed about the predictive nature of the colour frames, thus converting the 
task to a non-incidental design. 
Experiment 2.4: Attentional Learning 
The aim of this study was to explore whether the previous lack of learning in the RT 
measures was due to the lack of attention to the colour frames. Participants in this study were, 
therefore, informed that the colours predicted the locations, and were urged to find these 
relationships.  
Methods 
Participants 
The participants were 23 undergraduate students (13 female and 10 male; M = 21.87 
years, SD = 3.68 years) of Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary and all were native 
speakers of Hungarian. Data from one participant had to be discarded from the analysis 
because of the number of incorrect key presses represented an extreme outlier. Each 
participant received 1000 HUF (approximately 5 GBP) for participation in a 45-minute 
session comprising several unrelated experiments; this study made up the first half of the 
session. 
Materials and Procedure 
The materials and procedure of the present experiment were identical to the second 
experiment (when the colour frames were present). However, an extra piece of information 
was given to the participants in the introduction to the test. They were instructed: “Pay 
attention to the colours in the frame of the computer screen. They predict the location of the 
next asterisk. Try to find out which colours best predict which asterisk.”  
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Results 
RT Measures 
The irregular trials remained to be the ones with the faster RTs (M = 461.27, SD = 
13.07) compared to the regular trial RTs (M = 470.78, SD = 14.16), F(1, 21) = 9.28, p = .006, 
η
2
p = .31. The effects of Block, F(1.96, 41.06) = 16.00, p < .001, η2p = .43; Hand-shift, F(1, 
21) = 39.92, p < .001, η2p = .66, were significant again.  
Inclusion of a between-subjects factor in the ANOVA model allowed comparison of 
these data with those of the second (uninstructed) experiment. This analysis showed no 
reliable differences: no main effect of Group, nor Group × Regularity interaction, Fs(1,45) < 
1 (Figure 26). This result indicated that the new instruction did not cause a reliably different 
pattern of results to that found in the second experiment. In other words, no evidence was 
found of directed attention modulating the amount of learning in the RT measures. 
 Figure 26. The difference scores of the previous (Study 2) and the present study (Study 
difference scores were computed by subtracting the mean regular RTs from the mean irregular RTs in 
each block. The error bar represents the adjusted 2 
interaction. 
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Figure 27. The Inclusion and Exclusion conditions of the PDP result. The chance level was 8 in the 
task. The error bars represent SEMs. 
Inclusion Condition. Following the logic of the guessing criterion the proportion of 
correct responses was compared to chance level (25%) on those trials where the participant 
reported guessing in the Inclusion condition. This proportion was not significantly different 
from chance, t(19) = 1.29, one tailed p = .106, d = .29.  
The average correlation between the confidence ratings and the performance on the 
Inclusion trials was significantly above zero, (mean r = .13, SD = .24), t(22) = 2.60, one 
tailed p = .016, d = .54. The amount of money wagered on correctness of the Inclusion trials 
did not correlate with the correctness, the average correlation coefficient was not significantly 
above zero, (mean r = .01, SD = .29), t(22) < 1.   
Exclusion Condition. The guessing criterion did not indicate unconscious knowledge 
about the colour–location associations in the Exclusion condition either, (M = 22.79 %, SD = 
9.10), t(22) < 1. The average correlation between the confidence ratings and the performance 
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on the Exclusion trials was not different from zero, (mean r = .04, SD = .22), t(20) < 1; 
neither did the amount of money wagered on correctness of the Exclusion trials correlate with 
the correctness, the mean of the correlation coefficients was not significantly above zero, 
(mean r = .01, SD = .22), t(22) < 1.   
Following the logic of SMs and the PDW the conclusion of zero correlation in the 
Exclusion condition would be the evidence of ‘unconscious knowledge’ in the PDP task. 
However, the logic of PDP claims that better-than-chance performance (i.e. successful 
avoidance of predicted responses) in the Exclusion condition is indicative of explicit 
knowledge.  
 
Discussion 
This final experiment in this chapter showed that learning about the predictive 
relationships is possible in this design, although the learning was limited to the PDP test, the 
RT measures could not detect any effect of learning. One explanation for this lack of 
sensitivity could lie in the fact that the present design was considerably more complex than 
the previous similar tasks (e.g., Lambert and Roser, 2002), also it is possible that the delay 
between the identification of the colour frames and the appearance of the target stimulus was 
still too short to let anticipatory knowledge give an RT advantage.  
Another interesting observation can be made by contrasting the results of the different 
tests of awareness. The below-chance exclusion performance indicated conscious control of 
the knowledge. However, the subjective measures and the PDW showed no evidence of 
conscious knowledge, which (according to their logic) is evidence for unconscious 
knowledge. One explanation is that the participants based their responses upon their intuition 
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in the exclusion condition – by avoiding the one about which they had a ‘hunch’ - and this 
was sufficient for the resulting good performance.  
An alternative explanation is that the participants failed to exercise sufficient 
introspection about their confidence or accurately weigh the monetary risk of their wagering 
in each of the 64 trials of the PDP task, such that the subjective measures were insensitive to 
their level of explicit knowledge. Participants may have been indiscriminate with their 
confidence or wagering scaling, or they may have settled down at a certain point on the scale.  
 
Chapter Discussion 
The aim of the experiments presented in this chapter was to investigate implicit 
learning in an incidental learning design. The incidental learning technique was a modified 
SRT task, with peripheral predictive cues. Based on the reports of previous similar studies 
(Lambert & Roser, 2001), it was hypothesised that the participants would learn the 
associations between the peripheral cues and the target locations while remaining 
unconscious of them.  
In Experiment 2.1 and 2.2 the colour of the frame predicted (probabilistically) the new 
location of the target stimulus, and thus provided an incidental learning situation. The 
instructions drew the attention of the participants only to the locations of the asterisks (except 
in Experiment 2.4). Thus, presumably, a voluntary, endogenous control of attention on the 
asterisks would not focus attentional processing upon the predictor colour frames. However, a 
possible caveat of this design could be that exogenous (reflexive) control of orienting 
(Posner, 1980) may have drawn attention to the change in colour of the peripheral colour 
frame, causing them to draw focal attention, as well as simply being perceived. The lack of 
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observable learning in Experiment 2.2, and the very limited effect of learning (PDP) in 
Experiment 2.3 suggest that this was not the case. The frames had little or no impact on 
behavioural responding.  
When comparing the RTs on regular trials with those on the irregular trials, no 
learning advantage was found for trials on which the asterisk was predicted by the colour 
frame. The overall absence of learning was confirmed in Experiment 2.3 where the task was 
administered without the colour frames. The results of this latter experiment, where the target 
stimulus followed the previous fixed random sequence, were not reliably different from the 
data of the previous two experiments. The predictive colour frames of the task were within 
the visual field of the participants across the 720 trials of the task on the first two experiments 
and yet, contrary to the previous expectations, learning was not induced.  
In Experiments 2.2 and 2.4, learning was measured in the forced choice PDP. This 
learning was more pronounced in Experiment 2.4, when the participants were informed about 
the relationship of the colours and target stimuli. Surprisingly, this learning did not facilitate 
RT difference between the regular and irregular trials. Also, the knowledge was measured as 
explicit in the PDP (successful avoidance of predicted locations) and by the positive 
correlation between the correct choices and the subjective confidence (at least in the 
Inclusion condition), but met the criteria for unconscious according to the PDW, the guessing 
criterion, and the subjective confidence (only in the Exclusion condition). 
Overall, these results trigger two important questions: (1) why the participants did not 
show RT learning in this task, and (2) why the post-experimental tests did suggest different 
conclusions about the knowledge awareness of the participants. 
The first possible reason why the participants did not show learning in terms of RTs in 
this task might be design specific. One difference between the present experiment and the 
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previous spatial cueing and attentional learning studies is that here a more complex design 
was employed. This modification seemed to be necessary to ascertain the incidental nature of 
the test. In Lambert and Roser’s study (2001), where the two target locations were predicted 
by two peripheral colour cues 17 out of the 30 participants reported some awareness of the 
associations. It is possible, however, that the probabilistic contingencies of the 16 colours and 
the four locations in the present design was too demanding, and thus this complexity lead to 
learning measurable only by the PDP test.   
Another reason for this lack of learning might be that these colour cue–target location 
associations are not prone to be learned that easily. The predictive features were colours in 
this task and not locations as in a traditional SRT task such as those in Chapter II. It has been 
argued in the visual perception literature that position and presence changes are qualitatively 
different from colour changes (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Aginsky and Tarr (2000) found 
that while the position and presence can be automatically encoded the colour change needs 
active engagement of attention. This notion may be of key relevance to learning, since many 
researchers of implicit learning acknowledge that focused attention to the task stimuli is 
necessary for learning to happen (Dienes, Broadbent, & D. Berry, 1991; Jimenez & Mendez, 
1999; e.g., A. S. Reber, 1993; Rowland & Shanks, 2006a).  
The second question relates to the disagreement between the applied awareness tests. 
In the informed version of the experiment (2.4) both the inclusion condition and, critically, 
the exclusion condition of the PDP reflected an effect of learning. The inclusion performance 
was reliably above chance, while the exclusion performance was reliably below chance. This 
I > B > E pattern of results indicated the presence of explicit knowledge (Wilkinson & 
Shanks, 2004). Furthermore, the subjective confidence measures in the Inclusion condition 
indicated that the participants had higher confidence in their correct choices than in their 
incorrect choices. In contrast, the guessing criterion and the PDW and the subjective 
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confidence reports (in the Inclusion condition) did not indicate the presence of conscious 
knowledge. Above-chance behavioural performance in the absence of corresponding 
subjective reports is typically interpreted as evidence for unconscious knowledge.  
Some authors (Q. Fu et al., 2008; Norman et al., 2006) have argued that successful, 
(below-chance) performance in the PDP Exclusion condition does not necessitate the 
presence of conscious structural knowledge. That is, the sense of feeling-of-knowing is 
enough for correct exclusion. If this argument is accepted, and the subjective measures of 
awareness are taken at face value, the learning observed in this chapter might indicate 
implicit knowledge.  
On the other hand, there might be simpler explanations of the absence of correlation 
observed between these subjective measures and performance. An essential problem with 
PDW is that an absence of increasing betting on correct trials could be the result of risk 
aversion. Therefore, such a lack of correlation is not direct evidence of the absence of 
conscious processing. In accord with critics in recent literature (Schurger & Sher, 2008), this 
conjecture was supported by the present data in that the reported risk aversion positively 
correlated with the amount the participants were willing to wager. 
In the present design it is also plausible that the participants may not have exercised 
accurate introspection about their confidence or precisely weighted the monetary risk of their 
wagering in each of the 64 trials of the PDP task. Some participants may have wagered or 
reported their confidence in a random fashion, or simply settled for a certain point on the 
scale.  
A further peculiar finding in this study was that the participants produced faster RTs 
on the irregular trials than on the regular trials. This pattern of results, as shown in 
Experiment 2.3, could have not been the result of regularity, but rather some circumstantial 
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biases. It is clear, therefore, that this outcome arose from using the same fixed pseudo-
random orders for each participant. This was an unexpected by-product of the original plan of 
this study, which involved a trial-by-trial analysis of the development of learning between 
participants; a fixed order was reasoned to be more suitable for this purpose.  
The significant effects of hand-shift and dominant hand on RTs are of peripheral 
interest in this study, but are worth mentioning from a methodological perspective. In each of 
the experiments in this chapter the RTs were reliably faster on trials which did not require 
hand-shift, where the previous location was reported by the same hand. In a typical 
deterministic four choice SRT sequence the average probability of hand-shift is 2/3 and the 
probability of same hand location is 1/3 since the sequences avoid the consecutive repetition 
of any location. If, however, in a fully random control sequence any of the four locations 
have equal chance to follow the given location then the probability of hand-shift and same-
hand locations will become equal, 2/4. This dissimilarity can be advantageous for an 
unconstrained random sequence having more of the faster same-hand trials7. Therefore, any 
SRT study allowing for location repetition in the random control sequence would decrease 
the power of finding RT difference between the two types of sequences, whereas a design 
such as that used in Chapter II, where the ‘random’ sequences are made up of valid SOC sub-
sequences, avoids this issue.  
The other unplanned observation in this study was the measured faster right-hand RTs 
compared to the left-hand RTs. It is unsurprising that the dominant hand might be faster in 
SRT tasks because in general it is more trained in sequential skills (Deroost, Zeeuws, & 
Soetens, 2006). Functional imaging data suggests that the two hands have asymmetric 
cortical representations in the execution of movement selection, where during right hand 
                                                 
7
 This pattern was confirmed in a post-hoc analysis of the RTs of the random sequences in Experiment 
1.2 as well. The same hand RTs were reliably faster than the hand-shift RTs, t(12) = 2.40, p = .034, d = .07.  
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movements the left hemisphere representations are active, while during left hand movement 
both hemispheres are engaged (Schluter, Krams, Rushworth, & Passingham, 2001). 
Consequently, varying proportions of left- and right-hand responses across sequences would 
represent another source of uncounted biases in sequence learning tasks. 
These four experiments aimed to assess awareness in an incidental learning design. 
The attempts failed to demonstrate learning in the typical implicit learning RT measure. In 
the PDP test some learning was measurable, which was clearest when explicit instructions 
were given. The results shed light on some central issues of peripheral learning and testing 
techniques of awareness assessment, as well as provide new support for the models of 
learning (e.g., Jimenez & Mendez, 1999) that claim that perception is not sufficient for 
implicit learning to happen, but that the stimuli must be selected by attention.  
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IV. SELECTIVE ATTENTION AND LEARNING 
This chapter is dedicated to the investigation of the relationship between attention and 
learning. The central question of this research was to determine whether learning is a 
necessary consequence of selective attention.  
In agreement with a considerable number of studies in the field, the results of the 
previous experiment suggested that selective attention on the relevant features of the related 
stimuli is necessary for learning of their association. The idea that attention is sufficient for 
learning (e.g., Logan & Etherton, 1994), however, represents a different the suggestion: that 
whenever the relevant features of the stimuli are selectively processed (and baseline 
conditions are provided) their relationship will be learned. This criterion has two central 
aspects. Firstly, it tacitly infers that consciousness is not necessary for learning. Secondly, it 
claims that learning of an association between co-occurring stimuli is an obligatory 
consequence of attention on these stimuli. Before describing the experimental approach taken 
to address these questions of selective attention, awareness and learning, it is essential to 
review these concepts and what is already known about their relationship. 
Attention and Awareness 
According to the Higher Order Thought theory (HOT; Rosenthal, 2005), the term 
awareness refers to a knowledge that we are consciously aware of knowing. As described 
previously (Chapter III), the HOT theory states that a conscious mental state is a mental state 
of which we are conscious. To understand the implications of this statement for the learning 
literature, it is useful to understand what is meant by first- and second-order consciousness, 
and how these terms relate to each other.  
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There are generally two levels of consciousness discussed in the literature. First-order 
consciousness simply refers to the experience (qualia) or knowledge. A mental state is first-
order conscious if it has experiential properties, even though this mental state is not 
represented by any of the agent’s mental states (Block, 1995). The next (higher) level of 
consciousness is the second-order consciousness. A mental state is second-order conscious if 
we have a representation of currently having that mental state (Cleeremans, 2008). Therefore, 
meta-knowledge (knowing about knowledge) is a second-order mental state where we 
represent ourselves as having a first-order representation (in this case knowledge). In the 
implicit learning literature, the term conscious or explicit refers either to these second-order 
mental states (e.g., Dienes, 2008), or to a super-system with the ability to flexibly control 
behaviour (e.g., Frensch, 1998). 
Like awareness, the term attention has no universally accepted definition either. In the 
learning literature, two main forms of attention are generally distinguished: resource (or 
central) attention and selective (or input) attention (Johnston & Dark, 1986). Resource 
attention is a limited resource that requires mental effort and relies on working memory. The 
function of selective attention, however, is to focus cognitive resources on the relevant 
stimuli while ignoring the irrelevant information (Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004). 
Taking an example, when we are trying to listen to our friend at a party, we use our resource 
attention to follow what she is saying, but we use our selective attention to select her voice 
from the other voices in the room. This chapter will focus only on the role of selective 
attention in learning.   
There is no general agreement in the literature about the relationship of attention and 
consciousness. Baars (1997) defined attention generally as the “selection and maintenance of 
conscious contents” (p. 363). This implies that properties of attention should be viewed as 
properties of consciousness. According to this view, consciousness and attention are still 
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different concepts: attention is an access to consciousness. To use his analogy, attention is 
like selecting a television channel and what appears on the screen is consciousness. In Baars’ 
model attention can trigger consciousness and consciousness can also interact with attention.  
In line with this approach, Cowan (1995) argues that we should regard the content of 
consciousness as equivalent to the focus of attention for the sake of being able to link it to 
some observable quantity. Cowan assumed awareness (in a healthy population) to be a 
unified entity, so in this sense we can talk only about something being in and out of 
awareness or attention. Under attention he refers to only ‘new, unpractised selection’ 
differentiating it from ‘automatic selection’.  
Other theorists have attempted to distinguish selective attention from consciousness. 
In Posner’s (1993) attentional system model, attention is separated from consciousness and 
has three basic functions: “orienting to sensory stimuli, particularly locations in visual 
space; detecting target events, whether sensory or from memory; and maintaining the alert 
state” (2000, p. 617). Based on psychophysiological research, Koch and Tsuchiya (2007) 
claimed that selective attention and consciousness are two distinct brain processes. In their 
description, the two processes have substantially different functions. The functional role of 
attention is to select information of current relevance, while neglecting non-attended, 
irrelevant information: “[t]op-down attention selects input defined by a circumscribed region 
in space (focal attention), by a particular feature (feature-based attention) or by an object 
(object-based attention)” p.16. The function of consciousness is to perform tasks such as 
summarising all information, detecting anomalies, decision making, language, setting long-
term goals, and rational thinking.  
This distinction of functions implies that it is possible for attention and consciousness 
to work in opposition to one another. Analysing the processing of visual events and 
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behaviours, Koch and Tsuchiya (2007) provided examples of the four possible ways that 
attention and consciousness can interact. (a) Attention with consciousness: working memory, 
full reportability; (b) No attention, no consciousness: e.g., formation of afterimages, zombie 
behaviours; (c) Attention, no consciousness: e.g., priming, visual search; (d) Consciousness in 
the near absence of attention: pop-out in search, iconic memory, gist (Koch & Tsuchiya, 
2007). 
Attention and Learning 
Resource attention and selective attention seem to have a different influence on 
learning. The influence of resource attention upon implicit learning is often assessed by 
comparing performance on an implicit learning task with and without a concurrent secondary 
task (e.g., Frensch, Lin, & Buchner, 1998; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; Shanks & Channon, 
2002). Early works implied that implicit learning is unaffected by the burden of secondary 
tasks (e.g., Jimenez & Mendez, 1999; Mayr, 1996; Reed & P. Johnson, 1994). However, 
more recent studies have found that load on central attention impairs learning on the task 
(e.g., Shanks, Rowland, & Ranger, 2005). Therefore, an impairment due to central attention 
load seems to imply that the learning is not entirely implicit. It has been suggested, however, 
that the interference of a secondary task may be restricted only to the expression of learning, 
while not affecting the learning itself (e.g., Deroost, Coomans, & Soetens, 2009; Frensch et 
al., 1998). 
Selective attention, on the other hand, seems to be resistant to perceptual load or input 
complexity in implicit learning (Rowland & Shanks, 2006a, 2006b). That is, under increased 
selection difficulty, performance is not decreased if the selection is purely perceptual 
(Deroost et al., 2009). These findings may be explained by perceptual load theory (Lavie et 
al., 2004), which describes two mechanisms of selective attention: an early passive selection 
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that focuses attention to task-relevant stimuli when the perceptual load is high, and a late 
selection that is needed to ignore task-irrelevant stimuli if the perceptual load is low and in 
the case that the spare perceptual capacity would otherwise “involuntarily spill over to the 
task-irrelevant stimuli” (Deroost et al., 2009, p. 85) without executive control. The proposed 
first, perceptual selection mechanism leaves performance unaffected by high perceptual load 
since irrelevant distractors are not perceived. The second, active selection mechanism 
depends on higher cognitive function and is, therefore, of limited capacity (Lavie et al., 
2004). This theory might explain the seemingly contradicting results showing that the 
performance on sequence learning tasks can be unaffected (e.g., Rowland & Shanks, 2006a) 
or even increased (Deroost et al., 2009) by high perceptual load, but is impaired by cognitive 
load (e.g., tone-counting: Nissen & Bullemer, 1987).  
As described in Chapter III, Lambert and his colleagues used a spatial cueing 
technique to investigate the role of derived attention in learning. In the spatial cueing 
research the Jamesian notion of derived attention is used to “describe the propensity of cue 
stimuli to capture attention, by virtue of learned associations between cue attributions and 
target location” (Lambert, 2003, p. 272). Mere exposure to a predictive relationship of cues 
and target locations is enough for learning to occur, processed by either overt or covert 
attention (Lambert & Duddy, 2002; Lambert et al., 1999; Lambert & Roser, 2001; Lambert, 
Roser, Wells, & Heffer, 2006).  
A series of recent studies demonstrated that classic implicit learning tasks require 
selective attention (Hoffmann & Sebald, 2005; Jimenez & Mendez, 1999). Jimenez and 
Mendez (1999) administered a probabilistic Serial Reaction Time task (SRT) where the 
participants had to report the appearance of the stimulus on the screen by pressing the 
corresponding keys. They found that the predictability of the shape of the stimuli contributed 
to the performance only when the task instructions directed attention to the given dimension 
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of the target stimuli. These findings suggest that automatic associative learning happens only 
among those events that are attended to in the task (Stadler, 1995). 
The importance of selective attention in implicit learning has been demonstrated with 
negative priming designs (Cock, D. C. Berry, & Buchner, 2002; Deroost, Zeischka, & 
Soetens, 2007). Negative priming in sequence learning refers to the observation that 
performance is impaired if to-be-learned sequences have previously been ignored. The 
negative priming effect can be explained by the suggestion that the selective attention 
required to discriminate between relevant and irrelevant stimuli results in learning, even for 
irrelevant stimuli (Cock et al., 2002; Deroost et al., 2007).  
Results such as these have led many researchers to view associative learning as an 
automatic process that associates all the concurrently present components in the focus of 
attention (e.g., Frensch & Miner, 1994; Pacton & Perruchet, 2008; Logan & Etherton, 1994). 
Pacton and Perruchet (2008) proposed an attention-based associative account for 
(nonadjacent dependency) learning in which they claim that “selective attention is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for learning to occur” (p. 92). By the word sufficient the 
authors mean that “no other condition is required, neither in participants’ disposition (such 
as their intention to learn) nor in the external display (such as the spatial or temporal 
relationship between the events)” (p. 82). The authors go on to clarify that “this proposal is 
consonant with the position [… that views] construed associative learning as an automatic 
process that associates all the components that are simultaneously present in the attentional 
focus” (p. 93).  
This idea resembles Treisman’s binding theory, which is described as “... focal 
attention provides the “glue” which integrates the initially separable features into unitary 
objects” (Treisman & Gelade, 1980, p. 98). Similarly, the Obligatory Encoding principle of 
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Logan’s Instance Theory predicts that “... people will learn the co-occurrences they attend to. 
Attention is sufficient for learning co-occurrences; it may even be necessary.” (Logan & 
Etherton, 1994, p. 1023). 
The Present Study 
The work to be presented in this chapter will focus on two aspects of these claims. 
Firstly, the joint attention that is assumed necessary for learning will be interpreted narrowly 
as the concurrent activation of the representation of the cue and the target stimuli (rather than 
a representation of their association). It is difficult to find an operational definition of 
attentional activation which will ensure that stimuli will be ‘simultaneously present’ in the 
attentional focus. Even if two stimuli are positioned on the same screen, they may be attended 
to in succession, separated by the time taken for saccadic eye movements between the two 
locations. In practice, however, if attention is the enhanced activation of some information (a 
subset of working memory), then simultaneity is assumed unless the information exceeds 
capacity (3 to 5 chunks), or the persistence time (activation fading: 10 to 20 s), limits of 
working memory (Cowan, 1999).  
 Secondly, the notion of attention being sufficient for learning will be interpreted as 
implying that a participant’s intention to learn about or awareness of the relationship between 
the presented features is not needed.   
The aim of these experiments is thus to test the hypothesis that learning an association 
between two stimuli is a compulsory consequence of the concurrent processing of each of the 
two stimuli. To this aim a new test, the Selective Attention Learning Task (SALT), was 
devised. During the SALT, participants were performing two tasks. The first task was to 
detect the location of a target stimulus appearing in one of the four corners of the screen and 
to report the appearance by key-pressing. In a later part of the task a secondary task was 
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introduced. Between the target detection trials, a coloured geometrical form appeared in the 
middle of the screen. Each form was one of the nine possible combinations of three colours 
and three geometrical shapes. The participants were asked to detect specific shape-colour 
combinations and respond by key-press. The two tasks were related in that the identity of the 
shapes was predictive of the location of the target cues.  
Participants were initially not informed about the relationship between the shapes and 
the target location. The key manipulation involved some participants subsequently being 
informed that the colour of the forms predicts the target locations; these participants were not 
informed about the predictive power of the shapes (the features were counterbalanced for 
another group of participants).  
Since the participants were asked to be as fast and as accurate as possible in 
responding to the targets, the RTs for target detections act as a measure of the degree to 
which learning had allowed the target location to be anticipated. If selective attention is 
sufficient for learning then selecting the relevant features of the cue and target stimuli should 
result in learning of their association. As the informed (e.g., shape) and uninformed (e.g., 
colour) information were equally taking part in the detection task, in the case of above-
chance detection performance the relevant stimuli must have been attended to. 
 Should this learning happen, RT decrease is expected to be found for the location 
detection trials preceded by predictive cues, relative to the trials following unpredictive 
control cues. By combining predictive and non-predictive features, RTs could be assessed 
after presentation of cues whose predictive power derived solely from the ‘informed’ 
perceptual dimension and compared with RTs for equivalent stimuli which were predictive 
only on the basis of the ‘uninformed’ dimension. 
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Experiment 3.1: SALT Study 1 
In the first experiment of this study, the participants received the SALT task in two 
groups. One group was informed about the predictive power of either the colour or the shape 
within the test, while the other group was not informed about any association between the 
cues and target stimuli. Participants’ conscious knowledge about the cue-target associations 
was assessed in a variety of post-experimental tests: PDP, PDW, Confidence Ratings, 
Structural Knowledge Assessment and a Verbal Report test. 
Methods 
Participants 
The participants were 63 undergraduate students (35 female and 28 male M = 23.06 
years, SD = 3.90 years) of Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary and all were native 
speakers of Hungarian. Five persons had to be discarded from the analysis due to not having 
followed the test instructions8. Each participant received 1500 HUF (approximately 6 GBP) 
for participation in a 45-minute session comprising several unrelated experiments; this study 
made up the first half of the session. 
Materials and Design 
The task contained two types of trial: coloured cue trials and visual search task (VST) 
trials. On VST trials, the computer displayed four filled black circles which appeared in 
square location markers in each of the four corners of a gray computer screen. Three circles 
were distractor stimuli, 50 pixels in diameter, and the fourth was the target circle, 12% larger 
than the distractors.  
                                                 
8
 Three persons did not complete the whole test, one person misunderstood the instructions and another 
person produced not enough valid values for the analysis. 
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On the detection task trials, cue forms were presented in the centre of the screen 
which predicted the location of the target in the following VST trial. The coloured cues were 
formed by all possible combinations of three shapes (square, cross, triangle) and three colours 
(red, blue, yellow). The resulting nine different cues predicted the possible locations of the 
target stimulus in the following VST trial (Table 6). Colours I and II, and Shapes I and II 
always indicated that the target cue on the following VST trial would appear on a specific 
half of the screen (e.g., Shape I indicates left, Shape II indicates right; Colour I indicates top, 
Colour II indicates bottom). If the vertical position was indicated by shape, the colours 
indicated horizontal position, and vice versa. Shape III and Colour III had no predictive 
power. The shapes and colours acting as I, II and III were counterbalanced across the 
participants.  
Table 6 
The Relationship of the Cues to the Target Stimuli 
A 
 
B 
 
Note. Table 6A displays the relationship of the nine possible combinations (cues) of the three shapes 
and three colours to the target locations of the VST. The target locations are the four corners of screen 
in the order as shown in the figure (B). The bold numbers in A correspond to the possible locations of 
the target stimuli as numbered in B. 
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The nine cues were grouped into different types reflecting the degree to which they 
predicted target cue location (See Table 7). The four possible combinations of Colours I and 
II, and Shapes I and II, were labelled Type A stimuli, as they fully predicted the location 
(corner) of the target stimuli and, thus, had the same predictive power. Type B stimuli were 
Cues 3, 6, 7, 8 (containing either Shape III, or Colour III, but not both) which determined 
only which half of the screen where the target stimulus would appear in (top or bottom; left 
or right). Cue 9 (the combination of the nonpredictive Colour III and Shape III) was Type C, 
followed equally often by all four target locations. Type D cues were cues made of unfilled 
Shapes I and II, or circles filled with Colour I or II, which appeared only in the PDP phase.  
During the main task, participants were also required to perform a detection task 
which required responses to two Type A stimuli: the combinations of Colour I and Shape I, 
and Colour II and Shape II. These stimuli, whose presentation was tied to an action in the 
dual-task phase, were denoted Type A1. The action tied to Type A1 was the press of the four 
keys in the detection task. The remaining Type A stimuli (combinations of Colour I and 
Shape II, and Colour II and Shape I) were not action-tied, and denoted Type A2.  
During the task, participants in the Informed group were instructed about one of the 
two predictive dimensions (e.g., some colours predict that the next targets will appear on the 
top or bottom of the screen). In the case of the Informed group those Type B & D cues for 
which the predictive dimension matched this information were denoted Type B1 & D1; for 
Types B2 & D2 the predictive features were those about which the participants were not 
informed. For the Uninformed group there was no distinction within Types B & D. These 
stimulus types are summarised in Table 7. 
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Table 7 
Types of Cues by Predictive Power and Action 
Type Cue Predictive Power Description 
Type A1 1, 5 Full Action-tied 
Type A2 2, 4 Full Not action-tied 
Type B1 3, 6, or 7, 8 Half Informed feature is predictive 
Type B2 3, 6, or 7, 8 Half Uninformed feature is predictive 
Type C 9 None Not predictive 
Type D1 - (Half) Informed feature alone 
Type D2 - (Half) Uninformed feature alone 
Note. Full predictive power determined the exact location (corner) of the target stimulus after the cue. 
Half predictive power means that the cue predicted only the side of the screen where the stimulus 
would appear. Type D cues appear only in the PDP test. 
 
Procedure 
The test consisted of three phases which was followed by a PDP test. The first 
(Practice) phase of the task involved VST trials only. The participants were instructed to 
detect the large (target) circle in one of the corners in each trial by pressing down one of the 
four fingers placed on the four corresponding keys: Alt (left thumb), W (left index finger), 
AltGr (right thumb), and P (right index finger).  They were told to be as quick and as accurate 
as possible with the key presses. The first phase of the test consisted of 45 randomly ordered 
trials. The stimuli stayed on the screen for 1000 ms or shorter in the case of accurate 
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detection. After each accurate detection the next trial appeared with a 500 ms delay, during 
which time the target locations remained empty. The participant was allowed 3000 ms to 
respond, after which time a message appeared on the screen informing them that their time 
had run out. 
In the second phase a Dual Task was presented. This Dual Task included 450 pairs of 
cue trials and VST target trials presented in alternation (Figure 28). A secondary task 
instruction was introduced at the beginning of this phase: to press all the four keys together if 
a cue appearing in the centre of the screen before each trial is one of two named cues. The 
two target cues were the two stimuli of Type A1 (combinations of Shape I and Colour I, and 
Shape II and Colour II). Verbal descriptions of the two target cues remained displayed at the 
top of the screen throughout. The cues stayed in middle of the screen for 1400 ms or shorter 
in the case of accurate detection. Each cue appeared on the screen 50 times in random order. 
The target locations appeared on the screen after the disappearance of each cue with a 
500 ms delay. When the detection of the target cues was missed a message appeared on the 
screen informing them about their miss. The total number of cue detection responses, the 
number of cue detection, and the percentage of cue targets detected were constantly displayed 
on the left side of the screen to motivate accuracy. The next trial started after the detection of 
the target stimulus with a 300 ms delay during which time the target locations remained 
empty. 
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Figure 28. An example of cue and stimuli trials from the second phase of the experiment. The cue in 
the middle of the screen predicts the location of the target-stimulus (greater filled circle) in the 
following trials as described in Table 6. 
After each block of 45 trial pairs, which contained 5 presentations of each cue, the 
participants received feedback about their performance in the previous block and had a short 
break. In the second break of this phase, half of the participants (Informed group) were told 
that they could be faster in the task if they pay attention to the relationship between one 
aspect of the cues (shape for half the group, colour for the remainder) and the location of the 
target-stimuli. For example, a participant might be informed that the shapes of the cues 
determine whether the following target stimuli appear at the top or at the bottom part of the 
screen. The remaining participants (Uninformed group) were not informed about the 
relationship between the cues and the location of the target stimuli.  
The third phase (Single Task) of the test was similar to the second phase without the 
additional dual task requirement to make a response to Type A1 stimuli. The coloured cues 
still appeared on the middle of the screen between the VST trials, but the participants were 
required only to detect the VST target circles. This third phase consisted of 90 randomly 
ordered cue-stimulus pairing trials. 
After the main task, the participants were presented with a test based on the logic of a 
PDP. In the inclusion condition, the previously seen cues or empty (colourless) shapes or 
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colours appearing in a new shape (circles) were presented in the middle of the screen. The 
instruction was to indicate in which corner the target-cue would appear after the presented 
cue by pressing one of the corresponding keys. The cues were presented in random order, 
each cue appearing twice. After each prediction the participants were asked to rate their 
subjective confidence in their decision (50 – 100%), or (on every second trial) to wager how 
much they would bet (50 – 100 HUF) that their decision was right, and then to report whether 
their decision was based more on memory or on guess.  
The exclusion condition of the PDP was identical to the inclusion condition, with the 
exception that the participants were asked to show where the target-cues would not appear 
after the presented cues.  
After the experiment, the participants were asked to fill out a one-page paper 
questionnaire about their verbalisable knowledge and their risk aversion (Appendix F). The 
verbal report question asked “If you noticed any regularity in the appearance of the bigger 
filled circles then what was it and when did you notice it?” The participants also had to report 
what risk they would take for different monetary gains. On each such trial, participants were 
asked to choose between 100% certainty of winning 1000 HUF (10 pounds in the English 
version) and 50% chance of winning a larger amount. The value of the larger amount began 
at 1500 HUF and increased by 500 HUF (5 pounds) with each trial.  
Results 
Detection Task 
The aim of the detection task in the Dual Task phase was to induce selective attention 
to the relevant features. Performance in this detection task showed that the participants 
followed the instructions and correctly categorised the selected cues. For the Uninformed 
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group, Hit Rate 94%, False Alarm 7%. For the Informed group, Hit Rate 93%, False Alarm 
5%. There was no evidence that the two groups differed in their hit rate, nor false alarm rate, 
t(56) < 1. These results confirm that in both groups the participants attended to the relevant 
features of the cues. 
Reaction Time Measures 
If participants in this experiment learn about the relationship between the cues 
(coloured shapes) and the target stimuli then one way in which this may be indicated is in 
terms of a difference in RT for detecting the target stimuli after cues with different predictive 
power. Figure 29 shows the RTs from the third phase of the experiment, where the task of the 
90 randomly ordered cue-stimulus pairing trials did not require active categorisation. These 
means were analysed by means of a Group (Informed versus Uninformed) × Type (A1, A2, 
B, C) mixed ANOVA. A significant effect of Type, F(1.89, 105.53) = 16.65, p < .001, η2p = 
.23,  confirms that some learning occurred in that different cues produced different RTs. 
Figure 29 suggests that the learning effects are different in the Informed and Uninformed 
groups, confirmed by the interaction of Group × Type, F(1.89, 105.53) = 22.82, p < .001, η2p 
= .29. In fact, the Uninformed group alone showed no evidence of learning (main effect of 
Type, F < 1).  
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Figure 29. Mean RTs of the two groups in the five types of trials in the Single Task phase. For Type 
A1 and A2 the cue – target relationship was fully deterministic, but A1 was also action-tied; for Type 
B trials only one of the features (shape/colour) was predictive. For the Informed group on Type B1 
trials the predictive feature was the one that they were informed about; on Type B2 trials the 
predictive feature was the one that they were not informed about. For the Uninformed group Type B1 
and B2 trials were equivalent. Type C cues had random relationship to the target locations. The error 
bars represent SEMs. 
A more detailed analysis of learning in the Informed group was performed by means 
of pairwise comparisons, which showed that participants were faster on Type A1, A2 and B1 
than on the random Type C, ts(26) ≥ 5.54, ps < .001 (Bonferroni corrected α = .01), ds ≥ .87. 
Despite being action-tied in the Dual Task phase, RTs after the Type A1 cues were similar to 
those after Type A2 cues in the third, single-task phase, t(26) < 1.  There was no evidence of 
a difference between Type A and B1 RTs, t(26) < 1, suggesting that the participants were as 
fast following ‘half’ predictive power  as on the ‘full’ predictive power trials.    
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As it was described above, the Informed group were told that they could be faster with 
the detection of the target stimuli if they notice that one feature (e.g., colour) of the cues can 
help predict the stimuli to appear on one side (e.g., top or bottom) of the screen (the 
conditions were counterbalanced). The crucial hypothesis in this design was that attention to 
one piece of information about the task (e.g., colour of cue – vertical stimulus position 
relationships), would preclude attention to the other, equivalent relationship between the cues 
and target stimuli (e.g., shape of cue – horizontal stimulus position relationships). If attention 
to the relationship is required for learning, this will lead to selective learning of the informed 
relationship. Alternatively, if participants learn purely from the selective processing of cue 
features (induced by the detection task) and the target locations, then learning should be 
similar for both the informed and non-informed feature relationships.  
 The key test trials were Type B, where the stimuli were predicted only by the colour 
(Cue 3, 6) or only by the shape (Cue 7, 8) features. For the Informed group, Type B1 trials 
were those where the predictive feature was the one that they were informed about; Type B2 
trials were those where the predictive feature was the one those that they were not informed 
about. In accord with the hypothesis, participants in the Informed group were much faster on 
Type B1 (M = 568.04, SD = 115.49) trials than on Type B2 trials (M = 674.27, SD = 110.08), 
t(26) = 6.31, p < .001, d = .94. In fact, the mean RT for Type B2 was not significantly 
different from that of the random Type C, t(26) < 1. These results show that although 
participants in the Informed group showed learning, it was selective to the informed 
relationship: there was no evidence of learning about predictive features about which they 
were not informed. 
One could reasonably argue that it is possible that the Uninformed group did not show 
learning in the final Single Task phase because the removal of the dual-task categorisation 
requirement reduced attention to the cues. The analysis of the RT differences in the Dual 
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Task learning phase, however, argues against this account. Analysis of the Dual Task phase 
(Type A1 trials were excluded from this analysis since their RTs were biased by additional 
key presses9) showed a significant Group × Type interaction, F(1.57, 87.79) = 16.34, p < 
.001, η2p = .23, with no evidence of any difference between responses to the different 
stimulus types in the Uninformed group, F(1.81, 54.37) = 2.24, p = .12, η2p = .07. As for the 
Single Task phase, for the Informed group both Type A2 and Type B1 received faster 
responses than the random trials (Type C), both ts(26) ≥ 4.30, ps < .001, ds ≥ .45, whereas 
Type B2 trials were not different in speed from Type C, t(26) < 1,  (Figure 30). These results 
indicate that the learning measured in the final test phase was already measurable during the 
learning phase, with no evidence of learning in the Uninformed group, despite the 
requirement that they attend to the relevant stimuli. 
 
Figure 30. Mean RTs of Types of the two groups in the Dual Task phase. Type A1 was excluded from 
the analysis since those trials were part of the categorisation task and their RTs were biased by 
                                                 
9
 This is the reason why the Single Task was included, to allow an unbiased measure of the learning 
effects. 
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additional key presses; for Type A2 the cue – target relationship was fully deterministic; for Type B 
trials only one of the features (shape/colour) was predictive. For the Informed group on Type B1 trials 
the predictive feature was the one that they were informed about; on Type B2 trials the predictive 
feature was the one that they were not informed about. For the Uninformed group all Type B trials 
were equivalent. Type C cues had random relationship to the target locations. The error bars represent 
SEMs. 
 
Process Dissociation Procedure  
After the RT task the participants’ knowledge about the cue-stimuli relationship was 
assessed, as described above. Inspection of the PDP results depicted in Figure 31 clearly 
reflects the considerable difference in knowledge between the two groups. A Group × 
Condition (Inclusion-Exclusion) × Type (A, B, D)10 mixed ANOVA revealed a significant 
effect of Condition, F(1, 54) = 67.41, p < .001, η2p = .56. The difference between groups is 
confirmed by a Group × Condition interaction, F(1, 54) = 33.54, p < .001, η2p = .38. 
Analysing the Uninformed group alone, interestingly a reliable effect of Condition was 
found, F(1, 29) = 4.36, p = .046, η2p = .13, showing some evidence of flexible knowledge. 
One-sample t tests showed that no types differed significantly from chance level, except for 
Type B in the Inclusion condition, t(29) = 2.74, p= .010 (corrected α = .013), d = .50. Thus, 
despite showing no evidence of learning in the RT data, it appears that at least some members 
of the Uninformed group acquired some knowledge about certain cue-stimuli relationships. 
                                                 
10
 Since Type C had no predictive power, performance on those trials could not be evaluated. 
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Figure 31. The performance of the Uninformed and the Informed Groups in the Inclusion and 
Exclusion conditions along the different types of cues. The locations of the target stimuli were 
predicted in the case of Type A1 and A2 cues both by shape and colour; Type B1 only by the 
informed features; Type B2 only by the uninformed features (only the Informed group was informed 
about these features). Type D1 and Type D2 were previously not seen ‘only colour’ or ‘only shape’ 
stimuli, Type D1 were the informed featured; Type D2 were the not informed features. The chance 
level was unified to 25%. The error bars represent the confidence intervals with corrected α. 
In the Informed group Type A1, A2, B1 and D1 were all significantly different from 
chance level in both conditions, ts(25) ≥ 3.89, p ≤ .001, d ≥ .76. Analysis of types B2 and D2 
showed no reliable evidence of learning the predictive relationships about which the 
participants were not informed. Although the mean of Type B2 is below chance-level in the 
Exclusion condition, suggesting successful responding, after a Bonferroni correction this 
difference is not significant, t(25) = 2.27, p = .032 (corrected α = .008), d = .45. The crucial 
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Type D2 test was also not different from chance, Inclusion: t(25) = 1.47, p = .153, d = .29; 
Exclusion: t(25) < 1.  
Subjective Measures  
Confidence measures. After each PDP trial the participants were asked about their 
confidence about the correctness of their choices or (on every second trial) about how much 
money they would wager on it. It was expected that people would be more confident about 
their choices about the more predictable cues than the less predictable cues if they were 
aware that they had learned about their association. A Group × Type mixed ANOVA 
revealed a significant effect of Type, F(4.83, 246,20) = 13.72, p < .001, η2p = .21; and Group 
× Type interaction, F(4.74, 246,34) = 11.01, p < .001, η2p = .18 (Figure AF). The between-
subjects Group effect was also significant, F(1, 51) = 6.03, p = .018, η2p = .11. A repeated-
measures ANOVA showed that the difference between the types within the Uninformed 
group was not significant, F(3.03, 87.93) = 2.37, p = .076, η2p = .08. The confidence 
measures could not reveal any differentiation of the types within the Uninformed group. 
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Figure 32. The reported confidence measures of the Uninformed and the Informed groups in their 
decisions about the different types of cues. 50% confidence represents complete uncertainty, 100% 
confidence represents complete certainty. The error bars depict SEMs. 
Pairwise comparisons of the types within the Informed group showed that the 
participants were significantly more confident about their decisions about Type A1, A2, B1 
and D1 cues than about the control Type C, ts(24) ≥ 5.36, ps ≤ .001 (corrected α = .007), ds ≥ 
.83. Importantly, the participants had no more confidence about Type D2 than Type C, t(24) 
< 1. 
Post-Decision Wagering. Similarly to the confidence measures, in the wagering test 
the Group × Type mixed ANOVA showed a significant effect of Type, F(3.93, 208.108) = 
11.78, p < .001, η2p = .18 and Group × Type interaction, F(3.93, 208.108) = 7.75, p < .001, 
η
2
p = .13 (Figure 33). The between-subjects Group effect was also significant, F(1, 53) = 
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7.67, p = .008, η2p = .13. A mixed ANOVA showed that the difference between the types 
within the Uninformed group was not significant, F(3.01, 87.41) = 1.51, p = .218, η2p = .05.  
The PDW test did not measure any effect of knowledge in the Uninformed group.  
 
Figure 33. The average money wagered on the correctness of the knowledge about of the different 
types of cues in the Uninformed and the Informed groups. The error bars depict SEMs. 
Pairwise comparisons of the amount wagered on different types within the Informed 
group showed that the participants wagered significantly more on their decisions about Type 
A1, A2 and B1 cues, ts(24) ≥ 3.16, ps ≤ .004 than about the control Type C, (corrected α = 
.007), ds ≥ .73. Crucially, the participants wagered more on decisions about Type D1 than 
Type D2, t(24) = 3.93, p = .001, d = 1.01. However, Type D2 wagering was not significantly 
higher (after the correction of α) than it was for Type C, t(24) = 2.56, p = .017, d = .70. 
Conscious State Assessment. After each trial in the PDP the participants were also 
asked to report if they relied on memory or guess in their decisions. This test gave similar 
description about the effects: Type, F(3.66, 193.95) = 16.62,  p < .001, η2p = .24, and Group × 
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Type interaction, F(3.66, 193.95) = 15.41, p < .001, η2p = .23 (Figure 34). In general, the 
groups were different in this measure, F(1, 53) = 21.98, p < .001, η2p = .29. There was no 
Type effect within the Uninformed group, F(3.54, 102.67) < 1, indicating that in a group 
level this measure could not detect any evidence that memory was used more subjectively for 
predictive than for non-predictive stimuli. 
 
Figure 34. Reported reliance on memory/guess in the trials of the PDP in the Uninformed and the 
Informed groups. The error bars depict SEMs. 
Pairwise comparisons of the types within the Informed group showed that the 
participants reported more reliance on memory about Type A1, A2, B1 and D1 cues, ts(24) ≥ 
3.88, ps ≤ .001 than about the control Type C, (corrected α = .007), ds ≥ .90. Crucially, the 
participants did not seem to remember more about Type D1 cue – location associations than 
when it was random (Type C), t(24) < 1.  
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The PDP unveiled some knowledge about the cue-stimuli relationship in the 
Uninformed group. The question remains whether this knowledge was gained purely by the 
attentional processes or by the emerging conscious knowledge of some of the members of the 
Uninformed group. This question was investigated by the guessing criterion of unconscious 
knowledge (Dienes, 2008). According to the guessing criterion, if the discrimination 
performance of the participants is above baseline on those trials where they reported “guess”, 
then that would be evidence that knowledge is not conscious. 
The level of performance of each participant of the Uninformed group was analysed 
on those predictable trials where they reported that they had based their decisions on a guess. 
The mean performance of the Uninformed group was not above chance level (.25) on ‘guess’ 
trials which were fully determined (Type A) trials, (MS = .27, SD = .12), t(29) = 1.07, p = 
.293, d = .20. However, the mean performance was above chance level (.50) for the ‘half 
deterministic’ (Type B) trials (MS = .60, SD = .19), t(29) = 2.87, p = .008, d = .52. There 
were many fewer “memory” reports. On average, a participant in the Uninformed group 
reported “memory” on fewer than 2 trials, whilst reporting more than 14 “guesses”, resulting 
in too few datapoints for a reliable analysis of the memory reports. 
 
Discussion 
The aim of this experiment was to investigate the question of whether selective 
attention on the relevant features is sufficient for learning about their relationship, or whether 
this relationship also requires dedicated processing as well. The SALT was devised to 
construct an experimental situation where the amount of selective attention and explicit 
information could be modulated for the groups and conditions. 
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None of the RT measures reflected observable learning about any relationships in the 
Uninformed group or about the uninformed relationships in the Informed group. The pattern 
of results was not different in the Single and Dual Task phases, indicating that effective 
learning was not measurable regardless of the concurrent engagement of selective attention 
with the predictive features.   
The results of the confidence measure, the PDW and the guessing criterion reflected 
no difference between the knowledge of the predictable and the unpredictable types for those 
who were not informed about this predictability. One measure of the PDP alone showed 
generation performance different from chance level in the Inclusion condition of the 
Uninformed group. The corresponding Exclusion performance was not different from 
baseline, thus the PDP data does not provide clear evidence that this was the effect of implicit 
or explicit learning.  
These results of the guessing criterion analysis suggest that there may be some 
evidence for implicit learning in this group, in terms of evidence that some participants in the 
Uninformed group acquired knowledge about the cue-location associations in a way that they 
did not ascribe to their available memories at time of test. The overall pattern, however, 
suggests that little or no learning was detectable in the Uninformed group (in terms of RT 
results, confidence measures, PDW). It is also possible that the participants in the 
Uninformed group reported guessing when a little knowledge was available during the PDP 
task. Whereas 20% of participants reported in the paper questionnaire some evidence of rule 
awareness about the test, only 7% of the PDP decisions were described as based on memory. 
  As a whole, the measures provide a coherent picture, one which gives no support to 
the assertion that selective attention to the stimuli is, in itself, sufficient for learning to occur. 
In general, it appears that selective attention to the relationship is crucial. A few participants 
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who were not directed to attend to a relationship may have acquired some fragmented 
knowledge about the cue-target associations (which only the PDP was able to measure), but it 
is unclear whether the repeated engagement of attention on the predictor cues and predicted 
locations triggered this learning. There are numerous examples in the implicit learning 
literature showing that few members of the experimental group spontaneously realise, and 
may thus attend to, the hidden structure of the implicit learning task. Therefore, it would be 
not surprising to observe this phenomenon here.  
Importantly, the information provided about one of the predictive features did not 
produce learning about the other, equivalent relationship between the cues and target stimuli 
for the Informed group. Thus predictive learning did not occur, even though the selective 
attention of the participants was firmly engaged with the cues and target stimuli, as 
demonstrated by the accurate performance on the Detection Task, and the learning of the 
‘informed’ relationship.  
Although, the test showed that the participants attended to the relevant features, one 
could argue that the two representations were never concurrently active. It is possible, 
however somewhat unlikely, that the activation of the representation of the cue as a whole 
(but not those features which informed participants were instructed to learn about) decayed 
during the 500 ms delay between the disappearance of the cues and the onset of the target 
locations after each of the 450 trials. If this were the case, the failure to find learning may be 
a result of a lack of concurrent selective attention of the to-be-associated features.  
To investigate this possibility, the test was modified in the next experiment to ensure 
that the representation of all features of the cue predictors would be maintained, and thus the 
would be active simultaneously with the target locations. 
. 
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Experiment 3.2: SALT Study 2 
In this experiment the dual task was modified in a way such that the participants were 
directed to compare stimuli from the one trial to the next in terms of one feature (i.e. colour 
or shape). The reasoning behind this change of task was that the accurate detection of 
similarity between the features of the consecutive trials would imply that the representation 
of compared features must have remained active in between the two trials. If the detection of 
the target stimuli happens during this interval then it is reasonable to think that the 
representation of the cues and the target locations were active at the same time. If the 
concurrent activation resulting from selective attentional processing is sufficient for learning 
about an association, then we should expect to measure learning irrespective of any explicit 
information provided. 
Methods 
Participants 
The participants were 50 (32 female and 18 male; M = 26.34 years, SD = 3.84 years) 
volunteers and university students of University of Cambridge, UK. One person had to be 
discarded from the analysis because of the extreme outlier number of incorrect key presses. 
Each participant received 6 GBP for participation in a 45-minute experiment. 
The participants were randomly allocated into two groups and two subgroups: 
Informed (match Colour), Informed (match Shape), Uninformed (match Colour), Uninformed 
(match Shape). 
Materials and Procedure 
The materials and procedures in this task were identical with the previous study 
(Experiment 3.1) with one modification. Instead of detecting the two selected stimuli, the 
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secondary task was to press down all the four keys together when a particular feature (the 
colour for the ‘match Colour’ sub-groups, shape the ‘match Shape’ sub-group) of the cue 
stimulus is the same as the previous cue stimulus. 
Similarly to the previous study, half of the participants of the Informed group were 
informed about some relationship between the cues and the target stimuli. Those in the 
Informed (match Shape)  sub-group, who had the secondary task of detecting the shapes, 
were all informed about the predictive nature of the colours of the cues; those in the informed 
(match Colour) sub-group, who had the secondary task to detect the colours, were informed 
about the predictive nature of the shapes of the cues. 
As the dual task required attention to a single dimension, there was a difference 
between two types of Type B trials for all participants. Type B1 trials were those where only 
the dimension not required in the dual task was predictive (this was the instructed dimension 
for Informed groups); Type B2 trials were those where only the dimension required in the 
dual task was predictive (this was the uninstructed dimension for the Informed groups). 
After the RT task and the awareness tests (PDP, SMs and PDW) the participants filled 
out the previously described paper questionnaire (Appendix F). 
Results 
Detection Task 
The performance in this detection task showed that the participants followed the 
instruction and correctly categorised the selected cues Uninformed group: Hit Rate: 82%, 
False Alarm: 8%; Informed group: Hit Rate: 85%, False Alarm: 7%. The two groups did not 
differ in their measures of hit rate, t(44) < 1, and false alarm, t(44) < 1. Therefore, it is 
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plausible again to infer from these results that in both groups, the participants attended the 
relevant features of the cues, and maintained their representations between cue presentations. 
Reaction Time Measures 
In the first block of the Dual Task phase, both of the groups were uninformed about 
the hidden relationship between the cue forms and target circles. However, they had to attend 
to and compare the shapes or the colours of the subsequent cues. Selective attention on the 
relevant features in itself could have promoted learning, and so, the first analysis examined 
performance of the whole sample in the first block of the Dual Task was assessed.  
The design of the task provides two cues where only the shape and two cues where 
only the colour has predictive relationship to the target locations. RTs on the trials of these 
cues were compared to the control cue, which randomly related to the target location. If 
selective attention is enough for learning then we could expect faster RTs in the predictable 
than in the unpredictable trials. Three participants had to be discarded from the RT analysis 
because the numbers of their errors were extreme outliers from the sample and one further 
participant had to be discarded due to having not followed the instructions of the Dual Task.   
A mixed ANOVA with Type as within-subjects factor showed no RT difference 
between the four type of trials (A, B1, B2, C), F(2.05, 94.25) < 1. A selected pairwise 
comparison between Type B1 (when only the selectively non-attended features had predicting 
power) and Type B2 (when the attended features had predicting power) indicated no RT 
difference, paired t(45) < 1.  
Comparing the Informed and Uninformed groups across the Types in the rest of the 
blocks of the Dual Task (after the Informed group received the explicit information), Figure 
35 suggests a pattern similar to the previous study. This was confirmed using a mixed model 
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ANOVA with Group as between-subjects factor and Type as within-subjects factor. A 
different amount of learning (in terms of sensitivity to predictive status) between groups was 
confirmed by the interaction of Group × Type, F(1.87, 82.18) = 7.42, p = .001, η2p = .14.  
As is clear from Figure 35, there was no evidence of RT difference between the 
different types of trials in the Uninformed group, F(3, 69) < 1, whereas the Informed group 
RTs differentiated between the types, being faster on Type A and Type B1 compared to the 
rest of the types, F(1.45, 31.00) = 7.43, p = .005, η2p = .26. Type B2 was not reliably different 
from the random Type C in the Informed group, paired t(22) < 1. This result might be due to 
Type B2 consisting of those trials where the provided information was not predictive. 
Alternatively, the requirement to select the predictive feature for the detection task could, 
somehow, have interfered with the expression of learning about that feature in the target 
detection RTs during this phase. As in the previous study, the Single Task phase provides the 
best test for these differences.  
 
Figure 35. Mean Reaction Times of the two groups in the four types of trials in the Dual Task phase. 
For Type A the cue – target relationship was fully deterministic; on Type B2 trials only the to-be-
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selected features were predictive, on Type B1 trials the to-be-selected features were not predictive, 
but the Informed group was informed about their predictive power; Type C cues had random 
relationship to the target locations. The error bars represent SEDs. 
The crucial phase of this experiment is the Single Task where the participants are 
presented with cues prior to each response target, but are not instructed to press the keys at 
colour/shape match detection.  Responding in this phase was analysed with a mixed ANOVA 
model, with Group as between-subjects factor and Type as within-subjects factor. This 
revealed learning, in terms of different RTs to different stimulus Types, F(2.55, 112.11) = 
16.29, p < .001, η2p = .27. Learning was not equal in the two groups, as shown by the 
interaction of Group × Type, F(2.55, 112.11) = 8.92, p < .001, η2p = .17. As Figure 36 
demonstrates, there was no evidence of a difference between the RTs for different stimulus 
types in the responding of the Uninformed group, F(2.26, 51.99) = 1.15, p = .330, η2p = .05, 
i.e. no evidence was found that the Uninformed group learned anything about the cue – target 
associations that enabled them to respond faster when the cues were predictive.   
In the Informed group, by contrast, there was a difference between the response 
speeds for different types of stimulus, F(1.72, 38.05) = 19.41, p < .001, η2p = .48.  Dunnett 
Pairwise comparisons showed a difference from the control, random Type C was for Type A, 
t(22) = -4.88, p < .001, d = .82; and Type B1, t(22) = -3.44, p = .002, d = .56, but not for 
Type B2, t(22) = 1.37, p = .187, d = .16. This pattern suggests that it was the information 
provided, and not any concurrent selective attention, that was over and above the key factor 
in determining the amount of learning. 
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Figure 36. Reaction Time means of the two groups in the four types of trials in the Single Task phase. 
For Type A the cue – target relationship was fully deterministic; on Type B2 trials only the to-be-
selected features were predictive, on Type B1 trials the to-be-selected features were not predictive, 
but the Informed group was informed about their predictive power; Type C cues had random 
relationship to the target locations. The error bars represent SEDs. 
Process Dissociation Procedure 
After the RT task, the participants’ knowledge about the cue-stimuli relationship was 
assessed using the PDP test. Inspection of the PDP results depicted in Figure 37 clearly 
reflects the considerable difference in knowledge between the two groups. A Group 
(Informed vs. Uninformed)  × Condition × Type mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main 
effect of Condition (Inclusion-Exclusion),  showing that some flexible knowledge was 
acquired, F(1, 43) = 27.91, p < .001, η2p = .39; a Group × Condition interaction,  showing that 
the knowledge was different in the two conditions, F(1, 43) = 22.53, p < .001, η2p = .34; and a 
Condition × Type interaction effect, F(3.73, 160.36) = 4.56, p = .002, η2p = .01.  
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Analysing the Uninformed group separately revealed no evidence of learning in terms 
of different responding between conditions, F(1, 23) < 1; the greatest numerical difference 
from the chance level did not reach (corrected) significance, t(23) = 2.6, p = .016 (corrected α 
= .008), d =.53.. In the Informed group, by contrast, there was a significant effect of 
Condition, F(1, 20) = 33.43, p < .001, η2p = .63, and a Condition × Type interaction, F(3.10, 
61.95) = 10.61, p < .001, η2p = .35, indicating flexible knowledge that was sensitive to the 
degree of cue-location prediction. The scores of Type A, B1, D1 were significantly above 
chance level in the inclusion condition, one sample ts(20) ≥ 3.4, ps ≤ .003, ds ≥ .74 (corrected 
α = .008), and below chance in the exclusion condition, ts(20) ≥ -3.98, ps ≤  .001, ds ≥ .87 
(corrected α = .008). 
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Figure 37. The performance of the Uninformed and the Informed groups in the Inclusion and 
Exclusion conditions along the different types of cues. The locations of the target stimuli were 
predicted in the case of Type A cues both by shape and colour; Type B2 only by the attended features; 
Type B1 only by the unattended features (the Informed group was informed about these features); 
Type D1 and D2 were previously not seen ‘only colour’ or ‘only shape’ stimuli, Type D2 were those 
features that were attended before; Type D1 were not attended (the Informed group was informed 
about these features). Type C was random, performance on those trials could not be evaluated. The 
chance level was unified to 25%. The error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals.  
Subjective Measures 
Confidence measures. After each PDP trial the participants were asked about either 
their confidence in the correctness of their choices, or (on every second trial) about how 
much money they would wager on it. The measures are based on the logic that people will be 
more confident about their choices for predictable cues to the extent that they have learned 
explicitly about the predictive relationship. A Group × Type mixed ANOVA model revealed 
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a significant effect of Type, F(3.60, 143.85) = 4.94, p = .001, η2p = .11 and Group × Type 
interaction, F(2.32, 118.17) = 3.75, p = .008, η2p = .09. The Group effect was also significant, 
F(1, 40) = 8.07, p = .007, η2p = .17. There was no evidence for a difference in confidence of 
prediction across the types within the Uninformed group, F(4, 41) < 1 (Figure 38).  
 
Figure 38. The reported confidence measures of the Uninformed and the Informed groups in their 
decisions about the different types of cues. 50% confidence represents complete uncertainty, 100% 
confidence represents complete certainty. The error bars depict SEMs. 
Pairwise comparisons within the Informed group showed that the participants were 
significantly more confident about cues of Type A, B1 and D1 compared to their confidence 
in the random Type C cues (Type A: planned one-tailed t(18) = 1.80, p = .044, d = .48; Type 
B1 one-tailed t(18) = 2.98, p = .004, d = .73; Type D1 one-tailed t(18) = 2.03, p = .028, d = 
.49. Confidence in Type B2 and Type D2 cues were not reliably different from Type C, ts(18) 
< 1. Although, the Informed group had numerically more confidence in the random cues than 
the Uninformed group, this difference was not significant, t(40) = 1.74, p = .090, d = .40. 
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Post Decision Wagering. Similarly to the confidence measures, for the wagering test 
the Group × Type ANOVA showed a significant effect of Type, F(2.87, 114.82) = 7.71, p < 
.001, η2p = .16, and Group × Type interaction, F(2.87, 114.82) = 10.64, p < .001, η2p = .21, 
suggesting that predictability effects on wagering was larger in the Informed group.  There 
was no evidence of Type having an effect on wagering within the Uninformed group, F(4.37, 
96.10) < 1, again consistent with their being no detectable knowledge of differences between 
stimulus types in the Uninformed group (Figure 39).  
In the Informed group, pairwise comparisons of the amount of money wagered 
relative to the random Type C cues showed more wagering on predictions following Type A, 
B1 and D1 cues, ts(18) ≥ 2.97, ps ≤ .008, ds ≥ .59. Again, there was no evidence of 
knowledge about the uninformed feature, measured by the difference between Type D2 vs 
Type C, t(19) < 1. These results are consistent: participants learn the predictive relationship 
about which they received explicit information, despite the dual-task requirement to process 
and remember another, equally predictive, feature. 
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Figure 39. The average money (penny) wagered on the correctness of the knowledge about of the 
different types of cues in the Uninformed and the Informed groups. The error bars depict SEMs. 
Surprisingly, for each stimulus type the amount of money wagered in the Uninformed 
group correlated strongly positively with the level of risk aversion as reported in the paper 
questionnaire, r ≥ .56, p ≤ .010. For the Informed group, none of these correlations were 
significant, r ≤ -.38, p ≥ .087. 
Conscious State Assessment. After each trial in the PDP the participants were also 
asked to report if they relied on memory or guesses in their PDP response. Analysis of this 
test gave a similar description to the other measures: A main effect of Type, F(2.74, 117.92) 
= 5.86, p = .001, η2p = .12, and a Group × Type interaction, F(2.74, 117.92) = 8.18, p < .001, 
η
2
p = .16., plus a main effect of Group F(1, 43) = 11.39, p = .002, η2p = .21, (Figure 40). 
There was no Type effect within the Uninformed group, F(2.31, 53.12) < 1, indicating this 
measure could not detect any evidence of conscious knowledge in this group.  
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Pairwise comparisons of the memory reliance of the different types compared to the 
random Type C confirmed what Figure 40 suggests, the participants in the Informed group 
reported significantly higher reliance on memory in the case of Type B1, t(20) = 2.92, p = 
.008, d = .64, and Type D1 cues, t(20) = 2.53, p = .020, d = .65. This finding is not that 
surprising since the group received explicit information about these cues. The level of 
memory use in responding to D2 cues was not different from that for the random Type C, 
t(20) < 1.  
 
Figure 40. Reported reliance on memory/guess in the trials of the PDP in the Uninformed and the 
Informed groups. The error bars depict SEMs. 
In the verbal report of the paper questionnaire only one member of the Uninformed 
group reported finding regularity in the locations of the target stimuli. In contrast, 55% of the 
Informed group verbalised a memory or rule in the task. 
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In short, this experiment confirmed that learning can happen in this design, and that 
whilst explicit instruction to attend to a relationship promotes learning about that relationship, 
the requirement to attend and remember features is not sufficient for learning. In the previous 
study some evidence of learning was found in Uninformed group in the overall PDP 
performance, whilst above-chance performance was observed in some situations where 
participants reported that they were guessing. These results allowed the possibility that some 
unconscious knowledge may be responsible for performance. Those indices which, in 
Experiment 3.1, suggested some implicit knowledge, show no sign of the effects in this study. 
Neither the overall PDP performance of the Uninformed group, nor the performance of the 
Informed Group on Type B2, and D2 trials, differed reliably from chance performance, all ts 
< 1. 
 
Discussion 
In this experiment the design of the SALT was modified to ensure simultaneous 
activation of the representations of the cue and target stimuli. The central question of this 
study was whether effective learning is a consequence of such simultaneous attention to the 
to-be-associated stimuli.  
The mean RTs of the trials of different types diverged between the two groups after 
the Informed group received explicit information. The pattern of these results was not 
different from the previous test, as the Informed group showed learning only about those cue-
target associations of which they received explicit information. Learning was not observed 
about non-informed associations. However, the detection task results implied that the specific 
features were selectively attended to before, and kept in memory at the time of, attention to 
the target locations. 
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The results of the confidence measure, guessing criterion, PDP, PDW and the verbal 
report mirrored the findings of the RT analysis, indicating that all objective knowledge led to 
subjective knowledge, i.e., was explicit. The amount of money wagered in the PDW was 
related to the reported risk-aversion level for the Uninformed group. Surprisingly, the 
correlation between these measures was positive, whereas all the six (non-significant) 
correlational coefficients were negative for the Informed group. Whilst the pattern of the 
relationship is not simple to explain, the data clearly show that risk-aversion affects the PDW 
in relation to the level of learning. 
In summary, the main finding of this study is that the simultaneous co-activation of 
stimuli was not sufficient for effective learning. Participants paid attention to the relevant 
stimuli: the identity of the cues and the representation of the location of the target stimuli 
were active simultaneously for the 360 trials. Nevertheless, the only evidence of learning was 
in those participants whose attention was also drawn to that particular predictive relationship 
between stimuli. 
Chapter Discussion 
The research in this chapter began considering whether learning is a necessary 
consequence of selective attention. Studies in Chapter III suggested that attention may be 
necessary for learning to occur, but those experiments did not address whether attention will 
always result in learning. 
 Evidently, when sufficient conditions are mentioned in learning research then it is 
always meant to be a selection from a plausible list of conditions such as awareness, 
intention, or instruction. Other baseline conditions such as visibility, motivation or cognitive 
capacities are tacitly assumed. In this work, selective attention as a sufficient condition of 
learning was interpreted as implying that awareness about or attention to the association of 
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the cues and target stimuli are not needed. The new test, the SALT was devised and applied 
to test this hypothesis.  
Experiment 3.1 and Experiment 3.2 approached the question from different angles. In 
the first experiment the predictive cues were introduced to the participants as part of an 
independent dual task through which attention was drawn to the predictive cues 500 ms 
before the appearance of the associated target locations. The second experiment ensured that 
the representation of the cues and associated target locations were concurrently active. 
The level of awareness about the relationship between the stimuli was manipulated in 
two ways. Firstly, the two groups differed in whether they received explicit information about 
an association between the cues and the locations. Secondly, the Informed group was 
informed about only half of the predictive features, they remained uninformed about the other 
half. In this manipulation, the between-groups comparison of the behavioural data and the 
post-experimental knowledge tests of the second experiment showed no learning without 
contingent explicit information, although the first experiment indicated the presence of some 
element of knowledge in the Uninformed group. From those data it was not clear whether this 
subtle effect is the result of selective attention causing learning, or simply that a few 
participants guessed, or became aware of, the hidden rules in the task.  
The second type of manipulation turned out to be at least as effective, since in both of 
the experiments strong learning was demonstrated for the half of the relationships the 
participants were made conscious of. However, importantly, these participants showed no 
evidence of learning about the other half of the predictive cues. This manipulation devised in 
the SALT is novel in the sense that it ‘disguises’ certain rules in the task by drawing attention 
to other ones.  
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In a similar implicit learning task Norman and her colleagues (Norman, Price, Duff, & 
Mentzoni, 2007) showed four colour stimuli arranged in a square layout on the screen. 
Following an SRT task structure, the participants had to detect the location of the one target 
stimulus which was filled; the rest of the stimuli remained unfilled. During the task the 
location, colour and shape of the four stimuli changed in each trial. However, the target 
stimulus was predicted only by the location of the previous trials, the shape and colour 
features serving as a disguise. Despite the similarities, in that test the people could not learn 
anything about the predictive powers of the other attended features. Therefore, that test was 
not capable of testing derived attention this way.  
No previous implicit learning task was found in the literature that used explicit 
information to set an interpretation about how the test works which prevents the participant 
seeking for other rules. The successful application of this decoy may suggest that a 
satisfactory rule can prevent the participant looking for and learning other rules.  
Another important aspect of these findings is the size of effect of explicit knowledge. 
Both experiments showed partial effect sizes greater than .80 in the crucial RT results (Cohen 
considered those 'large', 1988). In other words, attention on the association between the 
stimuli has what is considered to be, statistically, a large effect on learning. One could further 
speculate on this notion that an even more limited opportunity for attention to the rule would 
still have a considerable effect on the behavioural figures. If this is the case, then probably 
even reduced attention to a relationship can cause observable differences in a RT learning 
task. Furthermore, if the memory of this attention decays faster than the effect of the 
attention, then many previous implicit learning results might have been the product of this 
differential decay, as this ‘conscious attention’ may not be recalled during post-experimental 
assessments.  
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Finally, it is important to emphasise that this study indicates only that learning is not a 
simple, obligatory consequence of selective attention to the stimuli. The data do not, 
however, rule out the possibility of learning without awareness, yet they provide an example 
of when attention to the associated stimuli only is insufficient to produce observable learning 
about the association between the stimuli. It cannot be excluded that here or in other learning 
situations different factors such as motivation or the intensity of attention play more direct 
roles. It seems, nevertheless, that awareness is an important factor for learning to occur.  
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V. ATTENTION AND DECISION MAKING 
Decision theorists have long distinguished between analytical and intuitive decision 
making (e.g., Brunswik, 1956; Simon, 1955), often attributing them with different processing 
modes (e.g., Epstein, 1994; Evans, 2008; Stanovich & West, 2001). The overlap of the 
copious definitions of intuition (for a review see Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox, & Sadler-Smith, 
2008) shows that intuition is an available feeling about an unavailable knowledge. This 
knowledge is often referred to as tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1967), gained by experience 
(Hogarth, 2001) or implicit learning. Despite the flourishing theoretical literature supporting 
this dichotomous view, the number of empirical attempts to contrast the effects of intuition 
and deliberation is limited. One reason for this lack of research could be ascribed to the 
difficulty of assessing the goodness of any particular decision (Wilson & Schooler, 1991). 
Another reason could originate from the traditional assumption that reasoning and analysis 
always lead to better outcomes (e.g., Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980). However, 
some of the theories that subscribe to this view assume that under certain circumstances the 
intuitive decisions can bring more optimal results than rational thinking. Operationalising 
Brunswik’s notions, Hammond and his colleagues (Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 
1987) suggested that there are certain areas in which intuitive decisions will be more 
beneficial than reasoned decisions. They argued that the different decision making situations 
demand different decision making strategies in a continuum between pure intuition and pure 
rational analysis. Thereby, the validity of a decision will always depend on the match 
between the demands of the task and the applied cognitive style. Empirical studies have given 
support to the notion that, for some tasks, we are really better off with intuition (e.g., emotion 
recognition: Halberstadt, 2005; basketball prediction: Halberstadt & Levine, 1999; perceptual 
training: Melcher & Schooler, 2004).  
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Intuition has been explained as the use of complex knowledge patterns based on 
experience-based learning (Hogarth, 2001) and regarded as a crucial component of expertise 
(Eraut, 2000). Experts relying on their intuition were found to make better judgments in 
various fields ranging from chess playing (De Groot, 1986) to the stock market (Harteis & 
Gruber, 2008) than when they tried to reason before their decisions. Wilson and his 
colleagues (e.g., Wilson, Dunn, Kraft, & Lisle, 1989; Wilson & Schooler, 1991) contrasted in 
several experiments the optimality of decisions made by people with or without analysing 
their reasons. They asked people to rate objects such as different brands of strawberry jams or 
different college courses. They repeatedly found that those who analysed their reasons behind 
their choices always made decisions that corresponded less with expert opinions than those 
who did not. The authors explained the results by the hypothesis that reasoning can lead 
people to focus on nonoptimal criteria and subsequently, to make worse decisions. Another 
stream of researchers emphasise that the benefits of intuitive decisions may lie in the use of 
‘smart heuristics’ that can represent an advantageous solution to real-world decision 
problems by reducing their complexity to simple rules of thumb (Gigerenzer, 2007). 
The Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT) (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006), however, 
goes further: it defines intuition as the result of unconscious thought. The UTT presents a 
strong argument that the restricted capacity of conscious thought (working memory) can lead 
to poor decisions in complex circumstances, while unconscious thought is not constrained by 
complexity. In this model unconscious processing is regarded as an active, creative mode of 
thought.  
Evidence in favour of UTT comes from a series of studies. Dijksterhuis and 
colleagues (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006) used 
an experimental situation in which the participants were presented with a long list of positive 
and negative attributes describing some features of the objects of choice (e.g., apartments, 
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cars, roommates).  After the presentation, one group, the Conscious Thought condition, had 
four minutes to think about the ratings of the presented objects. Another group, the 
Unconscious Thought condition, received the task just as for the Conscious Thought group 
with the exception that during the four minutes following the presentation their attention was 
diverted with an irrelevant explicit task before being asked to rate the items. The third group, 
the Immediate Decision condition, had to make their decision without delay after the 
presentation.  
The principal findings of these experiments suggested that the performance of the 
Diverted Attention groups was significantly better compared to the other two groups. 
According to the UTT theory these results can be interpreted as the diverted attention task 
engaging the conscious processing capacity during the time of the delay leading to an 
unconscious processing of the information under that condition. This explanation suggests 
that unconscious thought weights the various dimensions appropriately through distributed, 
bottom-up processing and integrates them to produce decisions better than those reached by 
conscious thought. The conscious thought is postulated to be disadvantageous in complex 
decisions because it can rely only on a hierarchical processing of a limited number of items at 
the same time, thus biasing impression formation (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006).  
These findings seem to present direct evidence that in cases when the complexity of 
the information is high, unconscious decisions are often more reliable than conscious 
decisions. The general picture regarding the power of intuition remains, however, more 
controversial as several empirical attempts have failed to prove the claims of the UTT and 
questioned the reliability of the supporting data (e.g., Acker, 2008; Newell, Wong, Cheung, 
& Rakow, 2008; Payne, Samper, Bettman, & Luce, 2008). The claim of support from these 
data was criticised on several grounds. It was pointed out that the effect could be explained 
not only by superior performance of the unconscious group, but also by some detrimental 
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performance of the conscious group due to, for example, simple memory retrieval 
interactions (Shanks, 2006). The validity of such criticism is supported by the fact that some 
of  the previous works failed to include a control immediate decision condition (Dijksterhuis 
et al., 2006) and that the contrast of such a control to the Unconscious Thoght has group 
brought mixed results (Dijksterhuis, 2004). In addition, some replications have failed to 
confirm the original effects (Rey, R. M. Goldstein, & Perruchet, 2009). These findings 
support the explanation that the effect lies in the suboptimal performance of the Conscious 
Thought group.  
Rey and his colleagues analysed the decision strategies in a task based on choosing 
the best car. The authors asked independent raters about how influential they thought the 
certain attributes of the cars are in making a decision. Using these evaluation scores they 
found that comparing two cars on the basis of 2-5 attributes gives the biggest difference 
between the ‘best’ car and the others, but observed a steep decrease in this difference with the 
inclusion of further attributes in the consideration. This analysis suggests that the greater 
difference observed in the unconscious group, which is taken as superior performance, may 
simply be due to their relying on only a few retrievable items. 
Others (e.g., Newell et al., 2008) have observed that the task in its typical design may 
be performed as an on-line judgment task, suggesting that the decisions are already made 
during the presentation phase, rather than during the ‘unconscious processing interval’.  
Despite these criticisms, the DWA task remains popular and further experiments have 
been reported in support of  the original assumptions of the UTT (e.g., Ham & Van Den Bos, 
in press; Ham, Van Den Bos, & Van Doorn, in press). In a recent meta-analysis, Strick and 
his colleagues (Strick et al., n.d.) found support for the original claims of the UTT, 
interpreting the mixed results of the published studies as revealing moderating factors which 
determine when the effect does and does not happen.  
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In the experiments reported in this chapter, intuitive decision making was investigated 
using a replication of the DWA design. Intuition was interpreted as previously defined by 
researchers of implicit learning: conscious judgment knowledge about unconscious structural 
knowledge (e.g., Dienes, 2008). If UTT is tenable then the following criteria must be 
fulfilled: (1) the performance of the unconscious group should be superior to the performance 
of the conscious group and the unconscious group; (2) the performance of the unconscious 
group must be better than the performance of the immediate group; and (3) performance in 
the conscious group should report a reliance on conscious knowledge (memory) while the 
unconscious group should reflect a beneficial effect of what is subjectively reported as 
guessing. 
 
Experiment 4.1: Deliberation-without-Attention Test Study 
This experiment was conducted to allow a fuller examination of the assumptions of 
UTT using additional measures to those in the original design (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 
2006). More specifically, the conscious status of structural knowledge was investigated after 
the participants made their judgments; furthermore, their subjective preference before the 
presentation was also measured. These measures were employed to assess the optimality as 
well as the conscious nature of these judgments.  
In addition, a Number Mean Estimation Test and a Bar Length Estimation Test were 
designed to explore the phenomena using a paradigm which does not depend upon subjective 
judgments (allowing performance to be objectively assessed). Previous analyses have 
revealed that the subjective preference for the complex stimuli (e.g., cars, housemates)  in the 
DWA task depends on the presentation order and some individual difference, neither of 
which is reflected by the ratings of individual attributes (Newell et al., 2008).  
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Therefore, instead of multi-attribute stimuli such as housemates, the participants were 
presented with blue and red digits in fixed order in the Number Mean Estimation Test. The 
participants were then asked to estimate the average of the red digits and the average of the 
blue digits, in a counterbalanced order. In a similar fashion, the Bar Length Estimation Test 
presented bars of different lengths in one of two colours. Here the task was to assess the 
average length of the bars of each colour after all presentations. These tests should make it 
possible to analyse the differences between the three DWA conditions on a more objective 
basis. If the unconscious processing leads to more optimal representation of complex 
information then a tendency for this group to produce more correct answers should be found 
in these tests. 
 
Method 
Participants  
The participants were 72 undergraduate students (41 female and 31 male; M = 21.86 
years, SD = 3.11 years) of Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary and all were native 
speakers of Hungarian. Each participant received 1500 HUF (approximately 5 GBP) for 
participation in a 45 minute session comprising several unrelated experiments; this study 
made up the second half of the session. The testing was conducted in three separate sessions, 
and individuals were randomised to each condition within each session. About 25 participants 
took part in one session where they were tested in the same classroom at separate computers. 
Materials and Procedure 
The participants were seated approximately 60 cm from the computer monitor and 
were presented with instructions on the screen. The test software was programmed in 
158 
 
Microsoft Visual Basic 2008, running under Microsoft Windows XP operating systems on a 
set of identical desktop computers. Responses were collected via the keyboard. 
The experiment consisted of three tasks in the following order: Housemate Rating 
Test, Number Mean Estimation Test, and the Bar Length Estimation Test. 
Housemate Rating Test. Participants were informed that they were taking part in a 
decision making experiment during which they would be presented with descriptions of three 
potential housemates (László, István, Zoltán), after which they would be asked to rate each 
housemate. Stimuli were those used by Dijksterhuis (2004; Experiment 3), translated into 
Hungarian including any necessary cultural adjustments (Appendix G). Prior to the main task, 
half of the participants in each group were required to rate the subjective importance of 
twelve attribute dimensions for a housemate (e.g., cooking skills) on a 7-point Likert scale 
from 1 (very unimportant) to 7 (very important).  
36 sentences were constructed, each describing a single attribute of one housemate on 
one of the twelve dimensions. Each described the housemate as either positive (e.g., “László 
is very friendly”) or negative (e.g., “István is not very tidy”) on one dimension. Housemate 
names and attributes were counterbalanced across participants. For each participant the most 
attractive housemate (hereafter Housemate A) had 8 positive and 4 negative attributes; the 
least attractive housemate (Housemate C) had the reverse attribute on each of these 
dimensions, giving  4 positive and 8 negative attributes. Finally, Housemate B had 6 positive 
and 6 negative attributes. The sentences were presented in a random order for 3000 ms each 
with 500 ms blank screen between each sentence. 
 Following presentation of the sentences, participants either rated the housemates 
immediately (Immediate Decision condition), or after a four minute interval. In the Conscious 
Thought condition, the names of the three potential housemates were presented on the screen 
and participants were encouraged to use the four minutes as thinking time. In the 
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Unconscious Thought condition, participants were required to perform a 1-back task during 
the four minute interval. In this task, a random sequence of the letters A, B, and C appeared 
on the screen, each letter shown for 1900 ms with an 800 ms ISI. Participants were instructed 
to decide if the letter was the same as the previous one, indicating their response by pressing 
one of two keys on the keyboard (X for same, M for different).  
Participants rated their impression of each potential housemate using three identical 
on-screen 7-point Likert scales, ranging from 1 (extremely negative) to 7 (extremely 
positive). For half of the participants the names of the housemates were arranged in A-B-C 
order (as in Dijksterhuis, 2004); for other participants the names were presented in C-B-A 
order. After four minutes, during which they were presented with the Number Mean 
Estimation Test, all participants rated the subjective importance of twelve attribute 
dimensions for a housemate, as described above (half of the participants were re-rating these 
dimensions). 
Finally, participants were asked to report how much they had relied on memories of 
specific attributes whilst rating the housemates. This was done using a numerical response 
reported on a scale from 0 (pure intuition/guess) to 10 (pure memory).  
Number Mean Estimation Test. This test was structurally equivalent to the Housemate 
task with the modification that instead of descriptive attributes the participants were 
presented with one digit numbers (0-9). They received the following instructions:  
“In the following task you will be presented with blue and red numbers. During the task you 
should attend to both the colours and the values of the numbers. After each number, press key 
X if the number has different colour from the previously presented number. If the two 
numbers had the same colours and the new number is bigger then press key M, otherwise do 
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not press any keys. Start the task from the second number presented. Later on you will have 
to evaluate these numbers according to their colours and values.”11 
 The numbers were presented on the screen in one of two fixed orders. The fixed 
orders were designed to detect a bias to overweight the recently presented numbers (recency 
bias) in List A and the primarily presented numbers (primacy bias) in List B (Figure 41) to 
allow us to test the effect of presentation order. A random half of the participants in each 
group (Conscious Thought, Unconscious Thought, Immediate Decision) were presented with 
the numbers in the order of List A, the other half of each group were presented in the order of 
List B. Our hypothesis was that the worse the performance on a particular list, the more that 
subgroup was affected by the biasing nature of the presentation order used in that list.  
 
Figure 41. The order of presentation of the numbers to detect recency bias (List A) and primacy bias 
(List B). For those who received List A the recently presented numbers would impair the performance, 
while in List B a primacy effect would be misleading. 
  
The colours were counterbalanced across the two groups of numbers. For a random 
half of the participants the blue numbers were larger, for the other half the red numbers were 
larger12.  
                                                 
11
 Translation of the original Hungarian instructions. 
12
 A comparison of the difference scores showed no evidence that the colour of the numbers had an 
effect on evaluating their means, t(128) = 1.55, p = .123, d = .08. 
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Each number stayed on the screen for 2100 ms and was followed with a 400 ms 
pause. For the Conscious and the Unconscious Thought groups the delay time after the 
presentation of the list was 2 minutes, during which the Conscious Thought group was 
instructed to think about the mean value of the presented numbers by colours. During an 
equivalent interval the Unconscious Thought group was presented with the same n-back task 
as they were in the Housemate Rating Test. The Immediate Decision group had to make 
decisions after the presentation without any delay.  
 In the decision making phase the participants had to adjust one slider on the screen for 
each colour to estimate the average value of the presented numbers between 0 and 9. They 
were also asked to report their confidence in their ranking of the means of the two coloured 
numbers in a scale ranging from 1 to 100 where the higher numbers represented more 
confidence. 
 Bar length estimation test. This third task was structurally identical to the Number 
Mean Estimation Test with the modification that instead of abstract symbols (numbers) the 
stimuli were visual features: horizontal bars. The values of the numbers were represented in 
the length of the bars. The bar length were 100 pixel + y × 25 pixels where y was identical 
with the numbers in List A and List B in the Number Mean Estimation Test. The bars were 
presented in two new colours: green and yellow (counterbalanced). During presentation of 
the bars, the participants had to press key X if the current bar had different colour from the 
previous bar, if the colours of the two bars were same and the second bar was longer then 
they had to press key M, otherwise they did not have to press any keys. The aim of this 
instruction was for the participants to concentrate on both the colours and the length of the 
stimuli during the presentation. In the decision making part the participants had to estimate 
the mean length of the bars in two colours by adjusting two coloured sliders on the screen. In 
all other features the design of this task was identical to the Number Mean Estimation Test. 
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Results 
Housemate Rating Test 
Attitude rating. Figure 42 shows the participants’ ratings of the potential housemates, 
which were analysed using an ANOVA contrasting mean ratings values across the within-
subject factor of Housemate, and between-subject factors of condition and gender.  There was 
a clear preference between housemates, with higher ratings for housemates with more 
positive attributes, F(1.89, 130.44) = 54.09, MSE = 3.35, p < .001, η2p = .44 (Figure 42). 
Further analysis confirmed that each group showed independent evidence of differential 
preference, smallest F(98.11, 155.89) = 14.48, MSE = 3.43, p < .001, η2p = .39, rating 
Housemate A significantly more positively than Housemate B, smallest t(23)= 2.25, p = .03, 
d = .46.  
There was no evidence of any influence of the different experimental conditions, or 
gender, on these ratings:  Fs < 1 for all effects and interactions.  
 
Figure 42. Mean attitude rating scores of each Housemate per groups. Error bars represent SEDs. 
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Congruency with Personal Preference. Following Dijksterhuis’s (2004) procedure, a 
weighting index was calculated from the final ratings of the twelve dimensions for each 
participant. This is the sum of the subjective ratings of the eight dimensions on which 
Housemate A was described more attractively than was Housemate C, minus the sum of 
ratings of the four remaining dimensions (where Housemate C was described more positively 
than was Housemate A). This index thus reflects the degree to which Housemate A should be 
(subjectively) preferred to Housemate C for that individual; a low value indicates that the 
participant regards the few positive attributes of Housemate C, or the few negative attributes 
of Housemate A, as important. 
This index was used by Dijksterhuis (2004) to evaluate the quality of the housemate 
judgments: insofar as participants rate Housemates A and C according to their subjective 
preferences, across participants the index should positively correlate with the degree of 
preference for Housemate A compared to Housemate C.  Excluding those participants who 
‘incorrectly’ rated Housemate A as less attractive than Housemate C13 (four in the Conscious 
Thought condition, five in each of the other conditions), the correlations in the current study 
were as follows: Conscious Thought group r(21) = .29, p = .101; Unconscious Thought group 
r(20) = .79, p < .001; Immediate Decision group r(20) = .02, p = .481. The correlation was 
significantly higher in the Unconscious Thought than in the Conscious Thought condition (z 
= 2.29 based on the difference between two Fisher-transformed r coefficients; (Howell, 
2007)). These correlations follow the pattern reported by Dijksterhuis (2004). 
                                                 
13
 The excluded participants were inconsistent with their decisions according to the logic of the original 
work (Dijksterhuis, 2004) since each participant’s subjective weighting would have indicated preferring 
Housemate A over Housemate C. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the incorrect decision makers would give the 
following results: Conscious Thought group r(24) = .36, p = .080; Unconscious Thought group r(24) = .254, p = 
.232, Immediate Decision group r(23) = .09, p = .685. 
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One acknowledged potential weakness of the Dijksterhuis (2004) study was that 
ratings for each dimension were elicited after the rating of housemates, and thus may have 
been influenced by the first rating process. In the present study, half of the participants in 
each group gave additional ratings of the attribute dimensions before the task, a manipulation 
that had no detectable influence on the rating of the three housemates Fs < 1. Using a 
weighting index calculated from the pre-task ratings only gave the same ordinal pattern of 
correlations among those who rated Housemate A more favourably than Housemate C: 
Conscious Thought group r(12) = -.09, p = .402; Unconscious Thought group r(13) = .83, p < 
.001; Immediate Decision group r(13) = .09, p = .391; Unconscious Thought group 
correlation was significantly higher again than that in the Conscious Thought group, z = 2.26.  
In summary, among those participants who discriminated between Housemates A and 
C, the magnitude of preference shown by participants in the Unconscious Thought condition 
more closely reflects individual subjective priorities than it does in the Conscious Thought 
condition.  
Conscious Status of Decision Knowledge. The conscious status of structural 
knowledge used for the housemate judgments was analysed in the same manner as the 
subjective weighting index, by correlating the reported rate of reliance on memory with the 
degree of preference for Housemate A over C. This analysis revealed that superior 
performance (greater difference in attractiveness rating) was generally associated with greater 
reported use of explicit memory: Conscious Thought group, r(15) = .40, p = .137; and 
Unconscious Thought group, r(16) = .57, p = .022; Immediate Decision group, r(17) = .25, p 
= .34114. The observed correlation in the Unconscious Thought group contradicts the UTT 
account that suggests that enhanced performance by these participants is due to their greater 
use of unconscious knowledge.  
                                                 
14
 The correlational coefficient of the Conscious Thought groupand the Unconscious Thought group 
was not different (z = 0.56 based on the difference between two Fisher-transformed r coefficients). 
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Presentation order effect. A further analysis was performed to assess the claim that 
the diverted attention condition would produce ratings based on a more optimal integration of 
information. Optimal use of information must result in ratings that are uninfluenced by 
factors such as the order in which positive and negative attributes were presented. As 
presentation order was randomised, the influence of order can be evaluated by assessing, for 
each participant, the degree to which the positive attributes of a particular housemate 
occurred early or late in the sequence.  
The few negative attributes of Housemate A may occur predominantly in the early or 
late part of the sequence; a similar pattern may arise for the few positive attributes of 
Housemate C. For each participant, a regression line was calculated for predicting the valence 
of the twelve attributes (positive = 1 or negative = 0) from their position within the 36 item 
sequence. Positive slopes thus reflect presentation orders where the positive attributes were 
predominantly late in the sequence, and whereas a negative slope reflects the reverse. 
Table 8 shows that the attractiveness ratings of both Housemates A and C were 
negatively correlated with the degree of slope in the attribute sequence. The table shows test 
statistics for null hypotheses of zero correlation combined across housemates for all groups 
(calculated from the mean of the Fisher’s transformed correlation coefficients; Howell, 
2007). There was a significant negative correlation overall, indicating that earlier presentation 
of the positive attributes produced higher attractiveness ratings. This tendency to overweight 
the information presented earlier was statistically significant for participants within the 
Unconscious Thought group. These data thus provide no support for the prediction that the 
Unconscious Thought manipulation produces a more optimal weighting of the attributes.  
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Table 8 
Slope - Performance Correlation Coefficients for Housemate A and Housemate C 
 
Note. Combined values represent standardised sum of the Fisher’s transformed correlation 
coefficients (Howell, 2007). Significance tests of zero correlation hypothesis  are * p < .05, ** p < 
.01. 
Number Mean Estimation Test 
Group Differences. A mixed ANOVA with Colour as within-subjects factor and 
Group as between-subjects factor showed that the participants within the three groups 
estimated the means of the two colour numbers differently, F(1,111) = 5.86, p = .017, η2p = 
.05, and, crucially, that there was an interaction between the groups and the estimated means, 
F(2,111) = 3.15, p = .046, η2p = .05, (Figure 43), indicating differences in performance 
between groups. Examination of the performance levels between the groups, measured as the 
difference between the colour estimates (Figure 43), revealed that the major difference was 
between the Conscious Thought and the Unconscious Thought groups, t(100) = 2.33, p = 
.022, d = .14, where the Conscious Thought group (M = 1.22) outperformed the Unconscious 
Thought group (M = .11) (the actual mean difference was 2 in the test).  
Examining the performance of each group separately showed that, on average, the 
Conscious Thought group correctly ranked the average of the larger numbers higher than the 
average of the smaller numbers, two-tailed t(47) = 3.63, p <.001, d =.52, while for the 
 
 Housemate A Housemate C Combined 
Conscious r(24) =  -.16 r(24) = -.05 Zr = -.69 
Unconscious r(24) = -.39 r(24) = -.50* Zr = -3.11** 
Immediate r(24) = -.14 r(24) = .05 Zr = -.29 
Combined Zr = -1.89 Zr = -1.45 Zr = -2.36* 
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between 1 and 100 where the higher numbers represented more confidence. Overall, 
confidence ratings did not correlate with performance r(129) = -.03, p = .704.  
Bar Length Estimation Test 
Performance. A mixed ANOVA on the estimation scores, with bar colour as a within-
subject factor and Group as a between-subject factor showed a difference between the 
estimated length of the presented bars by colour, F(1,87) = 79.12, p < .001, η2p = .48, where 
the mean of the estimations of the longer bar colours were, correctly, higher than the shorter 
bars (measured in units equivalent to the numbers in the previous task). This pattern was true 
for each group: Conscious Thought group, t(38) = 5.55, p < .001, d = .89; Unconscious 
Thought group, t(37) = 5.62, p < .001, d = .91; Immediate Decision group t(15) = 6.26, p < 
.001, d = 1.57, with no evidence of a difference between the groups F(2,87) = 1.43, p = .246, 
η
2
p = .03 (Figure 45).  
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Figure 45. Estimated average bar length of the three experimental groups. The bar length were 
measured in units equivalent to the numbers in the previous experiment. The true average difference 
between the length bars was 2 units. Error bars represent SEMs. 
Gender Differences. A Group × Presentation order × Gender ANOVA showed no 
significant effect of Gender, F(1, 78) = 3.02, p = .062, η2p = .04. 
Presentation order. The effect of presentation order on the difference scores for 
estimations did not reach significance, F(1, 87) = 3.18, p = .078, η2p = .04 (Figure 46), nor 
was there any Group × Presentation-order interaction, F < 1. Inspection of Figure 46 indicates 
that the effect is numerically largest in the Conscious and the Unconscious groups (the groups 
with delay between the presentation and the rating), and a post-hoc analysis of presentation 
order across these groups suggested an effect, F(1, 73) = 6.57, p = .012, η2p = .08 . Whilst this 
result cannot be regarded as conventionally significant, due to the lack of overall effect or 
interaction, this pattern suggests that a delay between the presentation and the decision 
making phase may encourage overweighting the recently presented bars. 
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Figure 46. The effect of presentation order in the bar length estimation in the three experimental 
groups. The actual difference between the two colour bars in the test was set to be 2 units. Error bars 
represent SEMs. 
Confidence rating. In the second and third testing sessions a confidence measurement 
was used after the ranking of the colour bars. In this measure the participants had to rate how 
confident they were in the order of the numbers they ranked. The scale ranged between 1 and 
100 where the higher numbers represented more confidence.  Overall, the confidence ratings 
did not correlate with the performance, r(72) = -.08, p = .460. 
Discussion 
This experiment consisted of a replication of a test of the deliberation without 
attention paradigm and two further tests designed such that the final rating of the stimuli can 
be more objectively assessed. This study tested two major claims of the UTT. The first 
question addressed here focused on whether the distracted attention group performs better in 
a complex judgment task. The second aim was to test whether the performance of the 
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distracted attention group is due to the more optimal weighting mechanisms of unconscious 
thought. 
The Housemate Rating Test failed to replicate the original finding (Dijksterhuis, 
2004) that the Unconscious Thought group performs better in the task in terms of rating, 
however, the pattern of stronger correlation between preference and rated subjective 
dimension weights was replicated. 
All three groups performed well on the task, no difference was found between their 
performances in this measure. In accord with the earlier study, and with the prediction of the 
UTT, the preferences of the Unconscious Thought group correlated with their ratings of the 
importance of the attribute dimensions.  
The measure of reliance on memory showed, however, that the more the members of 
the Unconscious Thought group relied on memory, the better performance they showed. Had 
unconscious knowledge been responsible for the greater correlation with the subjective  
index, the results would have shown the opposite, that is that more reliance on intuition 
would have been found among those who performed better. This pattern of results, however, 
indicates that if the Unconscious Group was better in any way, then there is no basis to 
assume that this was the result of unconscious thoughts, but rather from conscious reflection. 
The results refute the second assumption as well, since there is no evidence that the 
diverted attention group relied on more optimal weighing mechanisms. Rather, this group 
showed sensitivity to presentation order, the earliest-presented attributes got overweighed, 
suggesting a primacy bias, or early impression formation. 
The Number Mean Estimation Test was designed to reduce the subjectivity of the 
evaluation of the performance. The ranking of the numbers of the two colours was best 
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achieved by the Conscious Thought group, and the other two groups did not perform reliably 
above chance level. It seems that the good performance was due to the conscious deliberation 
time that was provided to the first group. According to UTT, unconscious thought is able to 
weigh the objects of choice more optimally, which implies that it would lead here to an 
approximately good estimation. On the other hand, one could argue that numbers are too 
abstract to be processed unconsciously. The UTT and previous empirical reports assume, 
however, that the unconscious can deal with numbers, not in an arithmetic level, but it can 
integrate the numerical information into rough estimations (Betsch, Plessner, Schwieren, & 
Gutig, 2001; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006).  
The Bar Length Estimation Test presented a different pattern of results. Here, all three 
groups performed equally well on the estimation test. It is difficult to determine from the data 
whether the difficulty or the nature of the task was different from the number task to allow 
this result. It is possible that the perceptual nature of this task is an important factor since it 
showed a strong recency of presentation effect, in contrast to the overweighting of early 
information observed in the other tests. Once again, the Unconscious Thought group did not 
perform better than the Conscious Thought group.  
In summary, the three tests provided no support for the predictions of the UTT. The 
only measure in which the Unconscious Thought group came out better was the correlation of 
the housemate rating and the subjective importance of the attribute dimensions. A crucial 
finding of this study showed, however, that the performance of the diverted attention group 
strongly correlated with their reliance on memory. In addition, the judgments of the 
Unconscious Thought group reflected a presentation order bias. It is plausible to think, 
therefore, that the diverted attention condition triggered unconscious processing, nor did it 
lead to more optimal weighting of the objects of choice. 
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Experiment 4.2: Modified Deliberation-Without-Attention Test Study 
It is important to notice that the lack of difference between the groups in the 
Housemate Rating Test and the Bar Length Estimation Test in the previous experiment along 
with the effect of presentation order in these tests may imply that the participants have made 
their rating during the presentation phase, more similarly to online judgment tasks (Hastie & 
B. Park, 1986). Along with all of the 16 experiments included within Acker’s (2008) meta-
analysis, participants were aware of the task demands before the presentation of the 
attributes.  
Thus, it is possible that the experimental manipulation did not affect performance 
because the participants had already made their decisions before the manipulation occurred. 
Consistent with this possibility, Lassiter et al (2009) have shown that the Deliberation 
without Attention (DWA) effect is abolished if participants are instructed to memorise 
information, rather than to form a global impression during the presentation phase.  
In this next experiment, the participants were neither asked to form an impression, nor 
were they informed about the latter task demands at the beginning of the experiment. If the 
available information is processed more optimally through unconscious thought, then in this 
design, the decisions can be made only during the manipulation period, and so we should 
expect a stronger manifestation of unconscious processing. 
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Method 
Participants  
The participants were 56 predominantly undergraduate students (32 female and 24 
male; M = 21.44 years, SD = 5.93 years) of Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary 
and all were native speakers of Hungarian. Each participant received 1000 HUF 
(approximately 5 GBP) for participation in a 45-minute session comprising several unrelated 
experiments; this study made up the second half of the session. 
Materials and Procedure 
This experiment consisted only of the Housemate Rating Test. The procedure of this 
test differed from the previous procedures in only one feature. Before the presentation of the 
stimuli sentences the participants were not informed that their task after the presentation 
would be to rank the objects. To ensure that the participants processed the necessary 
information, they were told to read the presented sentences carefully as they would need to 
use them in a later part of the test.  
Results 
Attitude rating. Just as in the previous experiment, an ANOVA with Housemate and 
Gender as within-subject factors and Group as between-subject factors revealed that the 
participants showed clear preference between the housemates, F(2, 100) = 15.80, p < .001, 
η
2
p = .24, (Figure 47). There was no reliable effect of Gender on these ratings, F(1, 50) = 
2.23, p = .147, η2p = .04. There was no evidence of any influence of the different 
experimental conditions on the groups, F(2, 50) < 1. Further analysis confirmed that each 
group showed independent evidence of differential preference, smallest F(2, 36) = 4.50, p = 
.018, η2p = .20. 
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Figure 47. Mean attitude rating scores of each Housemate per groups. Error bars represent SEDs. 
Comparing this experiment with the previous study, by including a factor of 
Experiment within the ANOVA model showed that, overall, the absence of the pre-
presentation information of the aim of the experiment had a small, but significant effect on 
the average rating of the housemates, F(1, 125) = 5.678, p = .019, η2p = .04. 
Congruency with Personal Preference. In this study the importance of the dimension 
was assessed only after the decision making phase to prevent any premature insight into the 
aim of the presentation. To evaluate the quality of the housemate the previously described 
subjective weighting index (Dijksterhuis, 2004) was correlated with the degree of preference 
for Housemate A to Housemate C.  Excluding those participants who ‘incorrectly’ rated 
Housemate A as less attractive than Housemate C (six in the Unconscious Thought condition, 
five in each of the other conditions), the correlations in the current study were as follows: 
Conscious Thought group: r(14) = .21, p = .469; Unconscious Thought group: r(12) = -.16, p 
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= .625; Immediate Decision group: r(17) = .10, p = .709. The correlation in the Unconscious 
Thought group in this experiment was significantly weaker than in the previous experiment  
(z = -3.59 based on the difference between two Fisher-transformed r coefficients).  
Conscious Status of Decision Knowledge. The conscious status of structural 
knowledge used for the housemate judgments was analysed in the same manner as in the 
previous study, by correlating the reported rate of reliance on memory with the degree of 
preference for Housemate A over C. This analysis revealed that superior performance 
(greater difference in attractiveness rating, as defined by Dijksterhuis, 2004) was generally 
associated with greater reported use of explicit memory, r(59) = .32, p = .015. However, 
whilst still positive, this correlation for the Unconscious Thought group was not significant 
this time, r(12) = .12, p = .705, all the three groups reported to rely more on memory than 
guess (Figure 48). Rating from 0 (pure guess) to 10 (pure memory) the mean values were the 
following: Conscious Thought group M = 6.63; Unconscious Thought group M = 6.33; 
Immediate Decision group M = 6.36. The groups reported to rely on memory equally, F(2, 
58) < 1. 
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Figure 48. Reported conscious status of decision knowledge. The bars represent the mean values of 
how much the participants in each group reported relying on memory vs. guess when rating the 
potential housemates. The error bars represent SEMs. 
Presentation order effect. Similarly to the previous experiment, in order to assess the 
influence of the presentation order on the rating of the potential housemates correlational 
coefficients were calculated between the regression line slope values and performance. The 
values of the slopes reflect the degree to which the positive attributes of a particular 
housemate occurred early or late in the sequence.  
Table 9 shows test statistics for null hypotheses of zero correlation combined across 
housemates for all groups (calculated from the mean of the Fisher’s transformed correlation 
coefficients). The individual correlation coefficients and the combined standardised sum 
values indicate that the attractiveness ratings of both Housemates A and C did not correlate 
significantly with the degree of slope in the attribute sequence. This absence of significant 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Conscious Thought Unconscious Thought Immediate Decision
Re
po
rte
d 
Co
n
sc
io
u
s 
St
a
tu
s
Pu
re
 
G
u
e
ss
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pu
re
 
M
e
m
o
ry
Group
179 
 
correlations provides no evidence that the presentation order had a (linear) effect on the 
attractiveness ratings. We can conclude from these results that the presence of the pre-
presentation instructions in the typical procedure of this test may be, in part, able to induce 
presentation order bias, perhaps by making participants engage in early impression formation.  
 
Table 9 
Slope - Performance Correlation Coefficients for Housemate A and Housemate C 
 Housemate A Housemate C Combined 
Conscious Thinking r(19) = -.13 r(19) = -.21 Zr = -.15 
Unconscious Thinking r(18) = .33 r(18) =.21 Zr = .24 
Immediate Decision r(22) = .03 r(22) = -.17 Zr = -.06 
Combined Zr = .11  Zr = -.07 Zr = .03 
Note. Combined values represent the standardised sum of the Fisher’s transformed correlation 
coefficients (Howell, 2007). None of the values are significant. 
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Discussion 
In this final experiment the participants were presented with a modified version of the 
Housemate Rating Task where they were not aware of the task of rating the potential 
housemates before the beginning of the conditions. The crucial question was to see how 
much of the decisions in the previous experiments could have been a result of impressions 
formed already during the presentation. It was reasoned that the lack of a DWA effect in the 
previous experiments could have been the result of this early impression formation and the 
present design should allow more manifestation to the unconscious processing in the diverted 
attention condition. 
Comparing the three groups on their rating about the three housemates, no difference 
was found. If, following the practice of the original study (Dijksterhuis, 2004), we regard the 
differential rating of the best and the second best housemates as a pivotal measurement in this 
test, then we could conclude that the four minutes delay inserted between the presentation of 
the attributes and the decision making had no beneficial effect on the performance of the 
participants; neither the Conscious nor the Unconscious Thought group could reliably 
differentiate between the best and the second best housemates. This result also suggests that 
the better performance of the groups in the previous experiment can be attributed to the fact 
that they had the opportunity to make their ratings online, during the presentation.  
A further difference from the previous experiment is that among those participants 
who rated Housemates A above Housemate C, the magnitude of preference did not reflect 
their reported subjective priorities particularly closely; for the Unconscious Thought group, 
there was a significant change from the previous study. In accord with the results of the 
housemate rating, these results show a detrimental effect of the withdrawal of the instruction 
to form impression from before the presentation of the attributes. 
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The assessment of conscious status of decision knowledge showed that all the three 
groups thought to make their decisions more on the basis of memory than guess. Crucially, 
there was no difference between the groups on this measure, the Unconscious Thought group 
reported relying on memory just as highly as the other groups. This result indicates that after 
the modification of the design of the test we have no more evidence to claim that the diverted 
attention condition facilitated unconscious processing. 
Finally, in this modified design the performance on the housemate rating did not 
correlate with the presentation order of the positive attitudes of the housemates. This absence 
of correlations suggests that the presentation order did not have an (linear) effect on the 
attractiveness ratings. We can conclude from these results that the presence of the pre-
presentation instructions in the typical procedure of this test, such as Experiment 4.1, induces 
a presentation order bias due to early impression formation. 
This experiment was motivated by two questions. The first question was whether 
preventing the participants from early impression formation would lead to different results 
from the previous experiment. Secondly, if the conditions have greater influence on the group 
performance in this design, then would the effect of the unconscious processing be better 
observed? The data indicated that the prevention of the opportunity of early impression 
formation had a detrimental effect on the test performance relative to the previous 
experiments, suggesting that the early test partly measured online judgment formation rather 
than processing during the post presentation delay. The analysis also showed that the diverted 
attention condition relied more on memory than intuition during the judgment task, not 
differently from the other groups.  
In conclusion, this control study did not provide evidence for the predictions of the 
UTT. Rather it suggests that the DWA testing paradigm in its typical design measures the 
memory effects of an online judgment task. 
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Chapter Discussion 
The findings of the experiments in this chapter challenge the conclusions of 
Dijksterhuis (2004) in several aspects. Firstly, there was no evidence found that the 
Unconscious Thought condition produces detectable improvement in choice performance. 
This finding accords with recent attempts to replicate this phenomenon. Newell and 
colleagues (Newell, Wong, Cheung, & Rakow, 2008) failed to replicate previous evidence in 
support of UTT in a series of studies; Acker (2008) reported a meta-analysis showing only a 
modest benefit for choices following unconscious thought conditions in all the published data 
using this paradigm (mean effect size g =.251). 
As reported by Dijksterhuis (2004), the rated attractiveness of a housemate reflected 
each participant’s subjective preference for the set of attributes most closely in the 
Unconscious Thought condition. This replicates a tendency which Dijksterhuis regarded as 
evidence for the benefits of unconscious thought. However, more detailed investigation of 
these data challenge the conclusions of Dijksterhuis (2004) in several ways.  
Firstly, if unconscious thought is advantageous, it follows that a greater use of 
unconscious knowledge will result in superior performance. However, performance within 
the Unconscious Thought condition was positively correlated with greater reported reliance 
on specific memories of attributes: the members of this group who performed best were those 
who responded on the basis of conscious, explicit memory.  
Secondly, according to the Weighting Principle of the UTT, advantageous decisions 
following unconscious thought arise because such processing combines a large amount of 
information in an unbiased manner. It would follow that participants in the Unconscious 
Thought condition would be less influenced by serial position effects in presentation. 
Analysis of serial position effects revealed that attributes at the beginning of the presentation 
had more impact on ratings than those presented later. Crucially, no evidence was found that 
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the effects of serial position were reduced in the Unconscious Thought condition. The 
analysis of serial position suggests that, for all groups, attributes early in the series have a 
greater influence on the final ratings.  
Along with all of the 16 experiments included within Acker’s (2008) meta-analysis, 
participants were aware of the task demands before the presentation of the attributes. As such, 
this pattern suggests that participants based their ratings on judgements formed online during 
presentation (Hastie & B. Park, 1986). The data of the second experiment supported this 
conjecture: without pre-presentation information about the latter judgment task the 
participants performed differently from the previous findings. These findings question to 
what degree the DWA effect described by Dijksterhuis (2004) was a result of online 
judgments and how much was it a manifestation of the different modes of thought.  
 One criterion for regarding judgment as intuitive is that the structural knowledge 
upon which it relies is unconscious (Dienes, 2008). The results of this study suggest that the 
diverted attention paradigm used by Dijksterhuis and colleagues does not produce ‘intuitive’ 
ratings in the manner claimed. Rather, it seems that explicit knowledge is the main modulator 
of performance in this test, regardless of the DWA manipulation. The Number Mean 
Estimation task showed with more objectively assessable stimuli that allowing time for the 
conscious thought leads to convincingly better judgments.  
Given that the diverted attention condition does not seem to produce more intuitive 
judgments, it is not immediately clear how the divided attention manipulation might produce 
the modest enhancements in performance suggested by a recent meta-analysis (Acker, 2008), 
or the improved correspondence to individual preference found in the current study. An 
explanation for these effects may be found in Newell and colleagues’ (2008) demonstration 
that the distraction manipulation leads to explicit recollection of fewer attributes.  
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It is likely that participants are more probable to recall those attributes that are either 
of subjective importance, or those consistent with their online impression. If so, the items 
most likely to be forgotten following the distraction are those which are subjectively rated as 
unimportant or inconsistent with the general impression. Thus a recollection of fewer items 
will produce a greater difference in ratings, similar to the ‘less-is-more’ effect reported by 
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002). This argument is very similar to that proposed to account 
for the DWA effect in a similar paradigm by Rey and colleagues (Rey et al., 2009). 
In summary, this investigation extends the argument presented by other recent works 
disputing laboratory demonstrations of beneficial unconscious thinking. The DWA 
manipulation results in performance that is no less associated with reliance on explicit, 
consciously available memory, and no less influenced by presentation order. Group 
differences in this paradigm, therefore, do not arise from the type of unconscious processing 
proposed by UTT. 
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VI.  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This thesis began with questions about the role of awareness and attention in human 
learning and decision making. The 11 experiments, which were conducted to explore certain 
aspects of these topics, have approached them through different avenues. Tests of awareness 
were an integral part of the designs of each of these experiments, and the role of attention was 
analysed either indirectly (Chapter II), or directly (Chapter, III, IV, V) in the data obtained.  
The first attempt to find support for a dissociation between learning processes began 
with the investigation of the interaction of conscious and unconscious learning. It was 
reasoned that if separate learning processes exist, then they could be observed through their 
interaction. Although it is often assumed of these processes that they cannot be easily 
distinguished through the use of behavioural tasks (e.g., Destrebecqz & Peigneux, 2006), an 
effect of interaction was still expected to serve as an indication of the presence of more than 
one source of processing.  
The second series of experiments in Chapter III investigated the question of 
unconscious learning in an incidental learning design. Based on previous studies which 
claimed that learning takes place without the focus of attention (e.g., Lambert, 2003), these 
studies tested whether the contingency between cues and target locations would lead to 
implicit learning if the stimuli are within the visual field, and those incidentally predictive 
cues which are not part of the primary task are presented peripherally.  
In Chapter IV, a new learning task, SALT, was introduced to separate the effect of 
attention and awareness. The question investigated was whether learning occurs when 
attention is focussed on individual stimuli, but awareness does not link the stimuli together. 
With the disguising technique of SALT (for details see Chapter IV), it was also tested 
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whether the knowledge of an explicit rule prevents learning about further possible 
associations if this rule is proved to be predictive.  
 In the final empirical chapter, Chapter V, the role of awareness in a decision-making 
task was analysed using the DWA paradigm. While diverted attention has been assumed to 
induce unconscious processing of information in complex decisions (Dijksterhuis et al., 
2006), the conscious status of this deliberation has not been directly investigated before. Two 
new versions of this decision making test were needed to allow the analysis to clearly 
separate the effects of diverted attention and conscious deliberation.  
Before drawing conclusions from this research on the role of attention and awareness 
in learning and decision making, a few crucial methodological and theoretical questions will 
be addressed. Following this, some alternative interpretations of implicit learning and the 
‘smart unconscious’ are discussed. After an attempt to form an integrated conclusion based 
on the empirical findings of this work, further thoughts are added with a view to fostering 
new questions for the understanding of human learning and decision making.  
Tests of Awareness 
In each of the experiments in this thesis, special attention was drawn to the various 
tests of awareness. A systematic application of these assessment methods across different 
studies provides a good opportunity to compare their merits and weaknesses. In the 
discussions of each chapter it was emphasised that the logic of implicit learning research is 
often based on tacit assumptions. At this point, it is possible to shed light on these 
assumptions and discuss their validity.  
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Two questions arise when the empirical tests of awareness in the implicit learning 
paradigm are considered: (1) how sensitive these tests are; and (2) if these tests all measure 
the same phenomenon. 
Verbal Reports. As was mentioned in the introduction to Chapter III, since awareness 
is a first-person phenomenon verbal reports are the most obvious means to explore whether 
people are conscious about a given piece of knowledge. Originally, an implicit form of 
learning was claimed on the basis of the inability to report the rules of the tasks where above-
chance performance was observed (e.g., Knowlton, Squire, & M. A. Gluck, 1994; Nissen & 
Bullemer, 1987; A. S. Reber, 1967; Miller, 1939). Posner defined this logic very clearly when 
he distinguished ‘detecting’ from ‘orienting’: “By detecting I will mean that a stimulus has 
reached a level of the nervous system at which it is now possible for the subject to report its 
presence by arbitrary responses that the experimenter may assign. These may be verbal (“I 
see it”) or manual (pressing a key). Detecting means to be aware or conscious of the 
stimulus.” (1980, p. 4). While there is no doubt that when people are able to verbalise a rule 
then they are conscious of it, to claim the opposite, i.e. that the people are unconscious of the 
rule when they are unable to report it, is more questionable.  
The first problem is that the test has to be sensitive enough to allow for identification 
of all relevant information that may be held responsible for the observed effect on 
performance (Shanks & St. John, 1994). The verbal report would not be sensitive enough for 
example if the participant did not understand the question correctly, or if the person was 
aware of the information yet remained unable to express it verbally. To put perceptual 
experience into abstract words undeniably places a heavy burden on the reporter. Further 
reasons why some conscious knowledge can remain undetected by verbal report may be the 
uncertainty of the participant about fragmented knowledge or retrieval failure due to the 
context of retrieval being different from the context of encoding (Shanks & St. John, 1994).  
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For instance, the context of an SRT task is a forced choice motor control situation, which is 
radically different from the context of a verbal interrogation or a paper questionnaire. This 
difference might be sufficient to result in cases where, despite performance due to fragmented 
(but explicit) knowledge, participants are subsequently not able to verbalise this knowledge, 
thus creating an artefact of implicit learning.  
Secondly, the test has to satisfy the information criterion as well (Shanks & St. John, 
1994), according to which the knowledge measured by the test of awareness has to tap into 
the same knowledge that was responsible for the learning. To satisfy this criterion is perhaps 
more challenging since there is generally no objective way of knowing what rule or 
information the person used in completing the task. Taking the example of the SRT task 
again, the participants are usually asked about those first- or second-order conditionals which 
were used in the construction of the test. However, the use of zero-order information (e.g., 
sequence element frequencies) can also lead to observable RT performance (Destrebecqz & 
Peigneux, 2006). Similarly in the AGL task, the reports of the participants about permissible 
and nonpermissible letter pairs were not categorised as correct conscious knowledge. 
However, this knowledge is sufficient to produce above-chance performance on the task 
(Perruchet, 2008). 
Eriksen (1960) lists some further desiderata of the verbal reports.  The participant 
must be motivated to respond with the care and precision that is required, and some adequate 
system or scaling of these reports is needed to categorise the accuracy of these reports.  
Experience with verbal reports in the present work justifies almost all of these 
concerns. The participants found it often challenging to verbalise their experience, despite 
other tests of awareness indicating that some of the information was under conscious, 
strategic control. From another aspect, occasionally the participants did not notice or could 
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not verbalise the sequence in the task, but later they communicated some regularities (e.g., 
location pair frequencies) that they had noticed during the task. The most frequent problem 
with verbal reports in these experiments was the lack of motivation to give a precise account 
of their task strategies. After the somewhat tedious and potentially exhausting RT tasks, 
participants were perhaps rarely motivated to prolong the experimenting time by giving 
detailed reports. 
Considering these limitations, some researchers have arrived at the conclusion that 
verbal reports can only prove that someone is aware of something; it cannot be proved that 
they are not (e.g., Stadler, 1989). The application of verbal reports, which goes back to 
Cartesian traditions, was criticised from a philosophical perspective as well. Dennett (2003), 
for example, did not accept an individual’s report as authoritative. In contrast, his 
heterophenomenology regarded these accounts, as any other data about the conscious state, as 
needing further verification.   
Subjective Measures  
Despite the substantial criticism of verbal reports as reliable indicators of awareness, 
there are still considerable arguments in favour of using subjective measures. As already 
discussed in Chapter III, if consciousness can be regarded as the flexible access of mental 
contents (e.g., Baars, 1997), then the inability to access this content serves as evidence that 
this content was not completely conscious. To investigate these claims, the zero-correlation 
criterion and guessing criterion (Dienes, 2008), which directly rely on these premises to infer 
unconscious knowledge, were repeatedly employed in the present experiments. Note that 
these measures provide an operational definition of implicit learning: the learning is implicit 
when the knowledge is above the objective threshold for performance, but is below the 
subjective threshold for report (Cheesman & Merikle, 1984; Dienes & D. Berry, 1997). It was 
argued that the PDW test (Persaud et al., 2007) is the same as other subjective measures in 
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that it relies on a confidence judgment of the person’s knowledge (Seth, Dienes, Cleeremans, 
Overgaard, & Pessoa, 2008). In this sense, despite the use of an objective wagering task, this 
measure, like other subjective measures, relies on metaknowledge.  
These tests have been employed several times to assess awareness in implicit learning 
tasks (e.g., Dienes & Scott, 2005; Shanks & Johnstone, 1999). The results of these studies 
showed that after excluding those participants who reported some knowledge after the task, 
the remaining participants, those who believed that they were guessing, still performed above 
chance. Furthermore, the confidence level did not always correspond with the measured 
performance. Can these results be counted as direct evidence for the presence of unconscious 
knowledge?  
Reingold and Merikle (1988) cautioned the researchers to note that the participants’ 
interpretation of the task may bias these measures. Floor effects (which may mask a 
relationship between confidence and performance) can occur for several reasons; for 
example, the interpretation of ‘guessing’ may vary between participants. Some participants 
may overestimate the experimenter’s expectation of reporting ‘knowing’ as compared to 
‘guessing’.  The use of a confidence scale can bypass this problem since it is analysed in a 
correlational way (Dienes, 2008). A different problem, however, should be considered with 
regard to confidence scales. Instead of the continuous (50-100%) scale, Tunney and Shanks 
(2005; 2003) used Kunimoto and colleagues’ (2001) binary (high vs. low) scale and found 
that the continuous confidence scale is not sensitive enough to lower levels of awareness, 
although no satisfactory explanation was proposed for why the binary confidence scales are 
more powerful15. This effect could possibly be explained by the phenomenon of decision 
                                                 
15
 According to previous findings (e.g., Zimmerman, 1993), under certain distributions, binary  
rescaling of a measure may be more sensitive than the raw data – for heavy-tailed distributions yes/no scaling 
may be more sensitive than continuous measures. 
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fatigue (Vohs, 2006). A growing body of research indicates that making choices may be 
regarded as relying upon a depleting resource (e.g., Baumeister, 2002). Making choices 
requires a form of ‘mental effort’ taxing this limited resource which is required to make self-
controlled choices, resulting in impaired self-control (Vohs et al., 2008). If deciding on a 
scale of 50-100% is more depleting than making binary choices then it is possible that the 
participants may lose their capacity to make adequately accurate choices on the scales of 
repeated trials.  
In general, the results of the present work left the interpretations of these selected 
awareness tests in disagreement. Therefore, there is reason to think that the measures failed to 
meet at least one of Eriksen’s (1960) desiderata: it was probably an unrealistic expectation 
that the participants would always exercise sufficiently careful introspection about their 
confidence on a 50-100% scale to distinguish between all possible confidence levels, or 
would precisely weight the monetary risk of their wagering in each of the 64 trials of the PDP 
task. 
There are further doubts about the validity of the PDW. One essential problem with 
the PDW is that, in theory, it could be solved implicitly as well. According to the PDW view, 
higher wagering on the correct than the incorrect trials indicates the presence of 
consciousness. Propagators of a ‘smart unconscious’ (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 2006), 
however, could argue that optimal wagering can be the result of decisions made by 
unconscious thought. On the other hand, since the absence of higher betting on correct trials 
could always be the result of risk aversion, the PDW task cannot conclusively indicate the 
absence of conscious processing either. This conjecture was supported here by the finding 
that risk-aversion (assessed by questionnaire) was related to the amount the participants were 
willing to wager.  
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In the experiments in Chapter V the amount of money wagered in the Uninformed 
group correlated strongly and positively with the level of reported risk aversion.  However, 
for the Informed group, although the correlations were mostly non-significant, for all the six 
types of cues the correlations were negative. Remarkably, the same pattern was found for the 
confidence ratings as well. Whatever the explanation for this pattern may be, the level of risk 
aversion seems to have a strong effect on the PDW and the confidence judgments. 
It is interesting to mention that, as a recent review indicated (Seth et al., 2008), no 
hitherto published work has applied both subjective measures and post-decision wagering in 
the same learning task, and as such their relationship has not been shown. These measures 
were systematically employed in Experiments 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 3.1, and 3.2 of the present work. 
The tests seemed to have similar sensitivity, none of them having detected the presence of 
conscious knowledge in Chapter III, and all of them showing conscious knowledge (for the 
Informed group) in Chapter IV. Both the confidence measure and the PDW seemed to be 
similarly sensitive to risk aversion. These findings support the argument that these tests are 
similarly dependent upon the metaknowledge of the participant. 
 Process Dissociation Procedure 
The PDP appeared to be the most sensitive test of awareness among the experiments 
in this thesis. Learning was detected by the PDP measures whenever it was indicated by 
another measure, and in Experiment 2.2, it was the only test that could measure learning in 
the task. The RT measures, the confidence measure, the guessing criterion and the PDW were 
unable to detect learning in that experiment. One could argue that this pattern of results may 
serve as evidence for the presence of unconscious knowledge. In this case, however, the PDP 
showed below-chance exclusion performance, which is usually interpreted as a sign of the 
presence of explicit control (e.g., Wilkinson & Shanks, 2004).   
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Some authors (Q. Fu et al., 2008; Norman et al., 2006), however, have argued before 
that even below-chance performance in the exclusion condition does not necessitate the 
presence of conscious structural knowledge. That is, the sense of feeling-of-knowing is 
enough for correct exclusion. As was described earlier, this feeling of knowing may be based 
on implicit sources as well (Koriat, 2000), providing an example of conscious judgment 
knowledge without conscious structural knowledge. The data of Experiment 2.2 does not 
support this conjecture. One quarter of the participants reported in the verbal reports that they 
were aware of having perceived any regularity in the test.  
The Uninformed group Experiment 3.1 again presented a case where only the PDP, 
but none of the other measures, provided evidence of learning. What could explain this 
difference in sensitivity between the PDP and the subjective measures? Perhaps the fact that 
the PDP is an objective test of awareness which does not require meta-knowledge or 
judgment about the presence of knowledge could explain this difference. Making decisions 
based on introspection may call for more mental effort than the participants are willing to 
make for the duration of the experimentation. The presence of these requirements may place 
an extra burden on the sensitivity in the subjective measures.  
In summary, it can be argued that each of the tests have weaknesses and limitations in 
assessing awareness. As Reingold argues “no proposed measure of conscious awareness, 
should be considered valid on an a priori basis” (2004, p. 118). According to Reingold and 
Merikle (1988), a valid measure must fulfil both the exclusiveness and the exhaustiveness 
criteria. In other words they should be sensitive to all relevant conscious knowledge, and to 
only this knowledge. As can be seen, none of the tests discussed here satisfy these 
requirements without serious doubts. A combined application of these tests, as the present 
experiments exemplified, can provide a more sensitive, however far from perfect, tool for 
assessing the presence of conscious knowledge.  
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The Logic of Implicit Learning Research 
The ‘Learning-plus-Retrieval’ Approach 
It is clear, however, that all these tests of awareness are designed to serve as evidence 
for implicit learning in a peculiar way. In a typical implicit learning task, learning occurs at a 
particular moment in time (Time 1) then sometime after that learning, but more often after 
some different task phases, the conscious status of the acquired knowledge is assessed (Time 
2). This methodological scenario relies on a tacit assumption that the conscious status of the 
retrieval at Time 2 is equatable with the conscious status of the process at Time 1. Implicit 
learning, therefore, seems to be a concept that is defined by the unconscious status of the 
process of learning, but measured by the lack of conscious status of the retrieval of memory. 
To accept this measurement it is necessary to weight the logic of its argument.  
When, 15 years ago, Berry (1994) summarised the 25 years of implicit learning 
research suggested that implicit learning should be defined and measured exclusively by the 
process of learning since it may or may not result in unconscious knowledge. Others also 
pointed out that the term ‘implicit memory’ should be used to refer to the case when the 
retrieval episode occurs without awareness, but the characterisation of ‘implicit learning’ 
should be based on the assessment of conscious intention and awareness during knowledge 
acquisition only (e.g., Frensch, 1998; Stadler & Roediger III, 1998). While they proposed that 
the intentionality or the automatic nature of the learning process should be the focus of 
investigation, others (e.g., Jimenez, 1997) argued that “intention cannot be safely assessed 
without reference to the conscious knowledge upon which it depends” (Jimenez, 1997, p. 14). 
It seems, therefore, that it is impossible to demonstrate implicit learning without the 
assessment of the conscious status of the acquired knowledge. Does this limitation make 
implicit learning a conundrum?  
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Some authors believe that it does not. Jiménez (1997), for example, laid down an 
explicit logic that arguably leaves room for knowledge-based implicit learning research. He 
proposed that “if we accept the assumption that intention to learn about some given 
regularities can not directly produce unconscious knowledge about these regularities, then 
implicit learning may indirectly be established through the demonstration of the acquisition 
of some unconscious knowledge” (p. 14). 
In his conceptual and methodological review, Jiménez (1997) described three 
methodological scenarios for demonstrating implicit learning based on knowledge 
assessment. Firstly, a pure measure of unconscious knowledge could serve as the best 
behavioural index. Most authors agree, however, that such a measure does not exist. 
Consciousness cannot be “switched off”, thus explicit knowledge can always affect the 
behavioural measures of unconscious knowledge (e.g., Curran & Keele, 1993). According to 
the second scenario, a pure measure of awareness could be utilised by ‘subtracting’ the effect 
of consciousness from a behavioural measure contaminated by both processes (e.g., Jacoby, 
1991). It has been argued, however, that the objective tests of awareness, where the 
participants are encouraged to access their knowledge for the test, would inevitably be 
contaminated by unconscious knowledge (e.g., Shanks & Johnstone, 1998). As was discussed 
earlier, even the exclusion phase of the PDP is not an uncontroversial measure of explicit 
knowledge (Q. Fu et al., 2008; Norman et al., 2006). The objective tests of awareness are not 
exclusive measures of conscious knowledge in this sense (Reingold & Merikle, 1988). The 
subjective measures, such as the verbal report or subjective confidence, are also criticised 
from the aspect that they are not exhaustive measures (Shanks & Johnstone, 1998; Perruchet 
& Pacteau, 1990). As was described previously, there are several reasons to believe that the 
verbal reports are insensitive in detecting the conscious knowledge of the participant. The 
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confidence measures, the guessing criterion, or the PDW are also vulnerable to biases such as 
risk aversion, misinterpretation or undermotivation.  
Not finding satisfactory pure measures of unconscious or conscious knowledge, 
Jiménez (1997) proposed a third possibility in which “the idea that one can identify pure 
measures of awareness should be abandoned in favor of the search for some minimal 
operational definition of this term”. He suggested accepting certain measures to be a priori 
relevant to the conscious or unconscious. In his example, intentional, controlled responding 
could be exclusively ascribed to consciousness, and thus be utilised for an operational 
definition. By this, however, he has inevitably returned to the second scenario that he 
previously rejected. Other researchers, who similarly found the ‘process pure’ models 
implausible (Destrebecqz & Peigneux, 2006; Perruchet et al., 2006; Sun et al., 2001a), 
suggested a model with simultaneous involvement of the different processes with varying 
contributions from each. The danger of this approach is that the model can become 
unfalsifiable. If the presence of explicit knowledge is not evidence against the presence of 
unconscious knowledge then unconscious knowledge remains an irrefutable concept.  
In summary, the ‘learning-plus-retrieval’ approach of implicit learning relies on the 
assumption that we can straightforwardly infer from the analysis of the retrieval of certain 
knowledge at Time 2, to the acquisition of the same knowledge at Time 1. As was 
demonstrated, this definition requires the acceptance of the assumption that conscious 
learning cannot lead to unconscious knowledge. This argument, however, could be refuted by 
independent evidence of unconscious knowledge about conscious learning. One could argue 
that the pattern of results in Experiment 2.2 is one of those cases. There the performance on 
the exclusion condition of the PDP showed below-chance performance, arguably 
demonstrating conscious control, or explicit knowledge about the stimuli. Despite this strong 
effect of conscious control (d =.68), none of the subjective measures reflected the presence of 
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explicit knowledge. A conclusion based only on the results of the confidence measure, the 
guessing criterion and the PDW should suggest evidence for implicit learning. The 
performance on the exclusion condition and the fact that 25% of the participants reported 
noticing regularities, however, contradict this logic. In conclusion, the essential problem with 
the usage of such tests of awareness is that logically the absence of evidence can never serve 
as evidence of absence. The absence of evidence for conscious knowledge in the assessment 
tests cannot unquestionably ascertain the presence of unconscious knowledge per se. The 
‘pure measure’ models, therefore, are not promising avenues for the research of learning 
processes. The ‘simultaneous involvement’ models are probably more plausible, but valid 
retrieval-based assessments of each contribution are even less conceivable. 
The ‘Learning-Only’ Approach 
A promising direction for research of ‘simultaneous involvement’ models, however, is 
the analysis of process interaction. Instead of aiming for studying the processes in isolation, 
the models of interaction try to go beyond the controversies by taking into account both 
learning processes (Sun et al., 2001b; Sun et al., 2005; Cleeremans & Jimenez, 1998). 
Although they used retrieval-based assessment of knowledge status as well, the first three 
experiments in this work (Chapter II) were dedicated to this approach. It was reasoned that if 
separate learning processes exist then they could be observed through their interaction. 
Although it is assumed of these processes that they cannot be easily separated in behavioural 
tasks (e.g., Destrebecqz & Peigneux, 2006), it has been argued that an observable interaction 
could serve as an independent criterion for isolating the effect of implicit learning (Jimenez & 
Mendez, 2001).  
The design of Experiments 1.1-1.3 attempted to ‘prime’ the implicit and explicit types of 
processing both independently and in combination. The results of Experiment 1.1 allowed for 
the interpretation that the interaction of the two systems resulted in a summated performance; 
198 
 
that is, the preliminary engagement of the two systems within the same task (but different 
sequences) may have added up in a beneficial way. This interpretation, however, was not 
supported by any of the tests of awareness, nor was it replicated in the following Experiment 
1.2 and Experiment 1.3. Crucially, the explicit knowledge of the participants alone could 
provide an explanation for all of the effects of learning. This lack of interaction could be 
interpreted as evidence against the two systems model. However, an alternative explanation 
for this failure to find an effect always remains that the ‘priming’ technique utilised in this 
study was not suitable to enhance a particular style of processing or that the test was not 
sensitive enough for measuring the interaction of these processes.   
A further way to examine the process of learning can be based on the assumed 
properties of the learning processes. One possible definition of implicit learning implies that 
it is automatic and does not require attention.  
There is no universally accepted set of criteria for automaticity. The requirements are 
usually lack of control, obligatoriness, effortlessness, poor memory, unconsciousness, or 
unconditionality (Frensch, 1998; Hasher & Zacks, 1984; Logan, 1988), where obligatoriness 
and effortlessness are probably the key properties (Frensch, 1998). The effortlessness refers 
to the claim that the process does not require ‘mental energy’. The obligatoriness means that 
under certain circumstances the process is always initiated.  
The effortlessness criterion seemed to be easily applied to experimental tests. The 
most obvious empirical way to investigate the effortlessness of a learning process is to test 
whether it is subject to interference in a dual-task manipulation (e.g., Nissen & Bullemer, 
1987). Starting from the origin of the SRT paradigm (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987) this question 
has been repeatedly tested. The studies, which used mostly tone-counting as a secondary task, 
replicated Nissen and Bullemer’s (1997) finding that the dual task interferes with sequence 
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learning (A. Cohen, Ivry, & Keele, 1990; Curran & Keele, 1993; Frensch et al., 1994; 
Frensch & Miner, 1994; Stadler, 1995). Stadler (1995) and Frensch and his colleagues (1994) 
suggested that the tone-counting may interfere with the organisation of sequence knowledge. 
Therefore, performance on the SRT task may be affected even if the learning was implicit. In 
short, the resource attention load in concurrent tasks reduces the capacities of control 
functions in sequence learning (e.g., Shanks et al., 2005). Therefore, it is, again, possibly not 
the most promising methodology to explore effortless implicit learning. 
The other possible consequence of implicitness is that the learning does not require 
attention. This hypothesis was tested from two perspectives in this thesis. In Chapter III it 
was explored whether unconscious learning occurs in an incidental learning design. Based on 
previous studies, which claimed that learning takes place without attentional focus on the 
stimuli (e.g., Lambert, 2003), studies in this chapter tested whether the contingency between 
cues and target locations would lead to implicit learning if the cues are not part of the task 
and are presented peripherally within the visual field.  
In Experiment 2.1 and Experiment 2.2 the participants were not informed about the 
cue-target relationships and, in general, learning did not occur. The only hint of a learning 
effect in Experiment 2.2 could be explained by explicit knowledge. Experiment 2.3 served as 
a control condition where the predictive cues were not presented in the design. In Experiment 
2.4 the participants were encouraged to find and use the cue-target relationships and as a 
result a greater effect of learning was measured, though just in the PDP test. In general, no 
effect of learning was found that would suggest that learning happened without attention. The 
results were again explainable without assuming any unconscious learning processes.  
The results of the experiments in Chapter III provided new support for the models of 
learning that claim that perception is not sufficient for implicit learning to occur, but that the 
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stimuli must be selected by attention (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975). The studies in the subsequent 
Chapter IV approached the question of implicit learning from a new angle. Many empirical 
researchers would agree that selective attention on the stimuli is necessary for learning to 
occur (e.g., Jimenez & Mendez, 1999;  Pacton & Perruchet, 2008). What the ‘learning 
without attention’ description of implicit learning refers to in this case is that learning can 
happen without conscious attention on the association between the stimuli (Pacton & 
Perruchet, 2008).   
Chapter IV discussed some models (e.g., Logan & Etherton, 1994) in which learning 
of the association between the stimuli is an obligatory consequence of the selective 
processing of their co-occurrence. Frensch and Miner (1994), for example, described a 
framework for implicit learning where learning involves all the covariational environmental 
information that is simultaneously active in the short term memory. In this sense, the 
concurrent or consecutive activation of predictably associated information would lead to 
implicit learning. It should be noted that a classic implicit learning interpretation of 
performance on the basic design of the SRT paradigm tacitly relies on this assumption.  
In Chapter IV, a new learning task, SALT, was introduced to separate the effect of 
attention and awareness. This task addresses the question of whether learning occurs when 
selective attention occurs, but awareness of a relationship does not bind the stimuli together. 
Experiment 3.1 and Experiment 3.2 approached the question from different angles. In the first 
experiment the predictive cues were introduced to the participants as parts of an independent 
dual task by which attention was drawn to the predictive cues 500 ms before the appearance 
of the target locations. The second experiment additionally ensured that the representation of 
the cues and associated target locations were concurrently active, thus allowing them to be 
linked together by an automatic process.  
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The level of awareness of the relationship between the stimuli was manipulated in two 
ways. First, the two groups in each experiment differed in whether they received explicit 
information about the hidden associations or not. Second, the Informed group was informed 
about only half of the predictive features, and remained uninformed about the other half. 
Detection rates on the Dual Task confirmed that the participants attended to and processed all 
the relevant features of the stimuli, but the between-groups comparison and the within-
subjects analysis of the behavioural data, along with the post-experimental knowledge tests, 
showed no evidence for learning without contingent explicit information.  
As the main conclusion, these studies do not support the view that learning is an 
obligatory consequence of selective attention. Rather, learning was observed only when 
attention was drawn to the associations between the stimuli, emphasising the central role of 
attention in learning. 
Overall, none of the nine experiments which were dedicated to questions of implicit 
learning in this thesis produced evidence for the existence of more than one kind of learning 
process. Of course, the fact that no support was found for dissociable implicit learning 
processes in these experiments does not exclude the possibility of its existence. Even if 
implicit learning is a real phenomenon, the data suggest, however, that its effects are either 
very weak, or not obligatory in human behaviour. 
The Critique of Unconscious 
If the support is so weak and the methodology is so problematic so far as finding 
evidence for the existence of unconscious learning is concerned, then why do we seem to find 
this dichotomy so intuitively sensible? Almost 50 years ago, Charles Eriksen (1960) 
summarised the research of the time on discrimination and learning without awareness. His 
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“Perhaps our tendency to uncritically accept experiments on unconscious phenomena 
may be due to our firm belief in the existence of the unconscious. [...] There would 
seem to be little doubt that a considerable amount of human behaviour occurs without 
awareness of the behaviour at the time of its occurrence but it is to be noted that this 
does not logically require that behaviour is learned without awareness.” (p. 297).   
Could the support for dissociating learning processes be the result of this type of 
flawed logic? 50 years later, the arguments that suggest this remain convincing. Those who 
argued for dual systems of memory (e.g., Graf & Schacter, 1985; Schacter, 1987), or learning 
(e.g., Dienes & Perner, 1999; Frensch et al., 1998; Willingham et al., 1989) often based their 
argument on the observed dissociation between the measures of the performance on the 
learning task and the tests of awareness. Those participants who do not provide evidence of 
knowledge on the test of awareness, but nevertheless perform above baseline on the learning 
task, have been counted as examples of the implicit phenomenon.  
However, this repeatedly observed pattern of results does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion of different systems being responsible for the dissociation of the measures. 
According to a simpler view of memory (Shanks, 2005; Shanks & Perruchet, 2002), the data 
can be easily explained by a one-system model. This model consists of two assumptions (1) 
the different items in the memory test are associated with one source of knowledge, 
familiarity, which is represented in the model by some variable memory strength f. The 
model also assumes that (2) the different measures access this source with independent errors, 
described by another random variable, e.  
The SRT task with a subsequent recognition test can serve as a good example. In the 
recognition test the participants are presented with (previously learned) old sequences and 
new sequences. As the familiarity of the old sequence increased during the training, f, which 
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is modelled as a random variable, would have on average higher values for the old sequence 
than for the new sequence. However, as for some participants the value of e associated to the 
recognition measures of the new sequence will be (by chance) larger than the value of e of 
the old sequence, this may produce a case where the recognition of the old sequence is at or 
below the level of recognition of the new sequence.  
In the RT measures of the same participants, however, the greater familiarity values of 
the old sequence would provide, on average, a measure of learning since the value of e in the 
two tests are independent (i.e., the specific recognition errors e, which underestimate the 
familiarity of the old sequence, or overestimating that of the new sequence in a particular 
case would, on average, disappear in another test). Hence, this model can account for the 
frequently observed dissociation, in selected individuals, between the two tests without 
implying two sources of knowledge.  
A similar single system model of implicit learning of Destrebecqz and Cleeremans 
(2001, 2003) proposed that during learning the representations become stronger and of better 
quality. When these representations are strong enough to produce behavioural change, but not 
good enough to become clearly conscious, then they give rise to the phenomenon of implicit 
learning. Although the models are similar, only the second supports the idea of implicit 
learning as a truly measurable effect. Interestingly though, neither of these models necessitate 
a role for consciousness in learning (for an argument see Q. Fu et al., 2008).  
In conclusion, the impression of independent sources of knowledge may be an artefact 
of the data. This work started with the statement that the assumption of one system is 
arguably more parsimonious than the assumption of multiple systems. No empirical evidence 
has been found in this work, or in a review of the literature, for unconscious learning. This 
lack of evidence suggests that, until more convincing evidence for dissociating learning or 
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memory systems arrives, single system models are good candidates for explaining the 
behavioural data.  
Does the assumption of unconscious cognition represent too great a surplus in our 
theories about the human mind? May it be disadvantageous to rely on theories of unconscious 
in our daily life? The final study in this thesis suggests that there might be a case for this. In 
the implicit learning literature, the early models of a smart unconscious, which is capable of 
discovering and encoding every covariation or abstract rule in an automatic manner (e.g., D. 
C. Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Lewicki & Hill, 1987) have been later replaced by a more 
association-based passive unconscious (Frensch & Runger, 2003). In the field of decision 
making, however, the idea of a smart unconscious seems to persist. The UTT, which was 
described in detail in Chapter V, provides not just a model of decision making, but gives 
suggestions for everyday decisions. For example, Dijksterhuis (2004) confidently advised the 
reader on how to arrive at complex decisions in life: 
“When faced with complex decisions such as where to work or where to live, do not 
think too much consciously. Instead, after a little conscious information acquisition, 
avoid thinking about it consciously. Take your time and let the unconscious deal with 
it.” (Dijksterhuis, 2004, p. 597) 
In Experiment 4.1 and Experiment 4.2 the original Deliberation without Attention 
design was replicated to test the empirical evidence behind this wisdom. Crucially, the 
conscious status of the decisions was assessed to determine whether there was any evidence 
of unconscious structural knowledge producing conscious judgment knowledge (i.e., 
intuition).  
The findings of these experiments challenged the conclusions of Dijksterhuis (2004) 
in several ways. Firstly, there was no evidence found that the Unconscious Thought condition 
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produces detectable improvement in terms of rating. Secondly, the results suggest that the 
diverted attention paradigm does not produce ‘intuitive’ ratings in the manner claimed. 
Rather, it seems that explicit knowledge is the main modulator of performance in this test, 
regardless of the DWA manipulation. The Number Mean Estimation task, for example, 
showed that with more objectively assessable stimuli, allowing time for the conscious 
thought leads to convincingly better judgments. 
In summary, the role of awareness and attention in human learning and decision 
making was investigated in the 11 experiments in this thesis using a range of techniques. The 
endeavour to obtain evidence for learning or decision making without awareness did not find 
support for such a mechanism, but the investigations still yielded many interesting findings. 
The role of attention in the process of learning was examined from different angles. It is clear 
that conscious attention has a considerable effect on learning, but only when attention is 
drawn to the association and not just on the stimuli. The new test, SALT, is a promising tool 
for investigating this relationship by being able to manipulate the amount of attention on the 
stimuli and on the relationship independently. The Number Mean Estimation task and the Bar 
Length Estimation task were designed to provide an objectively assessable test of decision 
making with and without conscious deliberation. The failure of the DWA paradigm to 
measure intuition does not exclude the possibility that there may be essentially different 
strategies based on intuition in human decision making. Further methodological 
improvements may yield ways in which these strategies become testable in laboratory 
situations.  
Further Thoughts 
Finally, some further thoughts are described addressing the questions of attention and 
awareness in the process of learning, which go beyond the scope of the empirical data of this 
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work and the literature reviewed. To begin with, the lack of evidence of learning without 
instructed attention in the SALT task indicates that no detectable learning happened between 
these stimuli, suggesting that attention on a relationship plays a crucial role in learning that 
relationship. Attention may be needed for learning not just to select the relevant features of 
the belonging stimuli for further processing, but also to link the stimuli together by 
representing their “belongingness”. Although, this might seem to be an ad hoc speculation, a 
substantial amount of empirical findings and theoretical positions are in accord with this 
consideration. 
Firstly, the propositional approach to associative learning (De Houwer, 2009; 
Lovibond, 2003; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Mitchell et al., 2009) claims that even basic 
forms of learning are not achieved through an automatic formation of links, but are instead 
the result of controlled reasoning processes. According to the model, associative learning 
effects depend on the formations of propositions. The associations are only states of affairs, 
while the propositions are statements about the presence and manner of these states of affairs 
(De Houwer, 2009).  
The formation of propositions is assumed to require controlled reasoning processes, 
which are described as effortful and attention-demanding processes resulting in conscious 
and declarative knowledge (Mitchell et al., 2009). It is noteworthy that the model leaves 
room for automatic processes in perception, performance, memory processes (e.g., retrieval), 
and emotional and physiological responses; it is only learning that cannot happen without 
awareness of the relationship (De Houwer, 2009). Although these claims are currently 
debated in the field  (see Mitchell et al., 2009), a recent review of the associative learning 
literature found only a very limited number of previous studies that could challenge a view 
that all human of learning relies upon a unitary mechanism (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002).  
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In summary, the propositional approach of associative learning claims that this type of 
learning, which is arguably more basic than the one studied in implicit learning task, cannot 
happen without the formation of a representation of the association. Discussing the role of 
attention in learning Mitchell and his colleagues predicted “... if reduced attention to the 
target relationship leads to a reduction in learning of that relationship, this would seem to 
suggest that learning is cognitively demanding and, in this sense, not automatic” (Mitchell et 
al., 2009, p. 189). In fact, this is what the SALT studies showed in the present work, that 
reduced attention to the stimulus relationship prevented observable learning. Therefore, it 
seems that there are basic models of learning that are compatible with the assertion that 
learning is a consequence of awareness of the relationship between stimuli.  
The second important empirical observation to be mentioned was described by 
Thorndike (1931). After presenting his participants with a sequence of pairs of words and 
numbers (e.g., bread 29, wall 16) he asked them not just what number came after a given 
word, but he also asked what word came after a given number. While within the pairs he 
found above-chance performance, between the pairs he measured was not better than 
guessing. He called it the effect of belonging.  
“The nature of the instruction, the way in which the pairs were read, [...] led the 
subjects to consider each word as belonging to the number that followed it, and each 
number as belonging to the word that preceded it. In this experiment, the temporal 
contiguity of a number with a word following it, the mere sequence without belonging, 
does nothing to the connection.” (p. 24).  
Later, he continued: “Repetition of a connection is the sense of the mere sequence of 
the two things in time has then very, very little power, perhaps none, as a cause of 
learning. Belonging is necessary.” (pp. 28-29).  
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Although he believed that one exception from this general finding is conditioning, his 
basic assumption seems to be confirmed today after many decades of research on learning. 
Following the philosophy of Thorndike’s ‘principle of belonging’ and the framework 
of the propositional approach, a minimalist description of learning is proposed. Starting from 
the finding that the effect of instructed conscious attention on learning in the SALT task was 
considerable, it is plausible to suggest that less attention on the association would also have 
resulted in observable learning. It is, therefore, not impossible that in situations where 
attention is greatly constrained (e.g., subliminal perception), a reduced level of attention is 
still able to cause observable behaviour change. In this model, attention on the predictive 
relationship of the stimuli (belongingness) ignites the process of learning. This ignition 
happens when attention drawn to an association leads to the development of a representation 
dedicated to this association. Depending on the degree of attention, the representation may 
decay with time resulting in a decrease in the amount of control, to the degree that it affects 
behaviour only at the level of familiarity or habit.  
In this framework, without an initial realisation of ‘belongingness’, learning cannot 
happen. However, once it has ‘ignited’ learning, this representation does not need to remain 
consciously accessible to affect behaviour. For example, this model would predict that cue-
outcome learning would only happen if the stimuli are encoded not just in their physical 
features, but also as related ‘cue’ and ‘outcome’. If the stimuli are not identified as ‘cues’ and 
‘outcomes’, cue-outcome learning would not happen. For the stimuli to become ‘cues’ and 
‘outcomes’ in this case, attention must be drawn to their belongingness. This is not to say that 
once the stimuli are associated through this attentive process, further features of this 
relationship cannot be formed by rules such as described by the models of associative 
learning (e.g., Dickinson, 1980).  
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The proposed model postulates predictions only about the conditions in which 
learning can occur and not about the knowledge it results in. One advantage of this model is 
that it posits more minimalist predictions than the propositional approach. One of the 
hypotheses of the propositional approach, for example, predicts the learners “who 
successfully learn the CS-US contingencies [will] be aware of, and be able to report, those 
contingencies” (Mitchell et al., 2009, p. 188). In other words, it assumes that not just the 
process of learning is conscious, but the resulting knowledge is conscious as well to a 
reportable level.  
The ‘ignition model’ allows for the case that conscious attention only initiates the 
learning, but the resulting knowledge of the association can affect the behaviour without 
further flexible access to this knowledge. Since learning can happen without further 
conscious control, pure experience-based learning can explain suboptimal decision making 
strategies (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978). In fact, the propositional approach was criticised by 
Dickinson (2009), who argues that the explanation of the acquisition of nonrational 
behaviours is problematic in the framework since it assumes conscious reasoning behind all 
learning processes. The ‘realisation’ and representation of belongingness is probably a lesser 
assumption than conscious reasoning.  
In summary, instead of postulating conscious reasoning and resulting declarative 
knowledge as a necessary part of all learning processes, the ignition model only proposes one 
additional precondition for learning. This precondition necessitates that attention is drawn not 
just to the associated features of the stimuli, but also to their belongingness (e.g., the stimuli 
being identified as ‘cues’ and ‘outcomes’). If incidental or limited attention is sufficient to 
generate belongingness, it may also initiate effective learning, which could possibly explain 
many of the findings in implicit learning research.  
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Final Conclusions 
Decades of implicit learning research have passed without resolution of the claim that 
explicit learning may be absent in various implicit learning settings. In this work, an attempt 
was made to find dissociating roles of awareness and attention in human learning and 
decision making. Convincing evidence was not forthcoming for models which necessitate a 
separate system to process unconscious learning or to make decisions. Rather, it was found 
that attention and explicit knowledge were able to account for all observed performance 
changes. There was, similarly, no support found for a ‘smart unconscious’ that deliberates on 
complex decisions in an optimal way. Instead, it was found that the methodology (e.g., 
Dijksterhuis, 2004) does not measure ‘intuition’ in the manner claimed.  
Notwithstanding the vigorous efforts in the field, a review of the literature showed 
that the evidence for unconscious cognition in learning or decision making remains elusive. 
The conclusion must be that, at best, unconscious rule learning plays only negligible role in 
human cognition. Therefore, until more convincing evidence is acquired, it is not 
parsimonious to postulate a separate system for it in our models of human cognition.  
Over the decades, the focus on the role of consciousness in implicit learning research 
presented the researchers with many methodological challenges. Some authors concluded that 
the problem is unsolvable, as Higham and colleagues’ pessimism about the dissociation logic 
exemplifies it: “... because it is so difficult to meet the exclusiveness, information, and 
sensitivity criteria, it is unlikely that skeptics of unconscious processes will be convinced by 
experiments based on this logic.[...] enough problems have become apparent with research 
based on this logic over the years to consider abandoning it altogether.” (Higham, Vokey, & 
Pritchard, 2000, p. 467).  
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Is implicit learning research, therefore, a futile endeavour of cognitive psychology? 
Certainly it is not. Even though the results do not necessitate the existence of dissociating 
learning systems, phenomena whereby learning results in stable knowledge with only weak 
conscious accessibility is an exciting topic of research16. Focusing more on the role of 
attention rather than consciousness could also lead to interesting hypotheses about learning. 
The ignition model aims to find the minimalist preconditions of learning, and the SALT test 
proposes a methodology that can modulate the magnitude and focus of attention in rule 
learning situations. A change in focus from ‘consciousness’ to ‘attention’ in future 
investigations and descriptions such as computational models, may yield considerably more 
advances in research on human learning and decision making. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
16
 For the importance of weak links as stabilisers of complex systems see Csermely (2006). 
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Appendix A 
The Paper Questionnaire Used in the Sequence Learning Study 
 
 
SRT Test Questionnaire  
Age: _____       Sex: Male / Female     
Handedness:    left  -  right           Date: ___ / ___ / 200... 
 
Q1.  
Please, give your main impressions of the task. 
 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Q2. 
To what extent did you feel that the asterisk followed a random or a 
predictable sequence of locations? 
 
The locations moved to by the asterisk were... 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
totally  
random 
mostly 
 random 
half and half mostly  
predictable 
totally  
predictable 
 
 
Q3.  
If you noticed any regularity in the movement of the asterisk, what are you 
able to say about it? When did you first notice this? 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Q4. 
If you noticed any repeated sequences in the task, how many items long were 
those sequences? 
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Appendix B 
The 16 colours used in the Colour-frame Study 
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Appendix C 
The English Translation of the Ethical Consent 
Used for the Experiments in Hungary 
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The Original Hungarian Language Ethical Consent 
Used in the Experimenting in Hungary 
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Appendix D 
The English Translation of the Questionnaire 
Used in the Colour-frame Study 
 
 
Subject number:   Age: _____        Sex: Male / Female          Date: ___ / ___ / 
2008 
 
 
Q1. Please, give your main impressions of the task. 
 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Q2. To what extent did you feel that the colour of the frame predicted the 
location of the asterisk? 
The locations of the asterisk were... 
1 2 3 4 5 
totally  
random 
mostly 
 random 
half and half mostly  
predictable 
totally  
predictable 
 
Q3.  If you noticed any regularity in the relation of the asterisk and the 
colours, what are you able to say about it? When did you first notice this? 
 
 
 
Q3. Are you more risk averse or risk seeker? 
1--------2--------3--------4--------5--------6--------7      
risk averse                                                                        risk seeker 
 
Q4. What would you choose rather ... 
⃞ 10 pounds   
or 
  ⃞ 50% chance of winning 15 
pounds 
⃞ 10 pounds   
or 
  ⃞ 50% chance of winning 20 
pounds 
⃞ 10 pounds   
or 
  ⃞ 50% chance of winning 25 
pounds 
⃞ 10 pounds   
or 
  ⃞ 50% chance of winning 30 
pounds 
⃞ 10 pounds   
or 
  ⃞ 50% chance of winning 35 
pounds 
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The Original Hungarian Language Questionnaire 
Used in the Colour-frame Study 
 
 
 
  
Ksz. szám:   Életkor: _____        Nem: Férfi / Nő          Dátum: 2008 ___ / ___ / 
 
K1. Röviden írd le a kísérletről szerzett benyomásod, gondolataidat. 
 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
K2. Mennyire érezted, hogy a képernyő keretének színe bejósolta a csillag 
helyét? 
A csillag megjelenése... 
1 2 3 4 5 
teljesen 
random 
többnyire 
random 
fele-fele többnyire 
bejósolható 
teljesen 
bejósolható 
 
K3.  Ha tapasztaltál valami rendszerességet a csillag helyét illetően, akkor mit 
tudsz arról mondani? Mikor tűnt fel ez először? 
 
 
 
K4. Magadat inkább kockázat kerülőnek, vagy kockázat keresőnek tartod? 
1--------2--------3--------4--------5--------6--------7  
kockázat kerülő                                                            kockázat kereső 
 
Q5. Mit választanál inkább... 
⃞ 1000 Ft-ot   vagy   ⃞ 50% esélyt, hogy nyerj 1500 Ft-ot 
⃞ 1000 Ft-ot   vagy   ⃞ 50% esélyt, hogy nyerj 2000 Ft-ot 
⃞ 1000 Ft-ot   vagy   ⃞ 50% esélyt, hogy nyerj 2500 Ft-ot 
⃞ 1000 Ft-ot   vagy  ⃞ 50% esélyt, hogy nyerj 3000 Ft-ot 
⃞ 1000 Ft-ot   vagy  ⃞ 50% esélyt, hogy nyerj 3500 Ft-ot 
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Appendix E 
The Ethical Consent Used in Cambridge 
 
 
 
 
Department of Experimental Psychology 
 
 
 
 
VOLUNTEER INFORMATION SHEET  
 
 
Title of Project: Reaction time and selective attention.  
 
Principle Investigator: Balazs Aczel 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the 
following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that 
is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take 
part. Thank you for reading this. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The purpose of the study is to examine some of the cognitive processes involved in attention and 
response selection. We hope the research will help us to develop theories about how people’s attention 
influences the way thy respond. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you decide to participate, you will be asked 
to sign the consent statement at the bottom of this letter, and you will be given a copy of this 
information sheet and consent statement. You will be free to withdraw from the study at any time and 
without giving a reason.  
 
Who can participate?  
Study participation is restricted to individuals over age 18. Also, if you have experienced mental 
health problems in the past (e.g. anxiety or depression), please discuss this with a member of the 
research team.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
The study will involve a single session at the Department of Experimental Psychology (Downing 
Site), lasting about fifty minutes. The tasks will be run on a computer, which will provide clear 
instructions at each point. Any questions will be answered by the experimenter who will be present 
throughout. You will have opportunity to practice all tasks. The task will involve pressing buttons as 
quickly as you can when you detect a target on the screen.  
 
Confidentiality – who will have access to the data? 
All data will be anonymous, identified only by a code number. Personal data (e.g. your name) will not 
be stored on computer, and kept only in a locked file. Only qualified members of the research team 
will have access to the stored computer data. 
 
What will happen to the study results? 
Results will be presented at academic conferences, written up in a PhD thesis and journal articles.  
Results are presented in terms of the average responses of groups of individuals. If any individual 
response data were ever presented, such data would be totally anonymous, without any means of 
identifying the individuals involved. 
 
Will video or audio tapes be used? 
No video or audio tapes will be used in this experiment. 
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Withdrawal  
You may withdraw at any stage without explanation. 
 
Approval 
The project has received ethical approval from the Psychology Research Ethics Committee of the 
University of Cambridge. 
 
You are entirely free to withdraw from the study at any time without having to explain why.  
 
If you have any questions about the study, please contact: 
Mr Balazs Aczel, PhD Candidate, Dept of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, 
Downing St Cambridge, CB2 3EB. Tel: 01223 333576. Email b.aczel@psychol.cam.ac.uk 
 
 
STATEMENT OF CONSENT 
 
Title of Project: Reaction time and selective attention. 
 
 
Subject ID code  ________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Please initial box: 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand this information sheet and I have had the 
opportunity to ask questions. 
   
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time, without giving any reason, without consequence. 
 
3. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________  ___________________   ______________________  
Name of participant  Date  Signature 
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Appendix F 
The English Version of the Questionnaire 
Used in the SALT Study 
 
 Age: _____    Sex: Female / Male     Handedness:   left  -  right     date: 2009 ___ / ___ / 
     
 
Q1. Please, give your main impressions of the task. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q2.  If you noticed any regularity in the appearance of the bigger filled circles 
then what was it and when did you notice it? 
 
 
 
 
 
Q3. Are you more risk averse or risk seeker? 
risk averse   1------2------3------4------5------6------7   risk seeker 
 
Q4. What would you choose rather ... 
⃞ 10 pounds   or   ⃞ 50% chance of winning 15 
pounds 
⃞ 10 pounds   or   ⃞ 50% chance of winning 20 
pounds 
⃞ 10 pounds   or   ⃞ 50% chance of winning 25 
pounds 
⃞ 10 pounds   or   ⃞ 50% chance of winning 30 
pounds 
⃞ 10 pounds   or   ⃞ 50% chance of winning 35 
pounds 
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The Hungarian Version of the Questionnaire 
Used in the SALT Study 
 
 Életkor: _____    Nem: Férfi / Nő     Kezesség:   bal  -  jobb     Dátum: 200.. ___ / ___ / 
     
 
K1. Röviden írd le a kísérletről szerzett benyomásod, gondolataidat! 
 
________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
K2.  Ha tapasztaltál valami rendszerességet a nagy körlapok megjelenésében a 
teszt során, akkor mi volt az és mikor észlelted ezt? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
K3. Magadat inkább kockázat kerülőnek, vagy kockázat keresőnek tartod? 
 
kockázat kerülő 1------2------3------4------5------6------7 kockázat kereső  
 
K4. Mit választanál inkább... 
⃞ 1000 Ft-ot   
vagy 
  ⃞ 50% esélyt, hogy nyerj 1500 Ft-ot 
⃞ 1000 Ft-ot   
vagy 
  ⃞ 50% esélyt, hogy nyerj 2000 Ft-ot 
⃞ 1000 Ft-ot   
vagy 
  ⃞ 50% esélyt, hogy nyerj 2500 Ft-ot 
⃞ 1000 Ft-ot   
vagy 
 ⃞ 50% esélyt, hogy nyerj 3000 Ft-ot 
⃞ 1000 Ft-ot   
vagy 
 ⃞ 50% esélyt, hogy nyerj 3500 Ft-ot 
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Appendix G 
Stimuli Used in the Housemate Rating Test 
Table G1 
English Translation of the Stimuli Used in the Housemate Rating Test 
 
 
Dimensions Positive attributes Negative attributes 
How important it is for you that 
your roommate ...  
Housemate X ... Housemate X ... 
 __ is friendly? __ is very friendly. __ is not too friendly. 
__ has a good sense of humour? __ has a good sense of 
humour. 
__ doesn't have a good 
sense of humour. 
__ is tidy? __ is very tidy. __ isn’t very tidy. 
__ is spontaneous? __ is very spontaneous. __ isn’t very spontaneous. 
__ is punctual? __ is very punctual. __ isn’t very punctual. 
__ has nice friends? __ has nice friends. __ has boring friends. 
__ is a good cook? __ is a good cook. __ isn’t a very good cook. 
__ likes the same music? __ likes the same music as 
you. 
__ likes different music 
than you. 
__ has experience with living in a 
shared house? 
__ has experience with 
living in a shared house. 
__ has no experience with 
living in a shared house. 
__ has a high income? __ has a high income. __ has a low income. 
__ gets good grades? __ gets good grades. __ doesn't get good 
grades. 
__ studies the same topic as 
you? 
__ studies the same topic 
as you. 
__ studies a different 
topic to you. 
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Table G2 
The Original Hungarian Stimuli Used in the Housemate Rating Test 
 
 
 
 
Dimensions Positive attributes Negative attributes 
Milyen fontos Neked, hogy a 
lakótársad ...  
László/István/Zoltán ... László/István/Zoltán ... 
 __ barátságos legyen? __ nagyon barátságos. __ nem túl barátságos. 
__ -nak jó legyen a humora? __ jó a humora. __ nincs jó a humora. 
__ rendszerető legyen? __ nagyon rendszerető. __ nem nagyon 
rendszerető. 
__ spontán legyen? __ nagyon spontán. __ nem nagyon spontán. 
__ pontos legyen? __ nagyon pontos. __ gyakran késik. 
__ jó fej barátai legyenek? __ jó fej barátai vannak. __ unalmasak a barátai. 
__ jól főzzön? __ jól főz. __nem túl jól főz. 
__ hasonló zenéket szeressen? __ hasonló zenéket szeret. __ más zenéket szeret. 
__ -nak legyen gyakorlata az 
együttlakásban? 
__ -nak van gyakorlata az 
együttlakásban. 
__ -nak nincs gyakorlata 
az együttlakásban. 
__ -nak legyen elég pénze? __ mindig van pénze. __ nincs sok pénze. 
__ -nak jók legyenek a jegyei? __ jók a jegyei. __ nem jók a jegyei. 
__ ugyanazt tanulja? __ ugyanazt tanulja. __ más tárgyat tanul. 
 
